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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1.  Have Constructions and the Double Object Construction 
     The aim of this thesis is to examine two have constructions in English and the 
corresponding uses of the double object construction in a simpliﬁed version of Conceptual 
Semantics (Jackendoff (1983, 1990, 2002, 2007), Culicover and Jackendoff (2005), Culicover 
(2009)). 
     Thus far, many different have constructions have been examined by various researchers 
in various theoretical frameworks (e.g. Benveniste (1966), Bach (1967), Costa (1974), 
Brugman (1988), Cowper (1989), Brunson and Cowper (1992), Belvin (1993), Langacker 
(1993, 1995, 2003), Déchaine et al. (1995), Harley (1995, 1997, 1998), Belvin and den 
Dikken (1997), Partee (1997, 1999), Ritter and Rosen (1997), Nakau (1998), Tham (2005, 
2006, 2009)).  The present thesis examines a have construction exempliﬁed in (1a) and 
another have construction exempliﬁed in (1b):   
 
 (1) a.  Mike has a wife. 
  b.  Mikei has a hole in hisi shoe. 
 
Have sentences like (1a) are instances of possessive have (PH), and those like (1b) are 
instances of existential have (EH).   
     Not only verbal, pronounced have but also unpronounced have has been extensively 
studied (e.g. McCawley (1974), Ross (1976), Pinker (1989), Larson et al. (1997), Harley 
(2003, 2004), Marušič and Žaucer (2006), Schwarz (2006), Harves (2008), Harves and Kayne 
(2012)).  For example, intentional transitive verbs like need and want are assumed to contain 
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unpronounced haves in their representations (e.g. McCawley (1974), Ross (1976), Harves 
(2008), Harves and Kayne (2012)).1   
     The double object construction (DOC), as exempliﬁed in (2), is another construction 
that is assumed to contain a have-like element in its representation, whether it be semantic or 
syntactic.2   
 
 (2)   Mike gave Mary a book.   
 
One reason for this claim is that the indirect and direct objects of the DOC seem to exhibit a 
have-like relation.  Taking (2) for example, the giving event initiated by Mike resulted in 
Mary having a book.  Observations of this kind have led several researchers to assume a 
have-like element in the representation of the DOC (e.g. Green (1974), Ross (1976), Pinker 
(1989), Harley (2003)).   
     One comment on a theory of concealed have is in order.  There are roughly two 
approaches to the issue of concealed, unpronounced have.  One is that the verbal have is 
embedded in other constructions.  For example, McCawley (1974) and Ross (1976) assume 
that verbs like want contain the verbal, unpronounced have in their syntactic representations.  
For example, [want NP] selects for a covert [to have NP] complement clause in the syntax.  
The unpronounced have in this case functions exactly in the same way as the pronounced have 
in have constructions.  
     A second approach hypothesizes that seemingly different constructions are both 
                                                   
1  We brieﬂy deal with verbs like need and want in the concluding chapter, chapter 6.   
2  The DOC has also been examined by various researchers in various theoretical frameworks (Green (1974), 
Oehrle (1976), Baker (1988), Larson (1988, 1990), Pinker (1989), Jackendoff (1990), Goldberg (1992, 1995), 
Krifka (1999, 2004), Croft (2003), Harley (2003), Beck and Johnson (2004), Pylkkänen (2008), Rappaport 
Hovav and Levin (2008), Bresnan and Nikitina (2010), Bruening (2010a, b), Ormazabal and Romero (2010, 
2012), to name a few). 
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manifestations of one and the same element.  This approach is taken, for example, by Pinker 
(1989) and Harley (2003).  Pinker (1989) assumes one and the same element in the semantic 
representations of both have constructions and the DOC.  He assumes that the semantic 
representation of English have constructions like (3a) contains only one function, namely the 
function HAVE, as presented in (3b):   
 
 (3) a.  Bob has a car.  
  b.  [State HAVE ([BOB], [CAR])])]  
(Pinker (1989: 190)) 
 
The function HAVE takes two arguments.  The ﬁrst and the second arguments are realized 
as the surface subject and object, respectively.  He also assumes the same function in the 
semantic representation of the DOC.  In (4a) and (4b) are given an example of the DOC and 
its semantic representation, respectively:   
 
 (4) a.  Bob gave Sue a ring. 
  b.  [Event ACT ([BOB], [SUE], [State HAVE ([SUE], [RING])])] 
(Pinker (1989: 211)) 
 
The example in (4a) denotes a situation where the surface subject argument acts on the 
indirect object argument, resulting in the indirect object argument having the direct object 
argument.  This is represented in the representation in (4b).   
     Working in the generative paradigm, Harley (2003) assumes that the verbal have and 
the DOC share the same element.  She assumes the abstract preposition HAVE, namely 
PHAVE and hypothesizes that it is incorporated into the BE verb and produces the verbal have 
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(cf. Benveniste (1966), Freeze (1992), Kayne (1993), Guéron (1995)).  She also assumes the 
same preposition PHAVE in the syntactic representation of the DOC.  The indirect and direct 
objects of the DOC appear in speciﬁer position and the complement of this preposition, 
respectively.   
     I do follow Pinker and Harley in that certain have constructions and the DOC share the 
same element.  Our approach differs from Pinker’s in that we do not assume that just one 
function is responsible for the relation between the subject and object of have, and the relation 
between the indirect and direct objects of the DOC.  Aside from advocating different 
theoretical apparatus, our approach also differs from Harley’s in that we do not assume 
prepositional elements such as PHAVE.   
     The present thesis deals with the following types of the DOC:3 
 
 (5) a.  Providence gave Mary a child.   
  b. % This gave himi several more people at hisi disposal. (The Money Run) 
 
The DOC in (5a) and that in (5b) can be regarded as the DOC counterpart of PH and as the 
DOC counterpart of EH, respectively.  In what follows, I call them PH-DOC and EH-DOC 
for convenience.  This thesis argues that PH and PH-DOC share one and the same semantic 
representation, and that EH and EH-DOC share one and the same semantic representation.   
     This thesis argues that PH, EH, PH-DOC, and EH-DOC semantically encode the 
referential dependency of one element on another.  Observe, for example, the sentences in 
(6):   
 
                                                   
3  Some English native speakers ﬁnd acceptable examples of EH-DOC like (5b), while others do not.  The % 
in front of the sentence in (5b) reﬂects this variability in judgements. 
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 (6) a.  He has a wife. 
  b.  Providence gave him a wife. 
 (7) a.  Hei has a wife of hisi own. 
  b.  Providence gave himi a wife of hisi own.   
 
Sentences (6a) and (6b) are interpreted as denoting situations described by sentences (7a) and 
(7b), respectively.  In the case of (6a), the object is referentially dependent on the subject 
referent; in the case of (6b), the direct object is referentially dependent on the indirect object 
referent.  These relations are more clearly observed in the sentences in (8), where there are 
universal quantiﬁers in the subject and indirect object positions:   
 
 (8) a.  Everyone has a wife. 
  b.  Providence gave everyone a wife.   
 
Each member of the sets denoted by the quantiﬁers in the sentences in (8) has a wife different 
from any other member’s in the same set.  This relation can be represented as in (9):   
 
 (9) a.  x1 has x1’s wife and x2 has x2’s wife and … and xn has xn’s wife. 
  b.  x1 had/got x1’s wife and x2 had/got x2’s wife and … and xn had/got xn’s wife. 
({x1, x2, … , xn} = a set of individuals) 
 
The value of the direct object in (8a) covaries with the value of the subject; the value of the 
direct object in (8b) covaries with the value of the indirect object.  
     This referential dependency of one entity upon another is binding relations in the sense 
of Culicover and Jackendoff (2005).  Culicover and Jackendoff (2005) (C & J (2005)) argue 
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that binding is a semantic relation, stating that “(f)undamentally, binding is a semantic relation, 
ﬁxing one phrase’s reference in terms of another’s,” (C & J (2005: 217)) and arguing that this 
relation is represented over semantic structure.   
     Their framework takes it that semantic structure represents both prototypical binding 
relations such as those exhibited by pronouns and reﬂexives, as exempliﬁed in (10), and those 
relations demonstrated by constructions such as the have constructions and the two uses of the 
DOC. 
 
 (10) a.  Everyone loves his mother. 
  b.  Everyone loves himself. 
 
For example, his in (10a) and himself in (10b) function as bound anaphora.  His in sentence 
(10a) and himself in (10b) are bound by the quantiﬁers in the subject positions.  Sentence 
(10a) denotes a situation where there is a different mother per person; sentence (10b) refers to 
a situation where each member of the set denoted by the quantiﬁer likes himself very much.  
Thus, the references of bound anaphora are determined intra-sententially; bound anaphora is 
referentially dependent on its antecedent, which appears within the same sentence.  Binding 
relations in the sense of Culicover and Jackendoff (2005) encompass the relations exhibited by 
sentences like those in (10) and those demonstrated by the sentences in (8).  In prototypical 
cases such as those in (10), binding relations are represented over both syntactic and semantic 
structures.  In less standard cases, the relations can only be represented over semantic 
structure.  The have constructions in question and the two uses of the DOC encode the 
referential dependency of one element on another, and that dependency is represented only 
over semantic structure.   
     This thesis investigates PH, EH, PH-DOC, and EH-DOC in the framework of a 
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simpliﬁed version of Conceptual Semantics (Jackendoff (1983, 1990, 2002, 2007), Culicover 
and Jackendoff (2005), Culicover (2009)).  This theory can appropriately represent binding 
relations between one element and another.  I show that these constructions contain elements 
that exhibit bound variable-like behaviors like pronouns and reﬂexives, and claim that the 
semantic representations of the constructions encode and give rise to these behaviors.  This 
thesis argues that these constructions cannot be fully understood unless one assumes binding 
relations between one entity and another, and that these relations are best represented over 
semantic structure.4 
     It should be noted here that not all sentences demonstrate the referential dependence of 
one element upon another.  Observe the sentence in (11), with the verb know:  
 
 (11)   Everyone knows a {house / wife}. 
 
The sentence in (11) does not refer to situations where each member of the set denoted by the 
                                                   
4  It has been observed that there are many different anaphoric elements other than pronouns and reﬂexives; 
more speciﬁcally, there are many different elements that have both “descriptive content and pronoun-like 
context-dependence in their meanings” (Partee (1989: 344)).  They are not pronouns or reﬂexives but can be 
quantiﬁed.  Examples are home (Jackendoff et al. (1993)), local (Partee (1989)), someone else (Culicover and 
Jackendoff (1995, 2005)), same, different (Carlson (1987)), and “all nouns that include relational sense” (Barker 
(1995)). 
  One characteristic of these “anaphors” is that they do not correspond with their antecedents formally; 
nevertheless, they can exhibit bound variable-like behaviors.  For example, Jackendoff et al. (1993: 174) 
observe that home can function as a bound variable in cases like (ia); Partee (1989) (cf. Mitchell (1986)) observes 
that a noun modiﬁed by local can be quantiﬁed in cases like (ib): 
 
 (i) a.  Everybody here wants to go home in time for dinner. (Jackendoff et al. (1993: 174)) 
  b.  Every sports fan in the country was at a local bar watching the playoffs.  (cf. Mitchell (1986)) 
 
The value of home in (ia) covaries with the universal quantiﬁer in subject position, that is, different home per 
person.  The same holds true for the noun modiﬁed by local in (ib).  Sentence (ib) refers to a situation where 
each member of the set denoted by the quantiﬁer was at his or her local bar and watched the playoffs.  
  Thus, these “anaphors” can be “bound” by quantiﬁers just as overt anaphors such as pronouns and reﬂexives.  
Home and local in these cases do not depend on an element external to the sentences in which they appear with 
respect to their identiﬁcation; the references of these elements are determined intra-sententially.   
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quantiﬁer knows a house or wife of his or her own.  In fact, English native speakers ﬁnd it 
difﬁcult to understand sentence (11).  These facts indicate that the have constructions and the 
two uses of the DOC encode binding relations between one entity and another.   
     Furthermore, the have constructions and the two uses of the DOC are subject to locality.  
Consider, for example, (12):   
 
 (12) a.  The girli’s fatherj has {*heri / hisj} (own) group of friends.   
  b.  Providence gave Mike’s sister a child.   
 
As illustrated in (12a), a pronoun in the object NP, when it appears, has to be anaphoric to a 
local subject; sentence (12b) describes not a situation in which Mike got a child of his own, 
but a situation where Mike’s sister got a child of her own.  Not all sentences are sensitive to 
this condition.  Observe (13):   
 
 (13)   The girli’s fatherj kicked {heri / hisj / your} house.  
 
One can do the act of kicking equally to his or her own house and to someone else’s house; 
thus, sentence (13) can contain any pronoun in object position.  In our framework, the 
locality conditions demonstrated by the have constructions and the two uses of the DOC also 
follow from the semantic speciﬁcations of the constructions. 
 
1.2.  Organization 
     This thesis is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 outlines our theoretical framework, on 
which the present argument is based.  It outlines basic tenets of Conceptual Semantics and 
introduces theoretical apparatus which will be employed for the explanation of PH, EH, 
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PH-DOC, and EH-DOC.  Two basic tenets of Conceptual Semantics are (i) that it is a 
mentalistic theory, and (ii) that it assumes that meaning is decompositional; the semantic 
representation of a given sentence consists of functions and arguments that they take.  
Arguments bear semantic roles.  This chapter structurally deﬁnes the Experiencer role, a 
semantic role that is taken by the subject of the have constructions and the indirect object of 
the DOC.  This chapter also deﬁnes binding in conceptual semantics terms and proposes 
conceptual structures shared by PH and PH-DOC on the one hand, and EH and EH-DOC on 
the other.   
     Chapter 3 ﬁrst overviews two often-made claims pertaining to the have constructions: 
one is that the subject arguments of PH and EH are (human) locations; in terms of semantic 
roles, they bear only the Location role and do not take any other semantic role.  The other is 
that English have has no semantics at all, and that the interpretation of a given have sentence is 
completely determined by the values of the arguments of have.  Bearing these points in mind, 
I move on to hypothesize the conceptual structures for PH and EH.   
     At the end of this chapter, we overview another often-made claim that the construction 
that we call here PH can be divided into two subclasses, regarding the so-called relationality of 
a noun in object position.  The PH taking a so-called non-relational noun as the surface 
object is said to denote alienable possession, while the PH taking a so-called relational noun as 
the surface object is said to denote inalienable possession.  This claim entails that the two 
PHs differ in the volitionality of the subject arguments: the subject of the PH denoting 
alienable possession refers to a volitional entity, while that of the PH denoting inalienable 
possession refers to a non-volitional entity.  The claim also seems to entail that the subject 
arguments of the two PHs bear two different semantic roles.  Contrary to several previous 
studies, I demonstrate that there is only one PH, and that the subject argument of PH does not 
exhibit any volition, regardless of the relationality of a noun in the object NP.  The semantic 
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role taken by the subject argument of PH does not vary in accordance with the relationality of 
a noun in the object NP.   
     Chapter 4 examines PH and EH.  This chapter answers the questions raised in chapter 
3: the question of whether or not the subject arguments of PH and EH bear only the Location 
role, and the question of whether or not the verbal have lexicalizes certain meanings.  This 
thesis argues that the subject arguments of PH and EH bear not only the Location role but also 
the Experiencer role, and that PH and EH do encode a certain meaning.  We examine cases 
that can be accounted for by assuming that the subject arguments are locations; we also 
investigate cases that can be explained by assuming that the subject arguments are not merely 
locations.  The subject arguments of PH and EH bear the Experiencer role by binding 
another argument.  Both PH and EH encode binding relations between one element and 
another, and these relations are constructional meanings of PH and EH.  I also demonstrate 
that the current theory is more adequate than alternative theories. 
     Chapter 5 investigates PH-DOC and EH-DOC.  I demonstrate that the proposed 
theoretical framework can explain many different phenomena exhibited by PH-DOC and 
EH-DOC.  Our framework also elucidates why the verbs envy and forgive, whose 
occurrence in the DOC has been claimed to be exceptional and/or idiosyncratic, occur in the 
DOC; their occurrence in it is motivated.  I then concentrate on the frequently examined 
question of whether or not the DOC and the corresponding prepositional phrase construction 
(e.g. I gave a book to Mary) encode the same or distinct meanings; I argue that they differ in 
their meaning.  This claim entails that they have different semantic representations.   
     Chapter 6 offers concluding remarks.   
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Chapter 2 
Theoretical Background 
 
2.1.  Introduction   
     Chapter 2 outlines our theoretical framework, on which the present argument is based.  
It outlines basic tenets of Conceptual Semantics and introduces theoretical apparatus which 
will be employed for the explanation of PH, EH, PH-DOC, and EH-DOC.  Two basic tenets 
of Conceptual Semantics are (i) that it is a mentalistic theory, and (ii) that it assumes that 
meaning is decompositional; the semantic representation of a given sentence consists of 
functions and arguments that they take.  Arguments bear semantic roles.  Conceptual 
Semantics is a theory of semantics in which the theory called the Parallel Architecture is 
grounded.  The Parallel Architecture is a linguistic theory developed by Jackendoff (2002, 
2007) and Culicover and Jackendoff (2005).  This chapter ﬁrst overviews the Parallel 
Architecture brieﬂy.  This chapter also structurally deﬁnes the Experiencer role, a semantic 
role that is taken by the subject of the have constructions and the indirect object of the DOC.  
After that, we brieﬂy take a look at the Causer and Agent roles.  The subject argument of the 
DOC takes the Causer role.  This chapter also deﬁnes binding in terms of conceptual 
semantics and proposes semantic structures shared by PH and PH-DOC on the one hand, and 
EH and EH-DOC on the other.  In the framework of Conceptual Semantics, binding 
relations are represented over semantic structure.   
 
2.2.  Conceptual Semantics 
     The Parallel Architecture is a linguistic theory developed by Jackendoff (2002, 2007) 
and Culicover and Jackendoff (2005).  The Parallel Architecture assumes that phonological, 
syntactic, and semantic structures comprise autonomous generative components, and that 
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there are distinctive primitives and principles of combination to each component.  What 
mediates the relation between two levels of structure is a set of interface components.  There 
are interface rules that deal with word-, phrase-, and sentence-sized structures.  These points 
can be summarized as in (1):   
 
 (1)   (Constraint-based generation) The structures of each component are licensed 
by simultaneously applied component-internal constraints.  The 
relationships among structures in different components are licensed by 
interface constraints. (Jackendoff (2009: 650)) 
 
There is no concept of sequenced derivation or logical sequence in the Parallel Architecture.  
     The Parallel Architecture is grounded in a theory of semantics called Conceptual 
Semantics (Jackendoff (1983, 1987, 1990, 2002, 2007, among others)).  There are two basic 
tenets of Conceptual Semantics: (i) that it is a mentalistic theory, and (ii) that it assumes that 
meaning is decompositional; the semantic representation of a given sentence consists of 
functions and arguments that they take, and arguments bear semantic roles.  Semantic 
representation in the theory of Conceptual Semantics is called conceptual structure.   
     Conceptual structure (CS) is a level of mental structure which represents human 
conceptualization of the world.  Functions are combined to build conceptual structures.  In 
addition, the position that an argument occupies in a given conceptual structure determines the 
argument’s semantic role; that is, a semantic role is a structural concept in Conceptual 
Semantics.  Furthermore, semantic roles that arguments bear in conceptual structures 
determine the surface realization of the arguments.  The basic idea is that the relation 
between semantic roles and syntactic positions is not random.  We thus assume a thematic 
hierarchy, a syntactic hierarchy, and the default correspondence rules.  This section also 
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explains s(emantic)-selection, the semantic speciﬁcation of the features of arguments in 
conceptual structure.  We will turn to each of these one by one.1 
 
2.2.1.  Mentalistic Theory 
     Conceptual Semantics is a mentalistic theory, in that it is a theory of the information that 
a language user has in his/her mind; a language user employs this information in order to 
understand utterances.   
     Traditional philosophy of language stresses the objectivity of language, whereas 
Conceptual Semantics is meant to study not “ultimate reality,” but human concepts.  In (2a) 
and (2b) are given traditional philosophical formulation of reference and truth, and mentalistic 
formulation of them, respectively:   
 
 (2) a. Traditional formulation: 
   i. A phrase P refers to an entity E in the world (or in a possible world). 
   ii. A sentence S is true if it meets conditions C1, … , Cn in the world.  
  b. Mentalistic formulation: 
   i. A language user LU understands a phrase P to refer to an entity E in the world 
as LU conceptualizes it. 
   ii. LU judges a sentence S true if S meets conditions C1, … , Cn in the world as 
LU conceptualizes it. 
(Jackendoff (2009: 655)) 
                                                   
1  Jackendoff (1990, 2007) proposes two distinct levels of tier in a conceptual structure: one is called the 
“thematic” tier, which represents the location or movement of a theme; the other is called the “action” or 
“macrorole” tier, which encodes the agent-patient relations in an event.  It is basically the action tier that 
determines the surface realization of arguments.   
  This thesis does not assume two distinct levels of tier in a conceptual structure.  But this does not entail that 
this thesis assumes its invalidity. 
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Conceptual Semantics treats the apparent objectivity of language in the following way: 
language users conceptualize the world more or less similarly; as a consequence, language 
appears to reﬂect the external, objective world.  In Conceptual Semantics, human 
conceptualization of the world is represented in a level of mental structure called conceptual 
structure (CS).  It consists of functions and arguments that they take, and represents 
meanings of words, phrases, and sentences.  Since Conceptual Semantics, in which 
conceptual structure is assumed, is a mentalistic theory, conceptual structure “encodes the 
world as human beings conceptualize it” (Jackendoff (2007: 92)) and does not reﬂect the 
external world directly, either.  As mentioned in the previous section, it is independent from 
syntactic and phonological structures.   
 
2.2.2.  Decompositional Nature of Meaning: Functions and Semantic Roles 
     Conceptual Semantics takes it that meaning is decompositional.  Meanings of verbs, 
phrases, and constructions are decomposed into functions and arguments that they take.  
Functions are combined and build conceptual structures.  Here are some of the functions that 
have been investigated within Conceptual Semantics:  
 
 · Functions that encode spatial location, motion, and orientation.  They all take two 
arguments: a Theme (the object being located or in motion) and a Place or Path: BE 
(Theme, Place), GO (Theme, Path), etc. 
 ·  Functions that encode Locations and Paths relative to a reference object: AT(X), 
IN(X), ON(X), TO(X), FROM(X), TOWARD(X), NEAR(X), etc. 
 · Causative functions that encode a Causer (a Causer or an Agent) being causally 
connected to an Effect (another Event): CAUSE (Causer/Agent, Effect), LET 
(Causer, Effect), HELP (Causer, Effect), ENABLE (Causer, Effect), and others. 
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(Jackendoff (2009: 660), with modiﬁcations) 
 
     Let us present two conceptual structures for intransitive verbs.  For example, sentence 
(3a) has a conceptual structure like the one represented in (3b):   
 
 (3) a.  Max is in Africa. 
  b.  [State BE ([Thing MAX], [Place IN ([Thing AFRICA])])] 
(Jackendoff (1983: 171-172), with modiﬁcations) 
 
The verb is corresponds to the State-function BE.  The subject of the sentence corresponds to 
the ﬁrst argument of BE, and the PP corresponds to the second argument.  The second 
argument comprises the Place-function IN and its complement, which is realized as the 
complement of the preposition.  The complement of IN bears the Location role, and it 
functions as a reference object relative to which the ﬁrst argument of BE is located.   
     Another example is given in (4).  Sentence (4a) has a conceptual structure like the one 
represented in (4b):   
 
 (4) a.  John ran into the room. 
  b.  [Event GO ([Thing JOHN], [Path TO ([Place IN ([Thing ROOM])])])] 
(Jackendoff (1990: 45), with modiﬁcations) 
 
The verb ran corresponds to the Event-function GO, entailing that this is a sentence 
expressing motion.  The subject of the sentence corresponds to the ﬁrst argument of GO, and 
the PP corresponds to the second argument.  The second argument itself decomposes into the 
Path-function TO and its argument, namely Place; the Place argument is in turn composite: the 
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Place-function IN takes a Thing as its argument, which is realized as the complement of the 
preposition.   
     Some conceptual structures for transitive verbs comprise a function and a location- or 
motion-denoting structure embedded under it.  For example, the sentence in (5a) has the 
conceptual structure represented in (5b):   
 
 (5) a.  Harry buttered the bread.   
  b.  [Event CAUSE ([Thing HARRY], [Event GO ([Thing BUTTER], [Path TO ([Place ON 
([Thing BREAD])])])])] 
(Jackendoff (1990: 54), with modiﬁcations) 
 
In this case, a motion-denoting structure is embedded under the function CAUSE.  The 
subject of the sentence corresponds to the ﬁrst argument of CAUSE, and the direct object 
corresponds to the complement of the function ON.  In this case, the verb ﬁlles in the ﬁrst 
argument of GO with information; that is to say, the ﬁrst argument of GO is not connected to 
either the subject or the object of the verb. 
     The arguments of functions bear thematic roles or semantic roles, which is meant to 
capture the compositionality of meaning by treating a situation in terms of the roles played by 
characters appearing in the situation.  In Conceptual Semantics, a semantic role is a structural 
concept, entailing that an argument’s semantic role is determined by the position that it 
occupies in a given conceptual structure.  For example, Theme is the ﬁrst argument of 
functions like BE and GO, that is, functions that encode spatial location, motion, and 
orientation.  Place is the second argument of function BE, and it in turn has as its internal 
structure a location-denoting function and the complement it takes.  The complement of a 
location-denoting function bears the Location role.  Path is the second argument of function 
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GO, and it in turn has as its internal structure the function TO and the complement it takes.  
The complement of TO bears the Goal role. 
     Semantic roles that we are mainly concerned with here are Theme, Location, 
Experiencer, Causer, and Agent.  Theme is “the character whose location, motion, or change 
is being asserted;” Location is the place at which Theme exists.  The Experiencer role is 
given different deﬁnitions by different researchers; in the next section, we deﬁne it.  We then 
move on to a brief discussion on the Causer and Agent roles.  We differentiate these two 
roles: Causer is a character that brings about an event and is not necessarily volitional.  Agent, 
on the other hand, is typically a volitional entity and hence a human being who volitionally 
brings about an event.   
 
2.2.2.1.  Experiencer 
     An Experiencer is an entity that is involved in a situation regardless of the referent’s 
volitionality (cf. Nakau (1991: 340-341, 1994: 322, 1998: 97)).  This thesis proposes that the 
Experiencer role is taken by the ﬁrst argument of the function EXP(ERIENCE), which is 
realized as the subject of have and the indirect object of the DOC.2  Following Nakau (1994), 
I propose the conceptual structure in (6), where the function EXP(ERIENCE) embeds a 
location-denoting structure:   
 
 (6)   [State EXP ([Xi], [State BE ([Y], [Place AT ([ei])])])] (cf. Nakau (1994: 321)) 
 
This structure will be explained in detail later in this section.  I assume that the Experiencer 
role is locative, to which we now turn. 
                                                   
2  Nakau (1994: 323) hints at both the subject of have and the indirect object of the DOC bear the same semantic 
role.   
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     The inherently locative nature of experiencers has been pointed out by many researchers 
(Verma and Mohanan ed. (1990), Arad (1998), Landau (2010), etc.).  Landau (2010), for 
example, observes examples across languages showing it.  For instance, he observes that the 
experiencer can be expressed as the container where the mental state resides, as exempliﬁed in 
(7):   
 
 (7)   There is in me a great admiration for painters. (after Arad (1998: 228)) 
 
Here, the experiencer me is marked by a location-denoting particle.  This option is extremely 
common and productive cross-linguistically.  Landau (2010) presents examples from 
Hebrew ((8)) and Navajo ((9)):   
 
 (8) a.   yeš    be-Gil  eyva  gdola  klapey soxney   bituax. 
    there-is  in-Gil  rancor  great  toward agents-of  insurance 
    ‘Gil has a great rancor toward insurance agents.’ (Landau (2010: 11)) 
  b.  yeš    be-tox  Rina tšuka  amitit  le-omanut. 
    there-is  inside  Rina passion real   to-art 
    ‘Inside Rina there is a real passion for art.’ (Landau (2010: 11)) 
 (9) a.  shil   hóóyéé. 
    with-me, became fear 
    ‘I am terriﬁed.’ 
  b.  shil   yá’ át’ ééh. 
    with me, it  is  good 
    ‘I like it.’ 
(after Jelinek and Willie (1996: (36, 37))) 
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In the above examples, experiencers are marked by location-denoting particles that can be 
translated into in, inside, and with in English.   
     According to Landau, subject experiencer verbs in some languages almost exclusively 
take these kinds of locative forms.  For example, Irish and Scots Gaelic do not employ 
nominative experiencers; they employ instead oblique experiencers, introduced by locative 
particles.  Consider Irish examples in (10) and Scots Gaelic examples in (11):   
 
 (10) a.  Tà  fuath  do Y  ag X. 
    is  hatred  to  Y  at  X 
    ‘X hates Y.’ 
  b.  Tà  eagla  roimh  Y  ar  X. 
    is  fear   before  Y  on X 
    ‘X is afraid of Y.’ 
(after McCloskey and Sells (1988: 181 (76a, 77a))) 
 (11) a.  Is     toil    leam   ﬁlmichean. 
    COP.PRES  pleasure  with-me  ﬁlms 
    ‘I like ﬁlms / ﬁlms are leasing to me.’ 
  b.  Tha    gaol aig Catriona  air Padraig. 
    Be.PRES  love at  Catriona  on Padraig 
    ‘Catriona loves Padraig.’ 
(Landau (2010: 12)) 
 
These morphological markings suggest that (subject) experiencers can be conceived as 
locations.   
     Subject experiencers in English are locative as well, although they are not marked by 
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location-denoting particles.  Landau (2010) notes that Speas (1990) observes the contrasts in 
the following data:   
 
 (12) a.  I got angry but it went away. 
  b. ?? I laughed but it went away. 
 (13) a.  I tried to remember his name, but it wouldn’t come to me.  
  b. ?? I tried to write his name, but it wouldn’t come to me.   
(after Speas (1990: 80-81)) 
 
The experiencer subject in (12a) functions as a location from which a theme moves away, 
unlike the non-experiencer subject in (12b); the experiencer subject in (13a) functions as a 
location toward which a theme moves, unlike the non-experiencer subject in (13b).  
According to Speas, these data indicate that it is strictly syntactic whether or not a given 
language marks experiencer subjects with location-denoting particles.  Conceptually, she 
argues, experiencer subjects are locations.   
     The present thesis assumes that the locative nature of experiencers is guaranteed at the 
level of conceptual structure.  Nakau (1994) proposes that subject experiencer verbs, that is 
certain transitive verbs, have conceptual structures like (14):   
 
 (14)   [State EXP ([Xi], [State BE ([Y], [Place AT ([ei])])])] (= (6)) 
 
The Experiencer role is assigned to the ﬁrst argument of the function EXP(ERIENCE).  The 
function EXP(ERIENCE) appears in structures like (14), where it takes as its second argument 
a location-denoting structure; structure (14) has the structure [Y BE [AT X]] embedded under 
the function EXP(ERIENCE).  The complement of function AT serves as a reference object 
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relative to which the ﬁrst argument of BE is located.  The complement of AT bears the 
Location role.  In this structure, an argument is both the ﬁrst argument of EXP and the 
complement of AT at the same time, which is indicated by the same subscript i; the ﬁrst 
argument of the function EXP simultaneously takes both the Experiencer and Location roles.3  
The complement of AT is empty, which is indicated by e.  The ﬁrst argument of EXP is 
mapped onto the surface subject or the surface indirect object.  The ﬁrst argument of BE 
bears Theme.4 
 
2.2.2.2.  Causer and Agent   
     Let us brieﬂy discuss the Causer and Agent roles.  The discussion here will be of use 
in chapter 5.  They are two distinct semantic roles, and only the Agent role requires its bearer 
to be volitional.   
     The Causer role is taken by an argument denoting a person, thing, or event that makes 
something happen.  A Causer argument need not be a human being or volitional entity.  
Observe the sentences in (15): 
 
                                                   
3  Jackendoff (1990, 2007) hypothesizes the idea that one argument can bear two distinct semantic roles.   
4  The idea that an argument is both the ﬁrst argument of EXP and the complement of AT at the same time is 
essentially the same as the ideas reﬂected in representations proposed by Jackendoff (1983).  Jackendoff (1983: 
192) proposes the conceptual structures for keep, give up/relinquish, and obtain: 
 
 (i) a.  Amy kept the doll. 
  b.  [CAUSE ([AMY], [STAY ([DOLL], [Place AT ([AMY])])])] 
 (ii) a.  Amy gave up/relinquished the doll. 
  b.  [LET ([AMY], [GO ([DOLL], [FROM ([AMY])])])] 
 (iii) a.  Beth obtained the doll. 
  b.  [CAUSE ([BETH], [GO ([DOLL], [TO ([BETH])])])] 
(Jackendoff (1983: 192), with modiﬁcations, bold mine) 
 
In these conceptual structures, one function embeds a location- or motion-denoting structure, where the 
complement of AT, FROM, or TO denotes the same referent as the ﬁrst argument of the function that embeds a 
location- or motion denoting structure. 
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 (15) a.  Unemployment is a major cause of poverty. 
  b.  Drinking and driving is one of the most common causes of trafﬁc accidents. 
 
Both sentences in (15) describe situations where a state of affairs or an event constitutes a 
cause of something.  When a human being constitutes a cause of something, he or she does 
not demonstrate volition in spite of his or her potential to do so.  Consider (16): 
 
 (16)   Mike is a major cause of their separation.   
 
     On the other hand, an Agent is typically a volitional entity and hence a human being 
who volitionally brings about an event.  The present thesis assumes that the subject argument 
of the prepositional phrase construction exempliﬁed in (17) bears the Agent role:   
 
 (17)   Mike gave an apple to Mary.   
 
Sentence (17) describes a situation where the subject argument volitionally gave a physical 
entity to another person.  In cases like these, the subject argument bears the Agent role.   
     The present thesis assumes that there are two different types of CAUSE.  One type of 
it requires its ﬁrst argument to be a Causer, and the other type of it requires its ﬁrst argument to 
be an Agent.  The semantic representation for the DOC contains the former, and that for the 
prepositional phrase construction contains the latter.   
 
2.2.3.  Thematic Hierarchy and Linking Rules 
     Semantic roles that arguments bear in conceptual structures determine the surface 
realization of the arguments.  The basic idea is that the relation between semantic roles and 
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syntactic positions is not random.  We assume a thematic hierarchy in (18a), a syntactic 
hierarchy in (18b), and the default correspondence rules given in (19):   
 
 (18) a.  Thematic hierarchy 
   Causer/Agent > Patient/Experiencer/Undergoer/Beneﬁciary > Theme > other 
(Location/Goal/Source, etc.) 
(cf. Jackendoff (1990: 258), Culicover and Jackendoff (2005: 185)) 
  b.  Syntactic hierarchy 
    [S NP … ] (Subject) > [VP V NP … ] (1st Object) > [VP V … NP …] (2nd 
Object) > [VP V … Oblique]  
(cf. Jackendoff (1990: 258), Culicover (2009: 153))  
 (19)   Linking (Default) 
    Causer/Agent      [S NP … ] 
   Patient …        [VP V NP … ] 
   Theme         [VP V … NP …]  
   other          [VP V … Oblique]  
    (cf. Culicover (2009: 152)) 
 
The hierarchies and the default linking rules concern the correspondences between semantic 
roles and NP arguments on syntactic structure.  The idea is that “the highest available role is 
mapped to the highest available [syntactic position]” (Culicover (2009: 155)).  If there are 
two roles, the higher role is mapped to Subject, and the lower role is mapped to Object.  If 
there is only one role, it is mapped to Subject.  Here are some examples of sentences and the 
semantic roles taken by the arguments:   
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 (20) a.  John opened  the window. 
    Agent     patient 
  b.  John ran. 
    Agent 
(Culicover and Jackendoff (2005: 185), with modiﬁcations) 
  
     Different researchers propose different thematic hierarchies.  In particular, the relative 
ordering of Theme and Goal has been debated actively.  Some argue that Theme is higher 
than Goal on the hierarchy (e.g. Larson (1988), Grimshaw (1990), Hale and Keyser (1993), 
Baker (1996, 1997)), and others argue that Goal is higher than Theme (e.g. Aoun and Li 
(1989), Kaga (2007)).  There is also a third type of approach that assumes the hierarchy of 
Agent > Affected Goal > Theme > Unaffected Goal, in which there are two Goal roles, 
affected and unaffected (e.g. Bresnan and Kanerva (1992), Koizumi (1995)).  The thematic 
hierarchy that we assume in (18a) is a third type one.   
 
2.2.4.  S-selection 
     The speciﬁcation of the features of arguments in CS is called s(emantic)-selection.  For 
example, the agent argument of the verb say is semantically speciﬁed as human and the theme 
argument as linguistic; similarly, the agent argument of the verb think is semantically speciﬁed 
as animate and the theme argument as propositional.  Their rough CS representations appear 
in (21):   
 
 (21) a.  say 
    [SAY (AGENT:X[HUMAN], THEME:Y[LINGUISTIC])] 
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  b.  think 
    [THINK (AGENT:X[ANIMATE], THEME:Y[PROPOSITION])] 
(Culicover (2009: 169)) 
 
     The differential acceptability of the sentences in (22) can be accounted for in terms of 
s-selection.  Consider (22):   
 
 (22) a.  Two days elapsed. (Culicover (2009: 170)) 
  b. * George elapsed. (Culicover (2009: 170)) 
 
The subject of the verb elapse is s-selected as a period of time.  While two days in (22a) 
denotes it, George in (22b) does not, leading to the difference in acceptability.  The 
s-selection of the subject argument is satisﬁed in (22a) and violated in (22b).   
 
2.3.  Binding  
     Here we ﬁrst deﬁne binding in conceptual semantics terms and see its representation 
over conceptual structure.  We follow Culicover and Jackendoff (2005) in that binding is to 
ﬁx the reference of one phrase in relation to the reference of another and is a semantic relation.  
In the framework of Conceptual Semantics, binding relations can be represented over 
conceptual structure alone, entailing that a bindee can be represented in conceptual structure 
alone.  The syntactic counterpart of a bindee may appear in syntactic structure.   
 
2.3.1.  Deﬁnition   
     Culicover and Jackendoff (2005) state that “(f)undamentally, binding is a semantic 
relation, ﬁxing one phrase’s reference in terms of another’s” (Culicover and Jackendoff (2005: 
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217)).  Accordingly, the present study deﬁnes binding as follows:  
 
 (23)   binding: 
    X binds Y if and only if the reference of Y is ﬁxed in terms of the reference of 
X.  
 
In other words, X binds Y iff Y is referentially dependent on X.  The present thesis employs 
the term “reference” as a cover term for “reference” in its strict sense and for “identity.”  That 
is to say, Y depends on X with respect to its identiﬁcation.5  The present study deals with 
sentences in which the binding deﬁned in (23) applies between the subject or indirect object of 
a sentence and an element within the same sentence other than the subject or indirect object.  
I employ the terms binding and to bind in the sense just deﬁned throughout the thesis. 
 
2.3.2.  Relationality of Nouns 
     Let us brieﬂy examine here the relationality of nouns.  What has often been dealt with 
in the discussion on referential dependency is relational nouns, since the reference of a 
relational noun is, by deﬁnition, determined in relation to the reference of another entity.  
Relational nouns are deﬁned as follows:   
 
 (24)   Relational nouns are logically not one-place predicates but correspond to 
predicates with two or more arguments (i.e. to relations). (Löbner (1985: 293)) 
                                                   
5  Culicover and Jackendoff (2005: 217) themselves employ the term “identity.”  Binding relations in the sense 
of them encompass the identiﬁcation of one element with another.  For example, binding also encompasses 
control in their framework.  It is argued that the identity of the try-er in sentence (i) determines the identity of the 
leaver in sentence (i):   
 
 (i)   Pat tried to leave. (Culicover and Jackendoff (2005: 217)) 
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It is sometimes claimed that the relationality of a noun is lexically speciﬁed; there is a clear 
dichotomy between relational and non-relational nouns.6   That is, certain nouns are 
lexicalized as relational nouns and others are lexicalized as non-relational nouns.   
     This thesis assumes that the relationality of a noun is more or less context-dependent, 
and that there are many different contexts that trigger a relational reading of nouns.  For 
example, Vikner and Jensen (2002) argue that prenominal genitive NPs like the girl’s and my 
coerce a shift of the meaning of the following non-relational noun, and make the noun 
relational.  This shift of the meaning is clearly demonstrated in example (25) by Löbner 
(1985):   
 
 (25)   When I enter a furniture shop and ask for “a table” I use table as a sortal noun.  
As such it contains certain conventional characteristics concerning size, shape, 
height, and proportions (among others), that distinguish tables from beds, 
trunks or an orange box.  But if John invites Mary to his sort of improvised 
room, it may well happen that he points to an orange box and tells Mary: 
“This is my table.  Please, take a seat.” (Löbner (1985: 293), bold mine) 
 
Löbner (1985) argues that the noun table in the above example serves as a relational noun; the 
orange box in question contextually plays the role that a table plays.  In the context in (25), 
only sentence (26a) is acceptable, and sentence (26b) is unacceptable.  Observe (26):   
 
 (26) a.  This is my table. 
  b. * This is a table.   
                                                   
6  For how previous studies have dealt with relational nouns or the relationality of nouns, see Löbner (1985), 
Partee (1989, 1997, 1999), Barker (1995), Burton (1995), Partee and Borschev (1998), Vikner and Jensen (2002), 
etc.   
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Sentence (26b) is deﬁning something that is not a table as a table and thus cannot be employed 
in the context in (25).  In this case, it is clear that the possessive determiner my makes the 
noun table relational.   
     Similar cases are observed in the V the body-part particle construction, which requires 
the element following the verb to be a body-part of the subject referent.  Observe (27):   
 
 (27) a.  Johni laughed hisi head off. 
  b.  Maryi laughed heri head off.   
 
In this construction, however, the element following the verb need not strictly be a body-part 
of the subject referent.  Observe (28):   
 
 (28) a.  He has worked his socks off and he’ll get his reward.  
(Iwata (2014: 16), bold mine) 
  b.  “Happy Game,” for instance, has a chorus about celebrating the end of an 
unhappy relationship, a state of affairs that in “Immigrants … ” days would 
have seen the band crying their guitars out at high speed for three minutes or 
so. (Iwata (2014: 18), bold mine) 
 
The nouns socks and guitars in the sentences in (28) contextually function as relational nouns.   
     The data in (29) also support the postulation that the relationality of nouns is more or 
less context-dependent.  It is observed in the data in (29) that a so-called relational noun, 
mother, serves as a non-relational noun.  Observe (29):   
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 (29) a.  a new mother (Partee and Borschev (1998: 237)) 
  b.  I met a lot of new mothers at the supermarket today. 
 
Partee and Borschev (1998: 237) (cf. de Jong (1987: 280)) note that (29a) denotes “a woman 
who has recently given birth to her ﬁrst child,” in which case the noun is not relational.  Thus 
in (29b), the determination of the referents of the object of the verb meet does not depend on 
the subject referent; that is to say, the subject referent does not have a lot of new mothers.  
These data indicate that the relationality of nouns can change in accordance with the contexts 
in which they appear, and that their relationality is hence more or less context-dependent. 
 
2.3.3.  Representation   
     Jackendoff (1987, 1990) and Culicover and Jackendoff (2005) assume that binding 
relations are represented over conceptual structure.  Consider (30):   
 
 (30)   CS:           Xiα binds [α;Y]j  
    corresponds to   |         | 
    Syntax        NPi [NP; anaphor]j 
(Jackendoff (1987: 407, 1990: 65),  
Culicover and Jackendoff (2005: 375)) 
 
A binder binds a variable in CS, which is notated by the Greek letters.  The binder and the 
bound variable in CS correspond to an antecedent and an anaphor in syntax, respectively.   
     The essential point in the framework of Conceptual Semantics is that binding relations 
can be represented in conceptual structure alone, entailing that a bindee is represented in 
conceptual structure alone.  The syntactic counterpart of a bindee may appear in syntactic 
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structure.  For example, the bindee in the sentence in (31) is present only in the conceptual 
structure:   
 
 (31)   Mr. Weissman’s an American.  They do things differently there.  
(Gosford Park, bold mine) 
 
They and there in (31) denote Americans and (in) America, respectively.  If Mr. Weissman 
refers to a Canadian, for example, they and there in the second sentence will refer to 
Canadians and (in) Canada, respectively.  In this case, there exhibits a bound-variable-like 
behavior.  The bindee in this case does not correspond to the binder formally; thus, the 
bindee is present only in conceptual structure.   
     Partee (1989: 353-354) also observes a case where the word there exhibits a 
bound-variable-like behavior.  Observe (32):  
 
 (32)   In all my travels, whenever I have called from any place for a doctor, one has 
arrived there within one hour. (Partee (1989: 353-354), bold mine) 
 
In this case, the value of there covaries with the value of a place from which the subject 
referent calls for a doctor.  
 
2.4.  Conceptual Structures 
     Taking into account the semantic deﬁnition of binding and its representation over 
conceptual structure, the present study proposes the following conceptual structures:  
 
 
31  
 (33) a.  [State EXP ([Xα]i, [State BE ([Y (α)], [Place AT (ei)])])] 
  b.  [State EXP ([Xα], [State BE ([Y], [Place AT ([Z (α)])])])] 
 
Possessive have (PH) and PH-DOC have the conceptual structure in (33a); existential have 
(EH) and EH-DOC have the conceptual structure in (33b).  More speciﬁcally, PH has the 
structure in (33a); PH-DOC has the structure in (33a) embedded under another function.  EH 
has the structure in (33b), which I propose on the basis of the discussion by Nakau (1998).  
EH-DOC has the structure in (33b) embedded under another function. 
     It is speciﬁed as a constructional meaning that the ﬁrst argument of EXP in structure 
(33a) binds the ﬁrst argument of BE, and that the ﬁrst argument of EXP in structure (33b) 
binds the complement of AT.  The structures in question thus differ in the position of the 
bindee.  In terms of s(emantic)-selection discussed in section 2.2.4, these speciﬁcations are 
s-selections imposed on the ﬁrst arguments of EXPs in these structures.   
     An argument containing a bindee and an argument that is empty are different.  There is 
a phonetic form of an argument containing a bindee, whereas there is no phonetic form of an 
empty argument.  For example, the ﬁrst argument of BE in structure (33a), which contains a 
bindee, is represented as Y(α).  Similarly, the complement of AT in structure (33b), which 
contains a bindee, is represented as Z(α).  An argument containing a bindee depends on 
another entity with respect to its identiﬁcation.  On the other hand, an empty argument has no 
phonetic form available whose reference is determined in relation to another entity.  For 
example, the complement of AT in structure (33a) is represented as (e), which does not have 
any representation of arguments such as Y or Z.   
     I assume that the situation denoted by the relation between the ﬁrst argument of EXP 
and its second argument is not spatio-temporally limited when the CS contains the [AT (e)] 
part, where the complement of AT is empty.  In this case, the relation between the ﬁrst 
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argument of EXP and its second argument tends to refer to an atemporal state of affairs.  I 
also assume that the situation denoted by the relation between the ﬁrst argument of EXP and 
its second argument is spatio-temporally limited when the CS contains the [AT ([Z (α)])] part, 
where the complement of AT is not empty.  In this case, the relation between the ﬁrst 
argument of EXP and its second argument tends to refer to a temporary and hence iterative 
situation.  Verbs and constructions having the conceptual structures in (33) belong to a class 
of predicates that have both possessive and spatial uses (cf. Jackendoff (1983: 192)). 
     In the framework of Conceptual Semantics, conceptual structures for related uses of 
predicates or constructions can be uniﬁed into one entry (Jackendoff (1990: 81)).  The CSs in 
(33) are uniﬁed into a single entry, as shown in (34):   
 
 (34)   [State EXP ([Xα]{i}, [State BE ([Y ({α})], [Place AT ([ {Z (α)}]{i})])])] 
 
The curly-bracketed elements are mutually exclusive.  Either the ﬁrst argument of EXP binds 
the ﬁrst argument of BE, or else it binds the complement of AT.  The speaker has this one 
entry stored in his or her mind.  This entry is reserved in English for states of affairs where a 
character is connected to a location-denoting proposition.   
 
2.5.  Semantic Roles 
     I propose subclassiﬁcation of the semantic role Experiencer into Possessor and 
Experiencer2.  When the ﬁrst argument of EXP binds the ﬁrst argument of BE, it bears the 
Possessor role; when it binds the complement of AT, it bears the Experiencer2 role.  The ﬁrst 
argument of EXP in structure in (33a) bears the Possessor role and that in structure in (33b) 
takes the Experiencer2 role.  Look at (35):   
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 (35) a.  [State EXP ([Possessorα]i, [State BE ([Y (α)], [Place AT (ei)])])] 
  b.  [State EXP ([Experiencer2α], [State BE ([Y], [Place AT ([Z (α)])])])] 
 
For purposes of comprehensibility, I use the semantic role labels to identify the ﬁrst argument 
of EXP.  For convenience, I use the term Experiencer1 to designate the superordinate 
semantic role into which fall semantic roles with more speciﬁc characteristics, such as 
Possessor and Experiencer2.7 
 
2.6.  Summary 
     Chapter 2 has outlined our theoretical framework, on which the present argument is 
based.  We have seen basic tenets of Conceptual Semantics and introduced theoretical 
apparatus which will be employed for the explanation of PH, EH, PH-DOC, and EH-DOC.  
Conceptual Semantics is a mentalistic theory, and it assumes that meaning is decompositional, 
assuming functions and arguments that they take.  Arguments in turn bear semantic roles.   
     This chapter has deﬁned the Experiencer role, a semantic role that is taken by the 
subject argument of the have constructions and the indirect object of the two uses of the DOC.  
The Experiencer role is taken by the ﬁrst argument of the function EXP(ERIENCE).  The 
function EXP appears in a structure in which it embeds a location-denoting structure such as 
[Y BE [AT X]].   
     This chapter has also deﬁned binding relations in conceptual semantics terms and 
proposed conceptual structures shared by PH and PH-DOC on the one hand, and EH and 
EH-DOC on the other.   
     The next chapter will overview problems unique to PH and EH.   
                                                   
7  The notion that there is one semantic role into which several semantic roles with explicit characteristics are 
categorized is similar to the notion of macro-role vs. micro-role by Van Valin and Lapolla (1997). 
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Chapter 3 
Semantic Roles of the Subject Arguments of PH and EH  
and Their Conceptual Structures 
 
3.1.  Introduction   
     This chapter ﬁrst overviews two often-made claims concerning have constructions: (i) 
one is that the subject arguments of PH and EH are (human) locations; in terms of semantic 
roles, they bear only the Location role and do not take any other semantic role, and (ii) the 
other is that English have has no semantics at all and the interpretation of a given have 
sentence is completely determined by the values of its arguments.   
     The present thesis argues against these claims.  I argue that the subject arguments of 
PH and EH bear not only the Location role but also the Experiencer role, and that PH and EH 
do encode a certain meaning.  These speciﬁcations are encoded in the conceptual structures 
for PH and EH, which I propose in this chapter.   
     At the end of this chapter, we overview another often-made claim that the construction 
that we call here PH can be divided into two subclasses, regarding the so-called relationality of 
a noun in object position.  The PH taking a so-called non-relational noun as the surface 
object is said to denote alienable possession, while the PH taking a so-called relational noun as 
the surface object is said to denote inalienable possession.  This claim entails that the two 
PHs differ in the volitionality of the subject arguments: the subject of the PH denoting 
alienable possession refers to a volitional entity, whereas that of the PH denoting inalienable 
possession refers to a non-volitional entity.  This claim also seems to entail that the subject 
arguments of the two PHs bear two different semantic roles.  Contrary to this claim, which is 
argued for by several previous studies (e.g. Belvin (1993), Harley (1998)), I demonstrate that 
there is only one PH, and that the subject argument of PH does not exhibit any volition.  The 
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subject argument of PH bears one and the same semantic role regardless of the relationality of 
a noun in the object NP.   
 
3.2.  Two Often-Made Claims   
     Let us overview two often-made claims pertaining to have constructions.  One is that 
the subject arguments of PH and EH are (human) locations, and that they bear only the 
Location role and do not take any other semantic role; the other is that English have has no 
lexical meaning at all, and that the interpretation of a given have sentence is completely 
determined by the values of its arguments.  We turn to each of these claims one by one.   
 
3.2.1.  Hypothesis that Subject Arguments of PH and EH Are Locations 
     The subject arguments of both PH and EH have often been considered to be (animate) 
locations; in terms of semantic roles, they have often been considered to bear only the 
Location role and not to take any other semantic role.  This section overviews this argument.  
We ﬁrst look at the claim pertaining to PH and then move on to the discussion concerning EH.   
     Cross-linguistically, possessors have been claimed to be (animate) locations.  This 
claim is fundamentally based on a claim of the following kind by Benveniste (1966):   
 
 (1)    Avoir n’est rien autre qu’un être+à inversé. (Benveniste (1966: 197)) 
    ‘To have is nothing other than an inverse to be-to’ (Benveniste (1971: 171)) 
 
This claim entails that the subject argument of the predicate have is nothing but the 
complement of the preposition in a location-denoting structure, in which the complement 
refers to a location; the subject of have is thus “the location of a state” (Benveniste (1971: 
171)).  Have looks transitive, but its subject referent does not act on the object referent.  The 
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verb merely denotes a relation between entities.  Benveniste observes that possessive 
relations are often encoded by location-encoding structures and/or morphemes, and claims 
that it is a manifestation of possessive relations being a subclass of locative relations.  The 
following claim made by Lyons (1977: 473-474) explicitly argues that locative relations 
include in them possessive relations.   
 
 (2)    “… the term ‘possessive’, as it is traditionally employed by linguists, is 
somewhat misleading: it suggests that the basic function of the so-called 
possessive constructions that are found in languages is the expression of 
possession or ownership … It can be argued that so-called possessive 
expressions are to be regarded as a subclass of locatives (as they very 
obviously are, in terms of their grammatical structure, in certain languages).” 
 
     Cross-linguistically, locative and possessive sentences tend to employ particles and/or 
predicates that have the same phonetic forms, or locations and possessors can be marked by 
the same particle or case (e.g. Gruber (1965/1976), Benveniste (1966), Lyons (1967), 
Anderson (1971), Costa (1974), Clark (1978), Ostler (1979), Jackendoff (1983, 1987, 1990), 
Pinker (1989), Freeze (1992), Kayne (1993), Guéron (1995), Kageyama (1996), Harley 
(2003), Langacker (2003), Tham (2009)).  Particles denoting spatial proximity are employed 
to mark possessors, and copulas and predicates denoting existence are employed to mark 
possessive relations.  We look at examples from Japanese, Hindi, Finnish, and Scots Gaelic 
one by one.   
     Both locative and possessive sentences in Japanese employ the particles ni and ga, and 
the predicate iru or aru.  For instance, Koen ‘park’ in (3a) denotes a location at which the boy 
exists; thus, it is said that Taro in (3b) can also be regarded as a location at which his sister 
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exists:   
 
 (3) a.   Koen-ni      otokonoko-ga  iru 
    park-postposition  boy-NOM    exist 
    ‘There is a boy in the park.’ 
  b.  Taro-ni   imoto-ga  iru  
    Taro-DAT  sister-NOM  exist 
    ‘Taro has a sister.’ 
 
In this case, the particle ni encodes both location and possessor. 
     In Hindi, the postposition (-ke) paas ‘near’ encodes both spatial proximity and 
possession.  Observe (4):   
 
 (4) a.   raam     baazaar-ke paas    hai  
    Ram-NOM  market-OBL.GEN near  be-PRES 
    ‘Ram is near the market.’ (Tham (2005: 2)) 
  b.  raam-ke paas     ek hii  makaan  hai 
    Ram-OBL.GEN near  one only building  be-PRES 
    ‘Ram has/owns only one building.’ (Mohanan (1994: 179)) 
 
     The Adessive case in Finnish, which encodes a range of spatial conﬁgurations, encodes 
possessors.  Consider (5):   
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 (5) a.  pöydä-llä   on kynä 
    table-ADE   COP pencil 
           [+LOC] 
    ‘There is a pencil on the table.’ 
  b.  Liisa-lla   on  mies 
    Lisa-ADE   COP  man 
           [+ LOC] 
    ‘Lisa has a husband.’ 
(Freeze (1992: 577)) 
 
These sentences employ copulas as predicates.   
     In Scots Gaelic, locative and possessive copular sentences look identical.  Observe 
(6):1 
 
 (6) a.  Tha  a’  mhin   anns a’  phoit. 
    COP  the oatmeal  in   the pot  
    ‘The oatmeal is in the pot.’ 
  b.  Tha  peann  aig Mairi.  
    COP  pen   at  Mary 
    ‘Mary has a pen.’ (lit. ‘A pen is at Mary.’)  
(Freeze (1992: 580-581)) 
                                                   
1  In Scots Gaelic, existential copular sentences look identical to locative and possessive sentences as well.  An 
example of existential copular sentences appears in (i):   
 
 (i)   Tha  mhin  anns  a’  phoit. 
    COP  oatmeal in   the pot 
    ‘There is oatmeal in the pot.’ (lit. ‘Oatmeal is in the pot.’) (Freeze (1992: 581)) 
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These data have been argued to support the claim that possessors are (animate) locations.   
     Let us return to the discussion of PH and EH.  In terms of semantic roles, the subject 
arguments of both PH and EH can be considered to bear the Location role.  In fact, 
Jackendoff (1983) hypothesizes the CS in (7) for a construction that we call PH here, where 
the complement of the function AT is the possessor.  Look at (7):   
 
 (7)   [State BE Poss ([Thing], [Place AT Poss ([Thing])])] (Jackendoff (1983: 192)) 
 
This representation entails that the possessive relation is conceptualized as the possessum 
existing at the possessor, which is a purely localistic view (Gruber (1965/1976)).  He 
postulates that conceptual structures for locative and possessive sentences share the same 
structure and the same functions, and differ only with respect to semantic ﬁelds in which the 
functions apply.  The functions in the structure of locative sentences apply in the semantic 
ﬁeld of Location; those of possessive sentences in the ﬁeld of Possession, which is indicated 
by the subscript Poss in structure (7).   
     Similarly, some studies have claimed that the subject argument of EH is a (human) 
location (e.g. Costa (1974), Jackendoff (1987), Culicover (2009)).  For example, Jackendoff 
(1987: 382-383) observes that the subject of EH in (8a) denotes the same referent as that of the 
complement of the preposition, which bears the semantic role Location.   
 
 (8) a.  The boxi has books in iti. (Jackendoff (1987: 382), with modiﬁcations) 
  b.  There are books in the box. (Jackendoff (1987: 382)) 
 
From this observation, he concludes that the subject argument of EH also bears only the 
Location role.  In addition, he considers sentences like (8a) to be apparently synonymous 
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with there constructions such as (8b).  The entity occurring in the subject position of EH 
appears as the complement of the preposition in the there construction, which takes the 
Location role.  This fact further supports the assumption that the subject of EH bears the 
Location role. 
     Thus, these morphological and/or structural markings seem to indicate that the subject 
arguments of both PH and EH are (animate) locations.  Now the present thesis pursues the 
following question:  
 
 (9)   Are the subjects of PH and EH (human) locations?  In terms of semantic 
roles, do they bear the semantic role Location and Location alone?   
 
Some studies have argued that the semantic roles taken by the arguments of the have 
constructions in question and the locative sentences in English are fundamentally the same 
(e.g. Jackendoff (1987)); others have claimed that the have constructions in English differ 
from the locative sentences with respect to the semantic roles taken by their arguments (e.g. 
Pinker (1989)).  However, there is little agreement as to the semantic role or roles that the 
subject arguments of PH and EH bear.   
     I do argue that the subject arguments of both PH and EH bear the Location role.  I also 
argue that the subject arguments in question bear simultaneously not only the Location role 
but also the Experiencer role.  As we saw in section 2.1, a semantic role is a structural 
concept, entailing that an argument’s semantic role is determined by the position that it 
occupies in a given conceptual structure.  Thus, I assume that the conceptual structures for 
PH and EH specify that the subject arguments of PH and EH bear two semantic roles 
simultaneously. 
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3.2.2.  (Semantic) Underspeciﬁcation  
     It has been noted that English have is semantically underspeciﬁed (e.g. Belvin (1993), 
Harley (1997), and Ritter and Rosen (1997)).  Some even argue that English have has no 
lexical semantics at all, and that the interpretation of a given have sentence is completely a 
by-product of values of its arguments.  For example, Bach (1967), dealing with both be and 
have, states the following:   
 
 (10)   It has often been said that be has no meaning by itself but only in connection 
with Predicate, the passive construction, and so on.  The same is true of 
HAVE.  The two forms are distinguished syntactically from most true verbs 
by the fact that they have no selectional restrictions in themselves, but occur 
in constructions where selections reach across from subject to ‘object’ or 
complement.  Likewise, from a semantic point of view, their contribution to 
the meaning of the sentence is determined completely by the items that they 
link. (Bach (1967: 476-477)) 
 
Bach continues to note that the sentence I have a house expresses ownership.  When a person 
and a house are linked by the verb have, he notes, they create the interpretation of the person 
owning the house.  A similar claim is made by Cowper (1989).  Cowper (1989: 89) notes, 
in the discussion on sentence (11), that “in the absence of any particular knowledge about 
Michael and his relationship to cars, we interpret [(11)] as involving simple possession.” 
 
 (11)   Michael has a car.   
 
     Now a couple of simple questions arise: why is it that the sentence given by Bach and 
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sentence (11) should exhibit such interpretations if have has no meaning at all; why is it that 
the simple juxtaposition of two nouns results in denoting ownership or simple possession?  If 
have had no lexical semantics, sentences like (11) could in principle mean anything (cf. 
Brugman (1988: 47)), but in fact it does not and cannot.   
     Not only PH but also EH is constrained as well.  The PP in EH cannot contain a 
pronoun referring to an entity other than the subject referent (Nakau (1991: 337)), as illustrated 
in (12a): 
 
 (12) a.  The deski has a book on {iti / *them}. 
  b.  I put a book on {my / his} desk.   
 
On the other hand, sentence (12b), with the verb put, does not exhibit such a constraint.  
Furthermore, sentence (13) cannot successfully instantiate EH.   
 
 (13)  * The tablei has a pencil on a book on iti. (Belvin and den Dikken (1997: 168)) 
 
One might suppose that the subject in (13) cannot syntactically bind an anaphor because it is 
too deeply embedded in the PP.  However, this claim is argued against by the data in (14) 
observed by Belvin and den Dikken (1997), in which the binder can syntactically bind the 
anaphor that is deeply embedded in the PP.  Consider (14):   
 
 (14) a.  Everyonei should concentrate on the pencil on the book on hisi table. 
  b.  Everyonei hates it when there is a spider crawling around on the hat on hisi 
head. 
(Belvin and den Dikken (1997: 168)) 
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It follows from these facts that EH is (semantically) constrained.   
     Here, another question arises: why is there such a constraint in EH?  If have had no 
meaning at all, sentence (12a) could in principle contain any pronoun in the PP, but in fact it 
cannot.   
     This thesis argues that these interpretation and constraint stem from the semantic 
encoding of PH and EH; the semantic speciﬁcations of PH and EH give birth to the 
interpretation and the constraint presented above.  PH speciﬁes that the surface object is 
referentially dependent on the surface subject.  Thus, when the object denotes a car or house 
and the subject denotes a human being, for example, the car or house is considered to be the 
human being’s car or house.  This interpretation is that of ownership or simple possession as 
noted by Cowper (1989).  EH, on the other hand, speciﬁes that the complement of the 
preposition is referentially dependent on the surface subject; the constraint found in (12a) 
follows from this encoding.  These speciﬁcations are represented at the level of conceptual 
structure.  Brugman (1988: 51) notes that “having either a general or an abstract meaning is 
not the same as having no meaning,” and we follow her in this respect. 
     It should be emphasized here that de Jong (1987: 280), dealing with have sentences 
with relational nouns in object position such as I have brothers, points out that it is have that 
triggers the relational reading of nouns, not relational nouns themselves.  This thesis extends 
this idea to cases where there are so-called non-relational nouns in object position.   
 
3.3.  Conceptual Structures for PH and EH 
     The CSs for PH and EH are represented as in (15a, b), respectively:   
 
 (15) a.  [State EXP ([Xα]i, [State BE ([Y (α)], [Place AT (ei)])])] 
  b.  [State EXP ([Xα], [State BE ([Y], [Place AT ([Z (α)])])])] 
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In the representations in (15a, b), binding relations are expressed by the Greek letters.  For a 
better understanding, we present examples of PH and EH in (16a) and (17a), and their CS 
representations in (16b) and (17b), respectively:   
 
 (16) a.  John has a wife. 
  b.  [EXP ([JOHNα]i, [BE ([WIFE (α)], [AT (ei)])])] 
 (17) a.  You have a hole in your shoe.  
  b.  [EXP ([YOUα], [BE ([HOLE], [AT ([SHOE (α)])])])] 
 
For ease of reference, the subscripts State and Place are omitted in the (b) representations.  
PH and EH differ with respect to the position of the bindee in the second argument of EXP: 
the ﬁrst argument of EXP in PH, which is mapped onto the surface subject, binds the ﬁrst 
argument of BE, which is mapped onto the surface object.  On the other hand, the ﬁrst 
argument of EXP in EH binds the complement of the function AT, which is mapped onto the 
complement of the preposition.  These are s(emantic)-selections imposed on the ﬁrst 
arguments of EXPs in these structures.  The ﬁrst argument of EXP in PH bears the Possessor 
role, while that in EH bears the Experiencer2 role.  In both PH and EH, the factor ensuring 
that the ﬁrst argument of EXP is connected to the situation denoted by the structure [Y BE 
[AT X]] is the binding relation in the sense of the present theory.2   
                                                   
2  It has also been noted that English have is thematically underspeciﬁed and does not assign a thematic role to 
its subject, and that the subject gets its interpretation by being related to some other constituent in the same 
sentence (Belvin (1993), Harley (1997), Ritter and Rosen (1997)).  For example, Harley (1997: 77), taking 
sentences like (i) for example, notes that “the ‘location’ interpretation for the subject of have is impossible 
without coreference with an embedded pronoun.” 
 
 (i)   The tablei has a book on itsi table.   
 
The present thesis adopts the idea that the subject argument of have gets its interpretation or semantic role by 
being related to some other element in the same sentence.  Possessor is a semantic role taken by an argument 
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     EH has the structure in (15b), which I propose on the basis of the discussion by Nakau 
(1998).  Nakau (1998) argues that EH is an Experiencer construction.  Nakau (1998: 101) 
claims that the subject argument of EH bears the Experiencer role by establishing a connection 
with the situation denoted by the elements following have.  The present thesis argues that the 
connection is established by the ﬁrst argument of EXP binding the complement of AT.  
Furthermore, this thesis argues that not only EH but also PH is an Experiencer construction.3   
     Note that in constructions like EH, in which the argument bearing Experiencer2 and the 
argument bearing Location are realized as different linguistic elements, it is binding that 
guarantees the subject argument bearing both Experiencer2 and Location.  That is, the bindee 
is an element within the complement which takes the semantic role Location.  The bindee 
refers back to the binder, and it ensures that the ﬁrst argument of EXP bears not only the 
Experiencer role but also the Location role (cf. Nakau (1998: 88)).   
     I assume that the situation denoted by the relation between the ﬁrst argument of EXP 
and its second argument is not spatio-temporally limited when the CS contains the [AT (e)] 
part, where the complement of AT is empty.  In this case, the relation between the ﬁrst 
argument of EXP and its second argument tends to refer to an atemporal state of affairs.  
                                                                                                                                                               
that binds the ﬁrst argument of BE; Experiencer2 is a semantic role taken by an argument that binds the 
complement of AT.   
3  Belvin (1993), Harley (1997), and Ritter and Rosen (1997) argue that EH is analogous to the experiencer have 
construction exempliﬁed in (i): 
 
 (i)   Shei had [heri camera conﬁscated by the police]. (Washio (1997: 51)) 
 
In this construction, the subject referent is thought of as affected by the event denoted by the elements following 
have.  For convenience, I call the elements following have (i.e. those bracketed in (i)) complements to have.  
The claim made by Belvin, Harley, and Ritter and Rosen is based on the observation that the experiencer have 
construction requires an element referring back to the subject in its complement.  In the case of (i), it is her in the 
complement.  Nakau (1991, 1998), making similar observations, also argues for this claim.   
  In addition, the relation of identity between the subject and the complement of the experiencer have 
construction is also claimed to be a semantic relation (Nakau (1991, 1998), Belvin (1993), Belvin and den 
Dikken (1997), Washio (1997), and Takeuchi (2013c)).   
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Therefore, PH tends to refer to a state of affairs that holds over a relatively long period of time.  
I also assume that the situation denoted by the relation between the ﬁrst argument of EXP and 
its second argument is spatio-temporally limited when the CS contains the [AT ([Z (α)])] part, 
where the complement of AT is not empty.  In this case, the relation between the ﬁrst 
argument of EXP and its second argument tends to refer to a temporary and hence iterative 
situation.  Therefore, EH tends to refer to a temporary and hence iterative situation.   
     The CSs for PH and EH are uniﬁed into a single entry, as shown in (18):  
 
 (18)   [State EXP ([Xα]{i}, [State BE ([Y ({α})], [Place AT ([ {Z (α)} ]{i})])])] 
 
The curly-bracketed elements are mutually exclusive.  Either the ﬁrst argument of EXP binds 
the ﬁrst argument of BE, or else it binds the complement of AT.  The speaker has this one 
entry stored in his or her mind.   
 
3.3.1.  PH   
     PH exhibits a binding relation between the ﬁrst argument of EXP, which is mapped 
onto the surface subject, and the ﬁrst argument of BE, which is mapped onto the surface object.  
In other words, the reference of the ﬁrst argument of BE is ﬁxed in relation to the ﬁrst 
argument of EXP.  For example, the sentences in (19), where there are universal quantiﬁers 
in the subject positions, exhibit binding relations between the subjects and objects.  Consider 
(19):   
 
 (19) a.  Everyone has a house.  
  b.  Everyone has a wife.   
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That is to say, each member of the set denoted by the quantiﬁer has a house or wife different 
from any other member’s in the same set; the values of the direct objects covary with the 
values of the subjects.  This relation can be represented as follows: 
 
 (20)   x1 has x1’s house or wife and x2 has x2’s house or wife and … and xn has xn’s 
house or wife. ({x1, x2, … , xn} = a set of individuals) 
 
     Furthermore, the sentences in (21) imply the meaning expressed in (22), not the 
meaning expressed in (23), where the asterisks indicate that the sentences in question do not 
express the meaning conveyed by the sentences in (21):   
 
 (21) a.  John has a house in a New York suburb. 
  b.  I have a sister in Northern Ireland. 
 (22) a.  John’s house is in a New York suburb. 
  b.  My sister is in Northern Ireland. 
 (23) a. * There is a house in a New York suburb. 
  b. * There is a sister in Northern Ireland. 
 
This fact indicates that the identity of the (surface) object referent is determined in relation to 
the subject referent.  Thus, these data support the existence of a binding relation in PH, as 
represented in (15a).4 
     Note that the binding relation in the sense of this thesis is not observed in sentences with 
verbs like know.  Observe (24):  
 
                                                   
4  This diagnostics is proposed by Takeuchi (2011).   
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 (24)   Everyone knows a {house / wife}. 
 
The sentence in (24) does not refer to situations where each member of the set denoted by the 
quantiﬁer knows a house or wife of his or her own.  In fact, English native speakers ﬁnd it 
difﬁcult to interpret sentence (24).  These facts indicate that PH is associated with binding 
relations between one entity and another.5   
     One advantage of hypothesizing (15a) as CS for PH is that it enables us to account for 
the fact that PH exhibits the deﬁniteness restriction, a restriction against deﬁnite NPs in the 
object position of PH (Costa (1974), Heine (1997), Harley (2004), Tham (2006), among 
others).  Observe (25):  
 
 (25) a.  Judy has {a / *the} car. (Heine (1997: 35), asterisk added by the author) 
  b.  John has {a / *the} sister. (cf. Tham (2006: 137)) 
 
The deﬁnite articles in the object NPs of the sentences in (25) hinder the referents of the NPs 
from being ﬁxed in relation to the subject referents, since the deﬁnite articles in this particular 
position cannot be anaphoric to the subject referents (cf. Guéron (2003: 212-213)).6, 7 
     This restriction is also observed in sentences with body-part nouns in the object position.  
Consider (26): 
                                                   
5  Working in the generative paradigm, Ritter and Rosen (1997: 309-315) postulate a null pronominal in the 
object NP of PH that refers back to the subject, regardless of the relational status of the noun in the NP.  
Although their assumption is a syntactic one, it seems to be motivated by semantics and/or pragmatics, especially 
when they deal with cases where there is a so-called non-relational noun in the object NP.  Morita (2003) makes 
a similar suggestion.  For a discussion against Morita, see Takeuchi (2013b).  In addition, Harley (1998) 
admits a syntactic binding relation in instances of PH with a relational noun in the object NP.   
6  Harley (2004: 259) notes that Jacqueline Guéron (p.c.) observes the deﬁniteness restriction demonstrated by 
the construction that we call here PH.   
7  The sentences Judy has the car and John has the wife are acceptable as instances of EH.  See the discussion 
in section 3.4.   
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 (26) a.  John raised {a / *the} hand. (Guéron (2003: 192), with modiﬁcations) 
  b.  Philip stubbed {a / *the} toe. 
  c.  The poor boy lost {a / *the} mind. (Helke (1973: 10), with modiﬁcations) 
 
The body-part nouns in the sentences in (26) are referentially dependent on the subject 
referents; therefore, the facts given in (26) support the claim that PH exhibits a binding relation 
between the subject and object.  The use of the deﬁnite article in the object position of the 
sentences in (26) is permitted only when the noun phrase in which it appears denotes a 
body-part of someone other than the subject referent. 
     This restriction is not observed in sentences which are not expected to demonstrate 
binding relations between the subject and object.  Observe (27):   
 
 (27) a.  John owns {a / the} house.  
  b.  Philip saw {a / the} car. 
  c.  The poor boy broke {a / the} chair.   
 
What matters here is the lexical meanings of verbs appearing in these sentences, namely own, 
see, and break.  The subject of the act of owning and something owned can exist 
independently of each other; in other words, the reference of an object owned need not be 
determined in relation to the reference of a person who owns it.  Similarly, the subject of the 
act of seeing and something seen can exist independently of each other; the reference of an 
object that is seen need not be determined in relation to the reference of an person who sees it.  
In a similar vein, the subject of the act of breaking and something broken can exist 
independently of each other; the reference of a thing broken need not be determined in relation 
to the reference of a person who breaks it.   
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     The present framework also enables us to account for the restriction of occurrence of a 
pronoun in the object NP of PH.  PH has the following restrictions: (i) a pronoun in the 
object NP, when it appears, must refer back to the subject referent; (ii) a coordinate constituent 
as a whole functions as an antecedent for a pronoun in the object NP; and (iii) a pronoun in the 
object NP must be anaphoric to a local subject.  These restrictions are also observed in the 
body-part constructions, supporting the claim that PH exhibits a binding relation between the 
subject and object.  Let us examine these cases one by one.   
     When it appears, a pronoun in the object NP in PH and in the body-part constructions 
must refer back to the subject referent.  Observe (28) and (29):   
 
 (28)   Hei has {hisi / *her / *their} (own) house. 
 (29) a.  Hei raised {hisi / *her / *their} hand. 
  b.  The poor boyi lost {hisi / *her / *their} mind. 
((a), Guéron (2003: 192), with modiﬁcations, 
(b), Helke (1973: 10), with modiﬁcations)  
 
The pronouns her and their in the object NPs of the sentences in (28) and (29) hinder the 
referents of the NPs from being determined in relation to the subject referents, since they refer 
to entities distinct from the subject referents. 
     This restriction is not demonstrated by sentences which are not expected to exhibit 
binding relations.  Observe (30): 
 
 (30) a.  Hei owns {hisi / her / their} house. 
  b.  Hei saw {hisi / her / their} car. 
  c.  Hei broke {hisi / her / their} chair.  
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One can own, see, and break entities that belong to someone else; thus, pronouns referring to 
entities distinct from the subject referents can freely occur in the object NPs of the sentences in 
(30).   
     Furthermore, in PH and in the body-part constructions, a coordinate constituent as a 
whole functions as an antecedent.  Consider (31) and (32), where the subscript k is intended 
to mean the girl and the boy:   
 
 (31)   The girli and the boyj, k have {*heri / *hisj / theirk} (own) {car(s)/weaknesses}. 
 (32) a.  The girli and the boyj, k raised {*heri / *hisj / theirk} hand. 
  b.  The girli and the boyj, k lost {*heri / *hisj / theirk} mind. 
(Helke (1973: 11), with slight modiﬁcations) 
 
In the sentences in (31) and (32), the constituent coordinated by and as a whole functions as an 
antecedent for the pronoun in the object NP.   
     This restriction is not demonstrated by sentences which are not expected to exhibit 
binding relations, either.  Observe (33), where the subscript k is intended to mean the girl and 
the boy: 
 
 (33) a.  The girli and the boyj, k own {heri / hisj / theirk} car(s). 
  b.  The girli and the boyj, k saw {heri / hisj / theirk} car(s). 
  c.  The girli and the boyj, k broke {heri / hisj / theirk} chair(s). 
 
The reasoning applied to the sentences in (30) applies to the sentences in (33).   
     Furthermore, pronouns in the object NP have to be anaphoric to a local subject.  
Consider (34) and (35):   
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 (34)   The girli’s fatherj has {*heri / hisj} (own) {car / group of friends}.  
 (35) a.  The girli’s fatherj raised {*heri / hisj} hand. 
  b.  The girli’s fatherj lost {*heri / hisj} mind.  
(Helke (1973: 11), with slight modiﬁcations) 
 
In these cases, girl cannot be an antecedent for pronouns in the object NP.   
     This restriction is not demonstrated by sentences which are not expected to exhibit 
binding relations, either.  Observe (36): 
 
 (36) a.  The girli’s fatherj owns {heri / hisj} house. 
  b.  The girli’s fatherj saw {heri / hisj} car. 
  c.  The girli’s fatherj broke {heri / hisj} chair.  
 
The restrictions observed in (25), (28), (31), and (34) all follow from the semantic encoding of 
PH: the surface object in PH is speciﬁed to be referentially dependent on the surface subject.   
     A prototypical example of a binding relation between the surface subject and object will 
be a sentence whose direct object is a reﬂexive pronoun.  Given that PH exhibits a binding 
relation between the subject and object, it is expected that PH behaves in the same way as 
sentences where there is a reﬂexive pronoun in object position.  This expectation is borne out 
by the data in (37):  
 
 (37) a.  The girl’s father washes {*herself / himself}. 
  b.  The girl and the boy wash {*herself / *himself / themselves}. 
 
As illustrated in (37a), a reﬂexive pronoun in object position must be anaphoric to a local 
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subject; as illustrated in (37b), a coordinate constituent as a whole functions as an antecedent 
for a reﬂexive pronoun.   
 
3.3.2.  EH 
     EH exhibits a binding relation between the ﬁrst argument of EXP, which is mapped 
onto the surface subject, and the complement of AT, which is mapped onto the complement of 
the preposition.  In other words, the reference of the complement of AT is ﬁxed in relation to 
the reference of the ﬁrst argument of EXP.  This relation is clearly observed in the sentences 
in (38), where there are universal quantiﬁers in the subject positions:   
 
 (38) a.  Everyonei has your name on hisi hat. 
  b.  Everyonei has Colin Powell at hisi disposal.   
 
Each member of the set denoted by the quantiﬁer in (38a) has someone else’s name on his hat; 
the value of the complement of the preposition covaries with the value of the subject.  This 
relation can be represented as follows: 
 
 (39)   x1 has your name on x1’s hat and x2 has your name on x2’s hat … and xn has 
your name on xn’s hat. ({x1, x2, … , xn} = a set of individuals) 
 
Sentence (38b) denotes a situation where each member of the set named by the quantiﬁer has 
Colin Powell at his own disposal. 
     Furthermore, the reference of the (surface) object in EH is ﬁxed independently of the 
reference of the subject, indicating that it is not relational and is not bound to the subject 
referent.  Observe (40)-(42), where the asterisks in (41) indicate that the sentences do not 
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express the meaning conveyed by the sentences in (40): 
 
 (40) a.  Johni has a hole in hisi shoe. 
  b.  The tablei has a book on iti. 
 (41) a. * Johni’s hole is in hisi shoe. 
  b. * The tablei’s book is on iti. 
 (42) a.  There is a hole in John’s shoe. 
  b.  There is a book on the table.  
 
The instances of EH in (40) do not imply the meaning expressed in (41), but the meaning 
expressed in (42).  These data indicate that PH and EH differ in the position of the bindee: 
PH has a bindee in the object NP, while EH has one in the complement of the preposition.   
     The present framework also enables us to account for the restriction of occurrence of a 
pronoun in the PP of EH.  In EH, (i) a pronoun in the PP, when it appears, must refer back to 
the subject referent; (ii) a coordinate constituent as a whole functions as an antecedent for a 
pronoun in the PP; and (iii) a pronoun in the PP must be anaphoric to a local subject.  Let us 
examine these cases one by one.   
     A pronoun in the PP, when it appears, must refer back to the subject (Nakau (1991: 
337)).  Consider (43):   
 
 (43)   Hei has a hole in {hisi / *her} shoe. (cf. (12a)) 
 
This restriction is not found in sentences which are not expected to exhibit binding relations: 
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 (44) a.  Hei put a book on {hisi / her / their} desk.   
  b.  Hei hid a book under {hisi / her / their} bed.  
 
What matters here is the lexical meanings of verbs appearing in these sentences, namely put 
and hide.  The subject of the act of putting and the place on which something is put can exist 
independently of each other; in other words, the reference of a place where something is put 
need not be determined in relation to the reference of a person who puts it there.  Similarly, 
the subject of the act of hiding and the place where something is hidden can exist 
independently of each other; in other words, the reference of a place where something is 
hidden need not be determined in relation to the reference of a person who hides it there.   
     Furthermore, a coordinate constituent as a whole functions as an antecedent for a 
pronoun in the PP.  Observe (45), where the subscript k is intended to mean a coordinate 
constituent as a whole:   
 
 (45) a.  The boyi and the girlj, k have holes in {*hisi / *herj / theirk} shoes.   
  b.  This deski and that onej, k have holes in {*itsi, j / theirk} legs.   
 
This restriction is not found in sentences which are not expected to exhibit binding relations.   
Observe (46), where the subscript k is intended to mean a coordinate constituent as a whole: 
 
 (46) a.  The boyi and the girlj, k put books on {hisi / herj / theirk} desk(s).   
  b.  The boyi and the girlj, k hid books under {hisi / herj / theirk} bed(s).   
 
     Furthermore, a pronoun in the PP must be anaphoric to a local subject; that is, EH is 
also subject to locality considerations.  Consider (47):   
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 (47) a.  Johni’s motherj has a hole in {*hisi / herj} shoe.   
  b.  Johni’s deskj has a book on {*himi / itj}.   
 
John in (47) cannot be an antecedent for a pronoun in the PP.  This restriction is not observed 
in sentences that are not predicted to demonstrate binding relations.  Observe (48): 
 
 (48) a.  The girli’s fatherj put a book on {heri / hisj} desk.   
  b.  The girli’s fatherj hid a book behind {heri / hisj} desk.   
 
The restrictions observed in (43), (45), and (47) all follow from the semantic encoding of EH: 
the complement of the preposition in EH is speciﬁed to be referentially dependent on the 
surface subject. 
 
3.4.  Classiﬁcation 
     Let me discuss here the classiﬁcation of the have constructions under discussion.  
Some might argue that sentences such as You have the book and Mary has the wallet 
instantiate the construction that we call here PH; however, we claim that they instantiate EH.   
     PH and EH differ in the situation denoted by the relation between the ﬁrst argument of 
EXP and its second argument, namely the [Y BE [AT X]] part.  The CS for PH contains the 
[AT (e)] part, where the complement of AT is empty.  Therefore, PH expresses an atemporal, 
abstract relation between the ﬁrst argument of EXP and its second argument, and tends to refer 
to a state of affairs holding over a relatively long period of time and hence cannot be recurrent.  
On the other hand, the CS for EH contains the [AT ([Z (α)])] part, where the complement of 
AT is not empty.  Therefore, EH expresses a temporal, spatial relation between the ﬁrst 
argument of EXP and its second argument, and tends to refer to a temporary and hence 
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iterative situation. 
     As observed by Costa (1974), certain have sentences can instantiate EH even though 
there is no PP appearing in surface structure.  For example, sentences such as John has the 
books and John has Mary’s wallet instantiate EH, with their [AT ([Thing (α)])] part, which is 
to be realized as the PP, not being realized in surface structure for contextual reasons (cf. 
Nakau (1998)).  This claim entails that Judy has the car and John has the wife in (25) in 
section 3.3.1 can be acceptable as instances of EH.  A possible context for the former is one 
in which someone asks his wife why they cannot use the car, and she answers that her sister, 
Judy, is in a shopping mall and has the car in question at her disposal and is currently using it; 
a possible context for the latter is one in which the subject referent has kidnapped a wife of 
someone else’s understood contextually and has her at his disposal.   
     This classiﬁcation is supported by the data in (49-51): 
 
 (49) a. * He frequently has a house.  (cf. Ichijo (2011: 85)) 
  b. * He frequently has a wife.  (cf. Ichijo (2011: 85)) 
 (50) a. * He always has a house.  (cf. Costa (1974)) 
  b. * He always has a wife. (cf. Costa (1974)) 
 (51) a. * Sometimes he would have a house.  (cf. Ichijo (2011: 85)) 
  b. * Sometimes he would have a wife.    (cf. Ichijo (2011: 85)) 
  c. * Sometimes this room would have a secret door. (cf. Ichijo (2011: 85)) 
 
As illustrated in (49) and (50), the adverbs of frequency, frequently and always, cannot appear 
with PH; similarly, as illustrated in (51), PH cannot co-occur with one use of the modal 
auxiliary would that denotes habits in the past.  On the other hand, EH can co-occur with 
both the frequency adverbs and this particular use of would.  Observe (52-54):   
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 (52) a.  Shei frequently has a mug in heri hand. (cf. Ichijo (2011: 85)) 
  b.  The tablei frequently has a lamp on iti.   (cf. Ichijo (2011: 87)) 
 (53) a.  Shei always has a mug in heri hand. (cf. Costa (1974)) 
  b.  The tablei always has a lamp on iti. (cf. Costa (1974)) 
 (54) a.  Sometimes hei would have a gun with himi. (Ichijo (2011: 85)) 
  b.  Sometimes the tablei would have a beautiful lamp on iti.  (Ichijo (2011: 87)) 
 
As is evident in (55-57), the have sentences that we have just classiﬁed as EH can also 
co-occur with these elements, validating our classiﬁcation:   
 
 (55) a.  John frequently has the books. 
  b.  John frequently has Mary’s wallet. 
 (56) a.  John always has the books. 
  b.  John always has Mary’s wallet.  
 (57) a.  Sometimes John would have the books. 
  b.  Sometimes John would have Mary’s wallet.  
 
The data in (55-57) are also consistent with the observation made above that the object 
referent of EH is ﬁxed independently of the subject referent.   
     Let us present another diagnostic of the classiﬁcation of PH and EH.  Observe (58-60):  
 
 (58) a. * He has a house for the day. 
  b. * He has a wife for the day.   
 (59) a.  Hei has a bag on hisi back for the day. 
  b.  The tablei has a lamp on iti for the day. 
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 (60) a.  John has the car for the weekend. 
  b.  John has Mike’s wife for the weekend. 
 
As illustrated in (58-60), the expression for the day/weekend can co-occur only with EH.  PH 
expresses a rather atemporal relation between the ﬁrst arguments of EXP and BE, and that 
relation cannot easily be bounded by expressions denoting limited (short) duration.  On the 
other hand, EH expresses a spatio-temporally limited relation between the ﬁrst argument of 
EXP and its second argument, and that relation can easily be bounded by expressions denoting 
limited (short) duration.8 
     Now that we have seen different relations that PH and EH express, let us move on to 
discuss another often-made claim that there are two subclasses of have expressing possession.  
We will argue that it is illusory.   
 
3.5.  One Possessive Have or Two Possessive Haves?   
     At the end of chapter 3, we overview another often-made claim that the construction 
that we call here PH can be divided into two subclasses, regarding the so-called relationality of 
a noun in object position.  The PH taking a so-called non-relational noun as the surface 
object is said to denote alienable possession, while the PH taking a so-called relational noun as 
the surface object is said to denote inalienable possession.  This claim entails that the two 
PHs differ in the volitionality of the subject arguments: the subject of the PH denoting 
alienable possession refers to a volitional entity, while that of the PH denoting inalienable 
possession refers to a non-volitional entity.  This claim also seems to entail that the subject 
arguments of the two PHs bear two different semantic roles.  Contrary to this claim argued 
                                                   
8  Sentence (58a) is acceptable in a situation where the subject referent has rented a house for special purposes 
(e.g. for a special party) for a day or two.  This interpretation is that of EH.   
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for by several previous studies (e.g. Belvin (1993), Harley (1998)), I demonstrate that there is 
only one PH, and that the subject argument of PH does not exhibit any volition.  I thus claim 
that the subject argument of PH bears one and the same semantic role regardless of the 
relationality of a noun in the object NP.9 
 
3.5.1.  Conjoinability 
     We ﬁrst consider the conjoinability of so-called relational and non-relational nouns in 
the object position of PH; the fact that these two kinds of nouns can be coordinated in this 
particular position indicates that there is only one PH.  Consider the examples in (61) from 
Partee (1997):   
 
 (61) a.  John has piles of money and no living relatives.  (Partee (1997: 469)) 
  b.  John has a good job, a nice house, a beautiful wife, clever children, and plenty 
of money (and an ulcer).   (Partee (1997: 469)) 
 
Partee (1997) notes that it is difﬁcult to posit two different haves on the basis of the 
conjoinability shown in (61).  In (61a), for example, the relation between relatives, a 
relational noun, and John can be regarded as inalienable, while the relation between money, a 
non-relational noun, and John can be regarded as alienable.  Regardless of this possible 
distinction, however, the two nouns or the two noun phrases can be coordinated.  It follows 
from this fact that the two nouns are of the same kind, and that one and the same have 
expresses both relations.  Sentence (61b) refers to the same type of situation.   
     The validity of this claim is demonstrated by the non-conjoinability of a (non)relational 
noun and an eventive noun.  PH cannot be used in the progressive form, as illustrated in (62):  
                                                   
9  This sub-section is based on the discussions in Takeuchi (2013c) and Takeuchi (2014).   
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 (62) a. * Mary is having a house. 
  b. * Mary is having a husband. 
 
On the other hand, have sentences where there is an eventive noun in the object NP as 
exempliﬁed in (63) can be used in the progressive form, as illustrated in (64):    
 
 (63) a.  Mary has a party. 
  b.  Mary has an exhibition. 
 (64) a.  Mary is having a party. (Ritter and Rosen (1997: 303)) 
  b.  Mary is having an exhibition. (Ritter and Rosen (1997: 303)) 
 
In the case of (63), the nouns party and exhibition make the sentences eventive, as noted by  
Harley (1998) and Ritter and Rosen (1997).  In this way, the difference between 
(non)relational nouns and eventive nouns is responsible for the (im)possibility of the 
progressive form.  It is clear that these two types of nouns function differently when 
occurring in the object position of have sentences.  Given that they are different in nature, it 
is expected that they cannot be coordinated in the object position of have.  This expectation is 
borne out by the data in (65):   
 
 (65) a. * Mary has a house and a(n) {party / exhibition}. 
  b. * Mary has a husband and a(n) {party / exhibition}. 
 
The data in (65) indicate that so-called relational and non-relational nouns in the object 
position of PH function identically and support the claim that there is only one PH.   
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3.5.2.  Control or Volitionality of the Subject  
     It seems to be assumed that possessing something by choice (i.e. alienable possession) 
entails that the possessor can intentionally both establish and cancel his or her relation to the 
possessee (e.g. Pinker (1989), Belvin (1993), Harley (1998), Tham (2005, 2006)).  In the 
discussion on alienable possession, this entailment has been considered to be an instantiation 
of the concept of control.  For example, Belvin (1993) states that the relation under 
discussion instantiates the following concept of control deﬁned by Authier and Reed (1991):  
 
 (66)   By ‘‘control’’ we refer to the possibility of canceling what is denoted by the 
predicate if the subject of this predicate decides to stop doing it.  
(Authier and Reed (1991: 202)) 
 
Similarly, Pinker (1989) gives the following deﬁnition of alienable possession:  
 
 (67)   Perhaps an alienable possessed object is construable as having an inherent 
tendency to move away from the owner, but the owner exerts a stronger 
opposing force keeping it with him and allowing him to do with it what he 
pleases. (Pinker (1989: 145)) 
 
He calls “control” a force that prevents an alienable object from moving away from the owner.  
Among the previous studies that advocate this view on alienable possession, it seems to be 
only Harley (1998) that presents linguistic evidence supporting the claim, to which we now 
turn.  
     In order to support her claim, Harley (1998) uses as evidence the interpretation of have 
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sentences containing locally free, non-reﬂexive -self forms.10  Consider the sentences in (68): 
 
 (68) a.  Pinnochioi had milk poured on himi.  (Harley (1998: 204)) 
  b.  Pinnochioi had milk poured on himselfi.   (Harley (1998: 204)) 
 
On the basis of observations made by Zribi-Hertz (1995), Harley assumes that the antecedent 
for a locally free -self form is a volitional entity.  For example, she observes that sentence 
(68a) is two-way ambiguous and has both the experiencer and causative interpretations, while 
sentence (68b), where there is a locally free -self form, is not ambiguous and has only the 
causative interpretation.  That is, (68a) has both an interpretation that the subject referent was 
affected by the event denoted by the elements following have (the experiencer interpretation) 
and one that he arranged for the event to happen (the causative interpretation).  Sentence 
(68b) has only the latter interpretation.  Furthermore, sentence (69a), she claims, has only the 
causative interpretation; sentence (69b) is not acceptable even as an instance of the causative 
use, since the subject argument is inanimate and thus cannot arrange anything.   
 
 (69) a.  Calvini has a bee on himselfi.   (Harley (1998: 206)) 
  b. * The oak treei has a nest in itselfi.  (Harley (1998: 206)) 
 
     She presents sentence (70) and argues that instances of possessive use of have denoting 
alienable possession can contain a locally free -self form, and that it thus serves as evidence 
                                                   
10  A locally free, non-reﬂexive -self form is one that is free within its so-called local binding domain and is 
differentiated from a reﬂexive one, which is exempliﬁed in (i):  
 
 (i) a.  Maryi thinks Johnj blamed {himselfj / *herselfi}. (Hirose (2009: 147)) 
  b.  Johni likes Maryj’s picture of {herselfj / *himselfi}. (Hirose (2009: 147)) 
  c.  Johni blamed {himselfi / *himi}. (Hirose (2009: 147)) 
64  
that the subject argument of this use of have is a volitional entity.  
 
 (70)   Calvini has a fancy red Porsche which comfortably seats both Mary and 
himselfi. (Harley (1998: 206)) 
 
She also postulates that the subject of possessive use of have denoting inalienable possession 
is not volitional, and that it is thus predicted that a locally free -self form cannot appear in 
instances of this use.  She argues that this prediction is borne out by the data in (71):  
 
 (71) a. ?? Johni has a large red nose which is exaggerated in the picture of himselfi 
hanging in the entrance hall. 
  b. ?? Johni has a terrible cold, and everyone is avoiding both hisi wife and himselfi.   
(Harley (1998: 207)) 
 
     In the following section, we examine several uses of locally free -self forms, on which 
the discussions in sections 3.5.2.2.1 and 3.5.2.2.2 will be based.   
 
3.5.2.1.  Locally Free -Self Forms 
     Simply put, as many previous studies (e.g. Cantrall (1974), Zribi-Hertz (1989), Baker 
(1995)) have pointed out, locally free -self forms have many different uses.  The -self forms 
in (70) on the one hand and in (68b) and (69a) on the other instantiate different uses.  The 
former and the latter are instances of the contrastive/emphatic use and the viewpoint use, 
respectively.  It is only the viewpoint use of -self forms that requires its antecedent to be 
volitional.  In this section, we examine these two uses of -self forms one by one.   
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3.5.2.1.1.  Contrastive/Emphatic Use 
     In this section, I examine the contrastive/emphatic use of locally free -self forms.  This 
use of -self forms does not require its antecedent to be a volitional entity.  The discussion 
here will be of use in the discussion in section 3.5.2.2.1.   
     The -self form in sentence (70) is an intensive (Baker (1995)).  Baker notes that 
intensives are appropriate only in contexts where emphasis or contrast is desired.  Observe 
-self forms of this use:  
 
 (72)   The queen invited {me/ *myself/ both Max and myself} for tea. 
(Reinhart and Reuland (1993:675), with modiﬁcations) 
 (73) a.  This paper was written by Ann and myself. (Ross (1970: 228)) 
  b. ?? This paper was written by myself. (Ross (1970: 228)) 
 (74) a.  Klinkhorn left Miami in 1953.  For some time there had been an 
estrangement between his wife and himself. 
  b.  Guerrero’s friends made their peace with the junta.  As for himself, there was 
little he could do but await arrest and the inevitable ﬁring-squad. 
(Leech (1980: 72), italics mine) 
 
The use of the -self forms in the sentences in (72) and (73) is licensed in contexts in which the 
-self forms are coordinated with other entities.  Two entities are coordinated and thus focused 
relative to entities that are not made explicit; as a result, the existence of the two entities is 
emphasized.  Following Baker (1995), we call this use of -self forms the 
contrastive/emphatic use.  What one ﬁnds in the sentences in (74) is expressions that make 
salient a contrastive relation of entities to other entities (Hirose (2009)).  They are between 
his wife and himself and as for himself in (74a) and (74b), respectively. 
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     It is further observed that the contrastive/emphatic use of -self forms does not require its 
antecedent to be volitional.  Consider (75):  
 
 (75) a.  Johni had an impossible plan suggested to Mike and himselfi by the scientist. 
  b.  Maryi had the rules of the game explained to John and herselfi by the teacher. 
 
Each sentence has a -self form in its complement, the elements following have, and admits the 
experiencer reading, whose subject is non-volitional.  One can see that the sentences in (75) 
instantiate the experiencer use by examining the contexts given in (76), where they are 
embedded:  
 
 (76) a.  John works for the government of the United States of America.  A highly 
contagious virus was found in several states.  John thought that it had to be 
eradicated.  He went to a scientist he knew with his colleague, Mike, and 
asked for help.  Then hei (=John) had an impossible plan suggested to 
Mike and himselfi by the scientist.  They (John and Mike) said that it was 
unrealistic, but the scientist insisted that it was a good plan.   
  b.  (At school) Mary had to participate in a game.  She didn’t know the rules of 
the game and was thus puzzled.  Her little brother, John, didn’t know them 
either.  Then, shei (=Mary) had the rules of the game explained to John 
and herselfi by the teacher.  They enjoyed the game.   
 
In each discourse in (76), the plausible interpretation of the have sentence is that of 
experiencer, not that of causative. 
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3.5.2.1.2.  Viewpoint Use 
     In this sub-section, I investigate the viewpoint use of -self forms, another use of locally 
free -self forms.  I demonstrate that this use of -self forms requires its antecedent to be 
volitional, which will be of importance in the discussion in section 3.5.2.2.2.   
     Let us ﬁrst introduce the viewpoint use of -self forms.  Consider (77): 
 
 (77) a.  The adultsi in the picture are facing away from us, with the children placed 
behind {themselvesi / themi}. 
  b.  The housei in the picture is facing away from us, with an elm tree behind {iti / 
*itselfi}. (Cantrall (1974: 146-147)) 
 
When themselves is used in (77a), the referents of the children are placed behind the referents 
of the adults; on the other hand, when them is used, there are two interpretations available: the 
one just mentioned, and the one where the referents of the children are hidden from the person 
viewing the picture.  The exact interpretation is determined by the context in which the 
sentence is uttered.  It is also known that sentence (77b), where the subject referent is 
inanimate, cannot include a -self form of the viewpoint use, since it is difﬁcult for the speaker 
to take the point of view of inanimate entities.   
     The difference in interpretation just observed is made explicit in the following 
diagnostic.  Observe (78):   
 
 (78) a.  Johni is happy that Anne has {come / ??gone} so far to see himselfi.  
(Levinson (2000: 321)) 
  b.  Johni is happy that Ann has {come / gone} so far to see himi.   
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The fact that only come, not gone, co-occurs with the -self form in (78a) is accounted for by 
assuming that the -self form in question instantiates the viewpoint use.  Given that the -self 
form in (78a) instantiates the viewpoint use, sentence (78a) is depicted from the point of view 
of John, the antecedent for the -self form.  The use of the perspectival indicator come is 
licensed only when the speaker takes the point of view of the goal; in (78a), the goal is the 
referent of the -self form, namely John.  Accordingly, only the co-occurrence of the -self 
form with the verb come is acceptable.  On the other hand, pronouns do not impose any 
restriction pertaining to the viewpoint of the antecedent; accordingly, sentence (78b) co-occurs 
with both the verbs.   
     Not only is the antecedent for -self forms of this use animate, but also it is volitional.  
Cantrall (1974: 158) argues that the appropriateness of the sentences in (79) rises, as the 
chance increases that the verb requires its subject referent to have a will.   
 
 (79) a. ?*Halley’s cometi has a glowing tail behind itselfi.  
  b. ?? Halley’s cometi leaves a glowing tail behind itselfi.  
  c. ? Halley’s cometi spreads a glowing tail behind itselfi.  
  d.  Halley’s cometi spreads itsi glowing tail behind itselfi.  
 
Furthermore, the observation by Kuno (1987: 153) also validates the claim made by Cantrall.  
Consider (80): 
 
 (80) a.  Johni pulled the blanket over himi.   
  b.  Johni pulled the blanket over himselfi.   
 
He notes that sentence (80b) implies that the subject referent tried to cover himself up with the 
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blanket in order to hide under it, while sentence (80a) has no such implication. 
     Given that the -self forms in the sentences in (68b), (69a), and (69b), repeated here as 
(81a-c), instantiate the viewpoint use, it naturally follows that (81a) and (81b) admit only the 
causative reading, and that (81c) is not acceptable as an instance of the causative use.   
 
 (81) a.  Pinnochioi had milk poured on himselfi. 
  b.  Calvini has a bee on himselfi.   
  c. * The oak treei has a nest in itselfi.  
  
Being the antecedents of -self forms of the viewpoint use, the subject referents in (81a) and 
(81b) are volitional and thus can arrange the situations denoted by the complement; being 
inanimate, the subject referent in (81c) cannot be volitional and thus cannot do the act of 
arranging situations to happen.   
 
3.5.2.1.3.  Interim Summary 
     In section 3.5.2.1.1, we have considered the contrastive/emphatic use of locally free -self 
forms, whose antecedent need not be volitional.  I will use this use of -self forms in the 
discussion in section 3.5.2.2.1.  In section 3.5.2.1.2, we have considered the viewpoint use of 
locally free -self forms, whose antecedent must be volitional.  I will use this use of -self forms 
as evidence for the absence of volitionality on the part of the subject of PH in section 3.5.2.2.2.   
 
3.5.2.2.  Arguing for the Non-volitionality of the Possessor of PH 
     In this section, I ﬁrst clarify that the pieces of evidence presented by Harley (1998) do 
not function as supporting her claim.  I then argue for the non-volitionality on the part of the 
possessor of PH regardless of the type of possession conveyed.   
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     In section 3.5.2.2.1, I invalidate Harley’s data by showing that PH can contain -self 
forms of the contrastive/emphatic use irrespective of the type of possession.  In section 
3.5.2.2.2, I demonstrate that PH cannot contain -self forms of the viewpoint use, which 
indicates that its subject, the antecedent for a -self form, does not exhibit volition.  In section 
3.5.2.2.3, I further demonstrate the non-volitionality on the part of the possessor of PH on the 
basis of its behavior in other diagnostics.   
 
3.5.2.2.1.  Invalidating Harley’s Examples 
     As we saw in section 3.5.2, Harley employs sentence (70), repeated here as (82a), as 
evidence for the presence of volitionality on the part of the subject of PH denoting alienable 
possession.   
 
 (82) a.   Calvini has a fancy red Porsche which comfortably seats both Mary and 
himselfi. 
  b.  Calvini has a fancy red Porsche which comfortably seats {himi / *himselfi}. 
 
She also presents the examples in (71), repeated here as (83), as evidence for the absence of 
volitionality on the part of the subject of PH denoting inalienable possession.   
 
 (83) a. ?? Johni has a large red nose which is exaggerated in the picture of himselfi 
hanging in the entrance hall. 
  b. ?? Johni has a terrible cold, and everyone is avoiding both hisi wife and himselfi.   
 
     Now, a brief comment on these examples is in order.  As the occurrence of both 
suggests, the -self form in sentence (82a) is an instance of the contrastive/emphatic use; the 
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sentence in (82b), where a -self form cannot appear solely, further illustrates the validity of the 
view that the -self form in (82a) instantiates this use.   
     Furthermore, the sentences in (83) should not be dealt with in a parallel fashion with 
sentence (82a), since the sentences differ in the environments where -self forms appear.  
While a -self form occurs in a restrictive relative clause in (82a), it appears in the NP headed 
by picture in (83a).  In (83b), it is the sentence following the have sentence that contains one, 
not even the have sentence itself.  Therefore, we cannot verify the validity of Harley’s claim 
on the basis of the sentence in (82a) and the sentences in (83).   
     One cannot determine whether or not the subject of PH exhibits volition by examining 
its instances containing -self forms of the contrastive/emphatic use, since this use of -self forms 
does not require its antecedent to be volitional (recall the discussion in section 3.5.2.1.1).  
Furthermore, the present study observes that -self forms of the contrastive/emphatic use do 
occur in PH regardless of whether its instance denotes so-called alienable or inalienable 
possession.  Observe the sentences in (84) and (85), where there is a -self form in the same 
environment as in (82a):  
 
 (84) a.  Mikei has a dog which always welcomes both hisi wife and himselfi.  
  b.  Mikei has a dog which always welcomes {himi / *himselfi}.   
 (85) a.  Mikei has a sister who loves both their father and himselfi deeply. 
  b.  Mikei has a sister who loves {himi / *himselfi} deeply.   
 
The sentences in (84) express so-called alienable possession; those in (85) inalienable 
possession.  The facts illustrated in the (b) sentences in these data, where a -self form cannot 
occur solely, support the view that the -self forms in the (a) sentences are instances of the 
contrastive/emphatic use.   
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     We have pointed out the non-validity of the sentences in (82a) and (83) as evidence for 
the presence of volitionality on the part of the possessor of PH denoting alienable possession.  
PH, whether it denotes so-called alienable or inalienable possession, can contain -self forms of 
the contrastive/emphatic use, which do not require their antecedent to be volitional.   
 
3.5.2.2.2.  Non-occurrence of the Viewpoint Use of -Self Forms in PH 
     In section 3.5.2.1.2, we saw that the viewpoint use of -self forms requires its antecedent 
to be volitional.  If it is the case that the subject of PH denoting alienable possession is 
volitional, as argued for by previous studies, it is expected that its instances can contain a -self 
form of the use under discussion.  The data, however, indicate the contrary; that is, PH, 
whether it denotes so-called alienable or inalienable possession, cannot contain -self forms of 
this use.  Observe (86):  
 
 (86) a.  Mikei has a dog which always welcomes {himi / *himself}. (= (84b)) 
  b.  Mikei has a sister who loves {himi / *himself} deeply.   (= (85b)) 
 
Sentence (86a) expresses so-called alienable possession; sentence (86b) so-called inalienable 
possession.  It is illustrated in (86) that the difference between two types of possession, if any, 
does not affect the behavior of a -self form of this use.   
     Furthermore, PH cannot contain -self forms of the viewpoint use even when there is an 
antecedent-perspective phrase according to X (Levinson (2000: 321)), which can induce the 
occurrence of -self form of this use, as illustrated in (87) (cf. Levinson (2000: 321)):  
 
 (87) a.  According to Johni, the paper was written by himselfi. 
  b. * Speaking of Johni, the paper was written by himselfi.   
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Observe (88):  
 
 (88) a. * According to Johni, hei has a house which always relaxes himselfi. 
  b. * According to Johni, hei has a wife who always welcomes himselfi. 
 
On the basis of these examples, I conclude that the possessor of PH does not exhibit volition, 
regardless of whether it denotes so-called alienable or inalienable possession.   
 
3.5.2.2.3.  Further Evidence 
     The non-volitionality on the part of the subject argument of PH is demonstrated by 
other phenomena.  The observation by Givón (1975) is of use.  Givón notes that sentence 
(89a) is acceptable only under circumstances in which it expresses the meaning shown in 
(89b).  That is, the referent of the surface object of tell must be volitional enough to cause the 
event denoted by the inﬁnitival clause to happen. 
 
 (89) a.  We told him to be examined by the committee. (Givón (1975: 66)) 
  b.  We told him to go and get examined by the committee. (Givón (1975: 66)) 
 
Given that the subject argument of PH is not volitional, it is predicted that PH cannot be 
embedded under the verb tell.  This prediction is borne out by the data in (90):   
 
 (90)  * I told Mary to have a {car / husband}. 
 
Furthermore, PH cannot be used as an imperative, which is licensed when the subject 
argument of a sentence denotes a voluntary referent (cf. Culicover and Jackendoff (2005: 
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428)).  Observe (91): 
 
 (91)  * Have a {car / wife}! 
 
These facts suggest the absence of volitionality on the part of the subject argument of PH; 
there is no evidence supporting its presence.   
     The present study thus argues that there is only one PH, in which both so-called 
relational and non-relational nouns can equally occur in object position.  I also argue that the 
subject argument of PH does not exhibit any volition, regardless of the type of a noun 
occurring in object position.   
     Note in passing that there is no volitionality observed on the part of the subject 
argument of EH, either.  Observe (92) and (93):   
 
 (92)  * Calvin had a bee on himself. (Harley (1997: 84)) 
 (93) a. * I told Maryi to have a hole in heri shoe. 
  b. * Have a hole in your shoe! 
 
As Harley (1997) observes, the viewpoint use of -self form cannot occur in EH, as illustrated 
in (92).  Sentence (92) is acceptable only as an instance of the causative use of have, which 
we have brieﬂy discussed in section 3.5.2.2.1.  As illustrated in (93), instances of EH cannot 
be embedded under the verb tell or be used as an imperative.  These data make it clear that 
the subject argument of EH as well as that of PH does not exhibit any volition.   
 
3.6.  Summary   
     This chapter has ﬁrst overviewed two often-made claims pertaining to have 
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constructions: (i) one is that the subject arguments of PH and EH are (human) locations and 
thus bear only the Location role and do not take any other semantic role, and (ii) the other is 
that English have has no semantics at all and the interpretation of a given have sentence is 
completely a by-product of the values of its arguments.  This thesis has argued against these 
claims.   
     This thesis has proposed, in section 3.3, conceptual structures for PH and EH.  These 
structures specify that the ﬁrst arguments of the function EXP(ERIENCE), the surface 
subjects, bear not only the Location role but also the Experiencer role.  The subject 
arguments of PH and EH bear the Experiencer role by binding another argument.  Binding 
relations are constructional meanings of PH and EH.   
     At the end of this chapter, we have overviewed another often-made claim that the 
construction that we call here PH can be divided into two subclasses, regarding the so-called 
relationality of a noun in the object position.  Contrary to this claim, which is argued for by 
several previous studies (e.g. Belvin (1993), Harley (1998)), I have demonstrated that there is 
only one PH, and that the subject argument of PH does not exhibit any volition.  I have 
claimed that the subject argument bears one and the same semantic role regardless of the 
relationality of a noun in the object NP.   
     On the basis of the discussions in chapters 2 and 3, we will examine PH and EH in the 
next chapter.   
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Chapter 4 
Possessive Have, Existential Have, and Related Phenomena 
 
4.1.  Introduction   
     Now, I show that the theoretical apparatus outlined in the previous two chapters can 
explain various phenomena pertaining to PH, EH, and constructions that share characteristics 
with PH or EH.  This chapter answers the questions raised in sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2: (i) the 
question of whether or not the subject arguments of PH and EH bear only the Location role, 
and (ii) the question of whether or not have has any meaning at all.  
     The subject arguments of PH and EH bear two different semantic roles simultaneously: 
Location and Experiencer.  We examine cases that can be accounted for by assuming that the 
subject arguments are locations; we also investigate cases that can be explained by assuming 
that the subject arguments are not merely locations.  The subject arguments of PH and EH 
bear the Experiencer role by binding another argument.  In other words, some phenomena 
exhibited by PH and EH can be explained by considering the [Y BE [AT X]] part of their 
CSs; the other phenomena can be accounted for by considering the binding relation between 
the ﬁrst argument of the function EXP and either argument in the [Y BE [AT X]] part. 
     Binding relations between the subject and another entity are constructionally speciﬁed 
meanings of PH and EH.  The ﬁrst argument of EXP in PH, the surface subject, binds the 
ﬁrst argument of BE, the surface object; the ﬁrst argument of EXP in EH binds the 
complement of AT, the complement of the preposition.  These speciﬁcations are 
s(emantic)-selections of the ﬁrst argument of EXP and are represented at the level of 
conceptual structure.   
     Nakau (1998: 101) claims that the subject argument of EH bears the Experiencer role 
by establishing a connection with the situation denoted by the elements following have.  
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When that connection is not established, he claims, the subject argument cannot take the 
Experiencer role, and the sentence is not acceptable as an instance of EH.  The present 
discussion on EH is based on his claim; the present thesis argues that the connection is 
established by the ﬁrst argument of EXP binding the complement of AT.  When the ﬁrst 
argument of EXP cannot bind the complement of AT, the argument in question cannot bear 
the Experiencer role, and the sentence is not acceptable as an instance of EH.   
     Nakau (1998) argues that EH is an Experiencer construction.  This thesis argues that 
not only EH but also PH is an Experiencer construction. 
     The deﬁnition of binding should be recalled here:   
 
 (1) binding: 
  X binds Y if and only if the reference of Y is ﬁxed in terms of the reference of X. 
 
In other words, X binds Y iff Y is referentially dependent on X.  The present thesis employs 
the term “reference” as a cover term for “reference” in its strict sense and for “identity.”  That 
is to say, Y depends on X with respect to its identiﬁcation.  
     Sections 4.2 and 4.3 discuss PH and EH, respectively.  Section 4.4 demonstrates that 
the current theory is more adequate than alternative theories.   
 
4.2.  Possessive Have 
     This sub-section focuses on PH and related phenomena.  In the present framework, PH 
has the CS represented in (2):   
 
 (2)   [State EXP ([Possessorα]i, [State BE ([Y (α)], [Place AT (ei)])])]  
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For purposes of comprehensibility, I use the semantic role label to identify the ﬁrst argument 
of EXP.  The function EXP in the CS for PH in (2) takes as its second argument the 
location-denoting structure [Y BE [AT X]], entailing that PH has locative characteristics, as 
well as characteristics of its own.  The complement of function AT serves as a reference 
object relative to which the ﬁrst argument of BE is located.  The ﬁrst argument of the 
function EXP in (2) simultaneously takes both Possessor and Location; an argument is both 
the ﬁrst argument of EXP and the complement of AT at the same time, which is indicated by 
the same subscript i.  The complement of AT is empty, which is indicated by e.  The ﬁrst 
argument of BE bears Theme.  The factor ensuring that the ﬁrst argument of EXP is 
connected to the situation denoted by the [Y BE [AT X]] part is the binding relation in the 
sense of the present theory.   
     Section 4.2.1 examines locative characteristics of PH; this sub-section investigates cases 
whose acceptability is determined by the [Y BE [AT X]] part.  Section 4.2.2 investigates 
non-locative characteristics of PH; this sub-section examines cases whose acceptability is 
determined by the binding relation between the ﬁrst arguments of EXP and BE.  The 
discussions in these sections clarify that locative situations can be easier to express than 
possessive situations (cf. Harley (2003: 37)); in other words, situations expressible by the [Y 
BE [AT X]] part are less restricted than those by the relation between the ﬁrst argument of 
EXP and its second argument.  Section 4.2.3 shows that our framework can offer a uniﬁed 
account of possessive sentences that are thought of as deriving from different sources.   
 
4.2.1.  Subject Argument of PH as Location 
     Locative and possessive sentences have one commonality: both denote a relation 
between two entities and one of them serves as a reference point relative to which the other is 
construed.  The present study captures this commonality by postulating that the CS for 
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possessive sentences, that is, that for PH, contains as its part a location-denoting structure.   
     As Talmy ((1983: 230-233), (2000: 182-185)) (cf. Langacker (1993)) notes, when 
language relates two objects in space, one object serves as a reference point for the other.  
Observe (3) and (4), where the # in the (b) examples indicates that the examples are less 
natural than the counterparts:  
 
 (3) a.  The bike is near the house.  (Talmy (1983: 231)) 
  b. # The house is near the bike. (Talmy (1983: 231), # added by the author) 
 (4) a.  [BE (BIKE) [AT (HOUSE)]] 
  b. # [BE (HOUSE) [AT (BIKE)]] 
 
The rough CSs of the sentences in (3) are given in (4).  As is clear from (3), it is more natural 
for the location of a bike, which is smaller and more movable, to be understood or construed 
relative to the location of a house, which is larger and more permanently located.  That is, the 
complement of the preposition in locative sentences like those in (3) functions as a reference 
point for the subject argument.  As shown in (4), this construal is directly reﬂected in the 
conceptual structure [Y BE [AT X]], where the complement of AT serves as a reference point 
for the ﬁrst argument of BE.  The complement of AT is realized as the complement of the 
preposition; the ﬁrst argument of BE as the subject.  The CS of sentence (3a) presented in 
(4a) refers to an acceptable situation, making sentence (3a) acceptable; on the other hand, the 
CS of sentence (3b) presented in (4b) refers to an unacceptable situation, making sentence (3b) 
unacceptable.  
     The same holds true for PH.  Observe (5):  
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 (5) a.  The house has three bedrooms. 
  b. * The three bedrooms have a house. 
 (6) a.  [BE (BEDROOMS) [AT (HOUSE)]] 
  b. # [BE (HOUSE) [AT (BEDROOMS)]] 
 (7) a.  [EXP (HOUSE)iα [BE (BEDROOM(α)) [AT (ei)]]] 
  b. * [EXP (BEDROOM)iα [BE (HOUSE(α)) [AT (ei)]]] 
 
The [Y BE [AT X]] part of sentence (5a) is given in (6a); the whole CS representation of the 
sentence is given in (7a).  The [Y BE [AT X]] part of sentence (5b) is given in (6b); the 
whole CS representation of the sentence is given in (7b).  The different acceptability of the 
sentences in (5) originates from the different acceptability of the situation named by the 
second argument of EXP, namely the [Y BE [AT X]] part, of the sentences.  It is natural that 
the larger entity, a house, functions as a ﬁxed reference point relative to which the smaller 
entities, bedrooms, are construed.  The [Y BE [AT X]] part of sentence (5a) is given in (6a); 
sentence (5a) takes house as the complement of the function AT and bedrooms as the ﬁrst 
argument of the function BE.  This ensures that the existence of bedrooms is construed 
relative to the existence of house.  The situation denoted by the [Y BE [AT X]] part of 
sentence (5a) is acceptable, rendering the sentence acceptable.  As for (5b), the [Y BE [AT 
X]] part of sentence (5b) is given in (6b); sentence (5b) takes bedrooms as the argument of the 
function AT and house as the ﬁrst argument of the function BE.  This makes the existence of 
house construed relative to the existence of bedrooms, which is less natural and more difﬁcult.  
The situation named by the [Y BE [AT X]] part of sentence (5b) is unacceptable, contributing 
to the unacceptability of the sentence.  In this way, the commonality between locative and 
possessive sentences can be captured.   
     Similar examples are in the following:  
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 (8) a.  The plane has four engines.   
  b. * The four engines have a plane.   
 (9) a.  [BE (ENGINES) [AT (PLANE)]] 
  b. # [BE (PLANE) [AT (ENGINES)]] 
 (10) a.  [EXP (PLANE)iα [BE (ENGINES(α)) [AT (ei)]]] 
  b. * [EXP (ENGINES)iα [BE (PLANE(α)) [AT (ei)]]] 
 
The [Y BE [AT X]] part of sentence (8a) is given in (9a); the whole CS representation of the 
sentence is given in (10a).  The [Y BE [AT X]] part of sentence (8b) is given in (9b); the 
whole CS representation of the sentence is given in (10b).  The difference in acceptability of 
the sentences in (8) originates from the difference in acceptability of the situations expressed 
by the [Y BE [AT X]] part of the sentences.  It is more natural for planes to function as a 
reference point relative to which engines are construed than vice versa.  The second 
argument of EXP of sentence (8a) is given in (9a); sentence (8a) takes plane as the 
complement of AT and engines as the ﬁrst argument of BE.  This ensures that the plane in 
question functions as a reference point for engines.  The [Y BE [AT X]] part of sentence (8a) 
denotes an acceptable situation, making the whole sentence acceptable.  As for (8b), the 
second argument of EXP of sentence (8b) is given in (9b); sentence (8b) takes engines as the 
complement of AT and plane as the ﬁrst argument of BE.  This makes the engines a 
reference point for the plane, which is less natural and less likely.  The [Y BE [AT X]] part of 
sentence (8b) denotes an unacceptable situation, making the whole sentence unacceptable.  
The differential acceptability of the sentences in (5) and (8) does not originate from the 
relation between the ﬁrst argument of EXP and its second argument.  We turn in the next 
section to cases whose acceptability is determined by this relation.   
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4.2.2.  Subject Argument of PH Not Being Mere Location 
     In this section, we examine cases whose acceptability is determined by the relation 
expressed between the ﬁrst argument of EXP and its second argument.  When the ﬁrst 
argument of EXP binds the ﬁrst argument of BE and bears the Possessor role, the sentence is 
acceptable; when it cannot bind the argument and cannot bear the role in question, the 
sentence is unacceptable.  For example, a part of a whole can be bound by the whole; by 
deﬁnition, being a part of a whole necessitates the dependence of the part on the whole with 
respect to its identiﬁcation.  This theoretical assumption accounts for the acceptability of 
examples given in this sub-section. 
     Let us observe the sentence in (11a):   
 
 (11) a. * This desk has a book. (cf. Belvin (1993: 65)) 
  b. * [EXP (DESK)iα [BE (BOOK(α)) [AT (ei)]]] 
 (12) a.  There is a book on the desk. / A book is on the desk. 
  b.  [BE (BOOK) [AT (DESK)]] 
 
The unacceptability of sentence (11a) stems from the unacceptable relation between the ﬁrst 
arguments of EXP and BE, which is represented in (11b).  Since books are not easily 
considered to be a part of a desk, the ﬁrst argument of EXP cannot bind the ﬁrst argument of 
BE and thus cannot bear the Possessor role.  In this case, the s(emantic)-selection of the ﬁrst 
argument of EXP is violated; thus, the sentence is unacceptable.  The proposition denoted by 
the [Y BE [AT X]] part of (11a) does not contribute to the unacceptability of the sentence, 
since books can be spatially located on desks, which is shown in (12). 
     The s-selection of the ﬁrst argument of EXP can be satisﬁed by pragmatic factors.  For 
example, sentences like (11a) can be acceptable in a situation of a meeting room where there 
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have to be a book and a pencil on every desk.  Observe (13):  
 
 (13)   This desk has a book, but not a pencil. (Takeuchi (2013a: 64)) 
 
Since this particular situation contextually makes a book and a pencil parts of a desk, the ﬁrst 
argument of BE can be bound by the ﬁrst argument of EXP.  Hence the ﬁrst argument of 
EXP can take the Possessor role, and the sentence is acceptable.  In this case, the s-selection 
of the ﬁrst argument of EXP is contextually satisﬁed.1 
     Let us look at another set of examples:   
 
 (14) a. * This table has a lamp.  (Déchaine et al. (1995: 87, fn. 3)) 
  b.  This table has no lamp.  (Déchaine et al. (1995: 87, fn. 3)) 
 
Déchaine et al. (1995) note that sentence (14a) is unacceptable only in a context in which 
having a lamp is not expected, and that sentence (14b) is acceptable as an instance of PH in a 
context in which it is expected that having a lamp is one of the characteristics of a table.  In 
other words, only in the latter case can the ﬁrst argument of BE, the surface object, be 
regarded as one of the parts of the ﬁrst argument of EXP, the surface subject.  Only in the 
latter case can the binding relation in the sense of the present thesis be established between the 
ﬁrst arguments of EXP and BE.  Hence the ﬁrst argument of EXP can take the Possessor role, 
and the sentence is acceptable.  In the case of (14b) as well, the s-selection of the ﬁrst 
argument of EXP is contextually satisﬁed.   
     The [Y BE [AT X]] parts of the sentences in (14) do not contribute to the difference in 
acceptability.  The [Y BE [AT X]] part can capture either the presence or the absence of a 
                                                   
1  This discussion is based on Takeuchi (2013a).   
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lamp on a table, as exempliﬁed in (15) and (16): 
 
 (15) a.  There is a lamp on this table. / A lamp is on this table. 
  b.  There is no lamp on this table. / No lamp is on this table. 
 (16)   [BE (LAMP) [AT (TABLE)]] 
 
The [Y BE [AT X]] parts of the sentences in (14) denote acceptable situations. 
     The discussion thus far has clariﬁed that locative situations can be easier to express than 
possessive situations; in other words, situations expressible by the [Y BE [AT X]] part are less 
restricted than those by the relation between the ﬁrst argument of EXP and its second 
argument (cf. Harley (2003: 37)).  For example, the unacceptability of the (a) sentences in 
(11) and (14), repeated here as (17a) and (17b), originates from the unacceptable relation 
denoted between the ﬁrst arguments of EXP and BE.   
 
 (17) a. * This desk has a book. 
  b. * This table has a lamp. 
 
The [Y BE [AT X]] parts, on the other hand, denote acceptable situations, as exempliﬁed in 
There is a book on this desk and There is a lamp on this table.  That is to say, when the 
relation expressible by the [Y BE [AT X]] part is acceptable, it does not necessarily entail that 
the relation between the ﬁrst arguments of EXP and BE also refers to an acceptable situation.  
The acceptability of the former relation does not entail the acceptability of the latter relation.   
     On the other hand, when the relation expressed between the ﬁrst arguments of EXP and 
BE is acceptable, the [Y BE [AT X]] part also refers to an acceptable situation.  Consider 
sentence (5a), repeated here as (18): 
85  
 (18)   The house has three bedrooms.  
 
In (18), the relation expressed between the ﬁrst arguments of EXP and BE is acceptable.  A 
house can be construed as a whole of which bedrooms are parts; the reference of the ﬁrst 
argument of BE can be determined in relation to the reference of the ﬁrst argument of EXP.  
In this case, the [Y BE [AT X]] part of the sentence also refers to an acceptable situation, as 
exempliﬁed in There are three bedrooms in the house. 
     Furthermore, when the [Y BE [AT X]] part denotes an unacceptable situation, the 
relation expressed between the ﬁrst arguments of EXP and BE is also unacceptable.  
Consider sentence (5b), repeated here as (19):   
 
 (19)  * The three bedrooms have a house.  
 
The [Y BE [AT X]] part of sentence (19) refers to an unacceptable situation, as exempliﬁed in 
*There is a house in three bedrooms.  In this case, the relation denoted between the ﬁrst 
arguments of EXP and BE is not acceptable, either.  Bedrooms cannot be easily construed as 
a whole of which a house is a part; the reference of the ﬁrst argument of BE cannot be 
determined in relation to the reference of the ﬁrst argument of EXP.  The unacceptability of 
the relation expressed by the [Y BE [AT X]] part entails the unacceptability of the relation 
expressed between the ﬁrst arguments of EXP and BE.  Thus, locative relations are 
expressible more easily than possessive relations.   
     In sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, we have seen not only locative characteristics of PH but also 
non-locative characteristics.  These characteristics can appropriately be captured by assuming 
a conceptual structure where the function EXP(ERIENCE) embeds a location-denoting 
structure.  More speciﬁcally, the locative characteristics can be captured by assuming the [Y 
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BE [AT X]] part in the CS, and the non-locative characteristics can be captured by assuming 
the binding relation between the ﬁrst arguments of EXP and BE.   
 
4.2.3.  English and Japanese Possessive Sentences 
     The proposed structure can provide a uniﬁed account of possessive sentences that are 
thought of as deriving from different sources.  Some possessive verbs are derived from verbs 
that express the existence of an entity, and others are derived from verbs that denote the action 
of grabbing or holding (Heine (1997), among others).  The Japanese possessive verbs, iru 
and aru, are examples of the former, and the English possessive verb, have, is an example of 
the latter.  Sentence (20) is an instance of the possessive sentence in Japanese. 
 
 (20)   Taro-ni  kodomo-ga aru / iru. 
    Taro-DAT child-NOM  exist 
    ‘Taro has a child.’ 
 
In the possessive sentence in Japanese, the possessor and possessee are marked by dative case 
and nominative case, respectively.  The dative case marker ni has the same phonetic form as 
a particle that refers to a location.  The possessive sentence in Japanese employs verbs that 
originally denote the existence of an entity, and the possessor is marked by a particle that has 
the same phonetic form as is used to mark a location.  Given these two points, it seems 
reasonable to hypothesize that the possessive sentence in Japanese has a CS containing the 
functions BE and AT.   
     The English have can also be considered to be derived from a predicate whose semantic 
representation contains the structure [Y BE [AT X]].  For example, Payne (2009: 112) notes 
that the diachronic derivation of have from grab or verbs of similar meaning may be justiﬁed 
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by claiming that a sentence like (21a) can have a CS like that in (21b): 
 
 (21) a.  Mary grabbed the book. 
  b.  [(MARY) CAUSE [[(BOOK) GO [TO (MARY)]] & [(BOOK) BE [AT 
(MARY)]]] 
(Payne (2009: 112)) 
 
The structure in (21b) means that an agent acts on an entity and causes it to come to her, which 
results in a situation in which the entity stays at the agent.  Jackendoff (1987: 379) also 
postulates a similar inference rule.  Look at (22):   
 
 (22)   If X GO to Y, then at some time X BE at Y. 
 
This kind of inference is reﬂected in the structure in (21b); the structure of the resultant state in 
(21b) contains the functions BE and AT.  
     It should be noted here that the possessor of the possessive sentences of both Japanese 
and English is realized in subject position.  With regard to the possessive sentence in 
Japanese, this is conﬁrmed by subjecthood tests such as subject honoriﬁcation ((23)) and the 
reﬂexive binding of zibun ‘self’ ((24)), both of which have been utilized to pick out the subject 
of a sentence.  
 
 (23) a.  Yamada-sensei-ni  kodomo-ga o-ari-ni-naru / irassharu 
    Yamada-Prof.-DAT child-NOM  HON-exist-HON-HON / exist 
    ‘Prof. Yamada has a child.’ (cf. Kishimoto (2000: 57)) 
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  b. * Bokuno-ototo-ni  kodomo-ga o-ari-ni-naru. 
    My-brother-DAT  child-NOM  HON-exist-HON-HON 
    ‘My brother has a child.’ (cf. Shibatani (1978: 190)) 
 (24) a.  Taroi-ni  zibuni-no kodomo-ga aru / iru. 
    Taro-DAT self-GEN  child-NOM  exist 
    ‘Taroi has hisi own child.’ 
  b. * Zibuni-no  tomodachi-ni kodomoi-ga  aru / iru. 
    self-GEN  friend-DAT   child-NOM   exist 
    ‘Hisi own friend has a childi.’ 
(Kishimoto (2000: 65), with slight modiﬁcations) 
 
These commonalities exhibited by possessive sentences in English and Japanese can be 
captured by assuming a conceptual structure where the location-denoting structure [Y BE [AT 
X]] is embedded under the function EXP, whose ﬁrst argument is mapped onto the surface 
subject.  By assuming this structure, we can capture in a parallel fashion possessive sentences 
that are thought of as deriving from different sources.2   
 
4.3.  Existential Have 
     Now, I move on to EH and related phenomena.  In the present framework, EH has the 
CS represented in (25):   
 
 (25)   [State EXP ([Experiencer2α], [State BE ([Y], [Place AT ([Z (α)])])])]  
 
                                                   
2  The possessive sentences in Japanese and English seem to share many properties.  Kishimoto (2000) notes 
that possessive sentences in Japanese exhibit the deﬁniteness restriction; Takezawa (2003) argues that possessive 
sentences in Japanese and English have very similar syntactic structures.  
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For purposes of comprehensibility, I use the semantic role label to identify the ﬁrst argument 
of EXP.  The function EXP in the CS for EH in (25) takes as its second argument the 
location-denoting structure [Y BE [AT X]], entailing that EH has locative characteristics, as 
well as non-locative characteristics.  The complement of function AT serves as a reference 
object relative to which the ﬁrst argument of BE is located.  The ﬁrst argument of the 
function EXP in (25) simultaneously takes both Experiencer2 and Location.  Note that in 
constructions like EH, in which the argument bearing Experiencer2 and the argument bearing 
Location are realized as different linguistic elements, it is binding that guarantees the subject 
argument bearing both Experiencer2 and Location.  That is, the bindee is an element within 
the complement which takes the semantic role Location.  The bindee refers back to the 
binder and it ensures that the ﬁrst argument of EXP bears not only the Experiencer role but 
also the Location role (cf. Nakau (1998: 88)).  The ﬁrst argument of BE bears Theme.   
     The present thesis proposes the structure in (25) for EH on the basis of the discussion by 
Nakau (1998).  Nakau (1998) argues that EH is an Experiencer construction, though he does 
not propose conceptual structures for EH and their functions.  Nakau (1998: 101) claims that 
the subject argument of EH bears the Experiencer role by establishing a connection with the 
situation denoted by the elements following have.  When that connection is not established, 
he claims, the subject argument cannot bear the Experiencer role, and the sentence is not 
acceptable as an instance of EH.  The present discussion on EH is based on his claim; the 
present thesis argues that the connection is established by the ﬁrst argument of EXP binding 
the complement of AT.  When the ﬁrst argument of EXP cannot bind the complement of AT, 
the argument in question cannot bear the Experiencer role, and the sentence is not acceptable 
as an instance of EH.  This proposal pertains to the discussion not in section 4.3.1 but in 
section 4.3.2.   
     Section 4.3.1 examines locative characteristics of EH; this section investigates cases 
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whose acceptability is determined by the [Y BE [AT X]] part.  Section 4.3.2 investigates 
non-locative characteristics of EH; this section examines cases whose acceptability is 
determined by the binding relation between the ﬁrst argument of EXP and its second 
argument.   
 
4.3.1.  Subject Argument of EH as Location 
     Not only PH but also EH has locative characteristics.  The complement of AT 
functions as a reference point relative to which the ﬁrst argument of BE is located.  The 
locative characteristics are created by the [Y BE [AT X]] part of the CS for EH.   
     The difference in acceptability between the sentences in (26) originates in the difference 
in acceptability of the proposition named by the [Y BE [AT X]] part of each sentence:   
 
 (26) a.  This draweri has the winter socks in iti. (Costa (1974: 14)) 
  b. * The winter socksi have this drawer around themi. (Costa (1974: 14)) 
 (27) a.  [BE (SOCKS) [AT (DRAWER)]] 
  b. # [BE (DRAWER) [AT (SOCKS)]] 
 (28) a.  [EXP (DRAWERα) [BE (SOCKS) [AT (α)]]] 
  b. * [EXP (SOCKSα) [BE (DRAWER) [AT (α)]]] 
 
(27a) and (27b) roughly represent the CSs of the second arguments of EXP of the sentences in 
(26a) and (26b), respectively.  (28a) and (28b) roughly represent the whole CS 
representations of the sentences in question.  Since the CS representation reﬂects human 
conceptualization, the present theory can account for the facts observed in the sentences in 
(26) as follows: one understands the location of socks relative to a drawer, which is larger and 
more permanently located than socks.  Similar examples are given in (29):  
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 (29) a.  That housei has a car behind iti.   
  b. * The cari has a house in front of iti.   
 (30) a.  [BE (CAR) [AT (HOUSE)]] 
  b. # [BE (HOUSE) [AT (CAR)]] 
 (31) a.  [EXP (HOUSEα) [BE (CAR) [AT (α)]]] 
  b. * [EXP (CARα) [BE (HOUSE) [AT (α)]]] 
 
(30a) and (30b) roughly represent the CSs of the second arguments of EXP of the sentences in 
(29a) and (29b), respectively.  (31a) and (31b) roughly represent the whole CS 
representations of the sentences in question.  A house can easily function as a reference point 
relative to which the location of smaller entities is understood.  The different situations 
denoted by the [Y BE [AT X]] parts contribute to the different acceptability of the sentences in 
(29).   
     Furthermore, the present framework predicts that both sentences in (32) are acceptable.  
Consider (32):   
 
 (32) a.  The cupboardi has a chest of drawers behind iti. (Costa (1974: 15)) 
  b.  The chesti of drawers has a cupboard in front of iti. (Costa (1974: 15)) 
 (33) a.  [BE (CHEST OF DRAWERS) [AT (CUPBOARD)]] 
  b.  [BE (CUPBOARD) [AT (CHEST OF DRAWERS)]] 
 (34) a.  [EXP (CUPBOARDα) [BE (CHEST OF DRAWERS) [AT (α)]]] 
  b.  [EXP (CHEST OF DRAWERSα) [BE (CUPBOARD) [AT (α)]]] 
 
The structures in (33) roughly represent the [Y BE [AT X]] parts of the CSs of the sentences 
in (32).  The structures in (34) roughly represent the whole CS representations of the 
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sentences.  As Costa (1974: 14-15) notes, a cupboard and a chest of drawers are almost the 
same size.  Thus both can function as a reference point for each other.  In sum, the speaker 
can conceptualize the situation denoted by the sentences in (32) the other way around much 
more easily than that denoted by sentences like those in (26) and (29).  Similar examples are 
as follows: 
 
 (35) a.  The motorcyclei has a bicycle behind iti.  
  b.  The bicyclei has a motorcycle behind iti.   
 (36) a.  [BE (BICYCLE) [AT (MOTORCYCLE)]] 
  b.  [BE (MOTORCYCLE) [AT (BICYCLE)]] 
 (37) a.  [EXP (MOTORCYCLEα) [BE (BICYCLE) [AT (α)]]] 
  b.  [EXP (BICYCLEα) [BE (MOTORCYCLE) [AT (α)]]] 
 
The structures in (36) roughly represent the [Y BE [AT X]] part of the CSs of the sentences in 
(35).  The structures in (37) roughly represent the whole CS representations of the sentences.  
Both a motorcycle and a bicycle can be considered to be able to function as a reference point 
for each other.  Therefore, the [Y BE [AT X]] parts of both the sentences in (35) represented 
in (36) denote acceptable situations, rendering the sentences acceptable.   
 
4.3.2.  Subject Argument of EH Not Being Mere Location 
     The relation expressed between the ﬁrst argument of EXP and the complement of AT 
can determine the acceptability of instances of EH.  When the ﬁrst argument of EXP can 
bind the complement of AT and can bear the Experiencer2 role, the sentence is acceptable; 
when it cannot bind the argument and cannot bear the role in question, the sentence is 
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unacceptable.3  For example, a part of a whole can be bound by the whole; by deﬁnition, 
being a part of a whole necessitates the dependence of the part on the whole with respect to its 
identiﬁcation.  This theoretical requirement accounts for the acceptability of examples given 
in this sub-section.   
     Let us observe the data in (38):  
 
 (38) a.  Your socki has a hole in itsi toe. (Costa (1974: 16)) 
  b. * Your toei has a hole in itsi sock. (Costa (1974: 16)) 
 (39) a.  [EXP (SOCKα) [BE (HOLE) [AT (TOE(α))]]] 
  b. * [EXP (TOEα) [BE (HOLE) [AT (SOCK(α))]]] 
 
The rough CSs of the sentences in (38) are given in (39).  As with the sentences examined in 
the previous section, one may ﬁnd that the difference in acceptability between the sentences in 
(38) can be explained by considering the second argument of EXP of the sentences, namely 
the [Y BE [AT X]] part.  However, a hole can be spatially located relative both to a toe and 
to a sock, as exempliﬁed in (40) and (41):   
 
 (40) a.  There is a hole in the toe. 
  b.  There is a hole in the sock. 
 (41) a.  [BE (HOLE) [AT (TOE)]] 
  b.  [BE (HOLE) [AT (SOCK)]] 
 
Therefore, the difference found in (38) cannot be explained by merely considering the second 
                                                   
3  In order to account for the acceptability of EH, Nakau (1998) proposes the concept of direct participant: an 
entity participating directly in the situation denoted by the elements following have.  The present thesis 
formulates the condition for an entity to directly participate in the situation in question.   
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argument of EXP.  
     The present study’s account is as follows: a sock can function as a whole of which a toe 
is a part.  Thus, the reference of a toe can be ﬁxed in relation to the reference of a sock.  
Only in the (a) sentence in (38) can the complement of AT be bound by the ﬁrst argument of 
EXP.  The ﬁrst argument of EXP can bear the Experiencer2 role and the sentence is 
acceptable.  In this case, the s(emantic)-selection of the ﬁrst argument of EXP is satisﬁed.  
On the other hand, it is difﬁcult to construe a toe as a whole of which a sock is a part.  In this 
case, the ﬁrst argument of EXP in (38b) cannot bind the complement of AT; it cannot take the 
Experiencer2 role; and the sentence is unacceptable.  In this case, the s-selection of the ﬁrst 
argument of EXP is violated.4 
     Similar examples are observed in the following: 
 
 (42) a.  That house has a TV in the kitchen.   
  b. * That kitchen has a TV in the house.   
 
A house can easily be considered to be a whole of which a kitchen is a part.  Thus, in (42a), 
the reference of the complement of the preposition can be ﬁxed in relation to the reference of 
the subject.  On the other hand, the subject referent of sentence (42b) cannot bind the 
complement of the preposition, since it is difﬁcult to regard a house as a part of a kitchen.  
Therefore, the subject in (42b) cannot bear the Experiencer2 role, and the sentence is 
unacceptable.  The s-selection of the ﬁrst argument of EXP is satisﬁed in (42a) and violated 
                                                   
4  The difference in acceptability can also be explained in Nakau’s (1998) idea of direct participant, which is 
mentioned in footnote 3.  The sock is necessarily connected in a situation in which there is a hole in its toe; the 
sock directly participates in the situation denoted by the elements following have.  On the other hand, a toe of a 
sock is not necessarily connected in a situation in which there is a hole in the sock, since there can be a hole 
anywhere in a sock.  In the latter case, the toe in question is not a direct participant in the situation denoted by 
the hole and sock.  Thus, the sentence is unacceptable.  The acceptability of all the sentences in this sub-section 
can be accounted for by his idea.   
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in (42b).   
     It has been observed that the subject argument of EH refers to a whole and the 
complement of the preposition denotes its part (Costa (1974), Nakau (1998)).  Within our 
framework, the reason for this whole-part requirement exhibited by EH is that it is not ensured 
for the ﬁrst argument of EXP to bind the complement of AT when the complement in 
question denotes not a part but a whole.   
     Note that the existence of a formal or syntactic binding relation between the ﬁrst 
argument of EXP and the complement of AT does not necessarily entail that the ﬁrst argument 
of EXP can bear the Experiencer2 role.  In both sentences in (38), there is a formal or 
syntactic binding relation between the subject and an element within the PP, and yet the 
sentences differ in acceptability.  What is crucial here is the establishment of a whole-part 
relation between the ﬁrst argument of EXP and the complement of AT.  When the subject 
denotes a whole of which an element within the PP is a part, the subject can bear the 
Experiencer2 role, and the sentence is acceptable.   
     As we have just seen, it is a whole-part relation, a semantic relation, that counts in 
licensing EH, entailing that there need not be a formal correspondence between the subject 
and an element within the PP.  For example, the complements of the prepositions in the 
sentences in (43) show a bound-variable-like behavior, even though they do not correspond to 
the subjects formally.  Observe (43):   
 
 (43) a.  Bill has a hole in the heart. 
  b.  The tree has a mushroom on the trunk.   
 
The sentences in (43) are licensed as instances of EH as long as the complement of the 
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preposition is understood as constituting a part of the subject referent.5  The complements of 
the prepositions in (43) exhibit a bound-variable-like behavior, as is clearly observed in (44):   
 
 (44) a.  Everyone has a hole in the heart. 
  b.  Every tree has a mushroom on the trunk. 
 
(44a) describes a situation where each member of the set denoted by the subject has a hole in 
his or her heart; (44b) describes a situation where each tree in the set denoted by the subject 
has a mushroom on its trunk. 
     Here is another example of this kind: 
 
 (45)   They have a lot of colleges around there.  
 
The subject in (45) refers generically to people living in the area denoted by the PP realized as 
an adverbial phrase (cf. Langacker (1995: 73)).  To put it differently, the PP in (45) refers to a 
location which the subject referents inhabit.  When the subject denotes Bostonians, for 
example, the PP denotes Boston, and when the subject refers to Londoners, the PP refers to 
London.  In these cases, the PP exhibits a bound-variable-like behavior.  If there is no such 
correspondence between the subject and the PP, the sentence cannot instantiate EH, as 
illustrated in (46):  
 
 (46)  * They (= Bostonians) have a lot of colleges around there (= in London). 
 
In (46), the subject is intended to denote Bostonians and the PP is intended to denote London, 
                                                   
5  Nakau (1998) will explain data like those in (43) by claiming that the Experiencer role is a pragmatic concept.   
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in which case the PP cannot function as a bound variable.  Since there is no formal 
correspondence between they and around there in (45), the bound-variable-like behavior 
displayed by the PP is attributed to the semantic speciﬁcations of EH.  
     Sentence (47a) parallels sentence (45):   
 
 (47) a.  We have a lot of coyotes around here. (Langacker (1995: 73)) 
  b. * We (= Americans) have a lot of coyotes around here (= in Japan). 
 
The subject of (47a) refers generically to people living in the area denoted by the PP realized 
as an adverbial phrase (Langacker (1995: 73)); to put it differently, the PP in (47a) refers to a 
location which the subject referents inhabit.  In this case, the PP functions as a bound variable.  
As illustrated in (47b), if there is no such correspondence between the subject and the PP, the 
subject cannot bind the PP and cannot bear the Experiencer2 role, and the sentence is 
unacceptable.  
     As we have seen thus far, the ﬁrst argument of EXP in EH binds the complement of the 
function AT, which in turn is the second argument of the function BE.  This requirement can 
provide an explanation for the unacceptability of the sentences in (48); in both examples, the  
ﬁrst argument of EXP does not bind the complement of AT, which is the second argument of 
BE.  The rough semantic representations of the sentences in (48) are given in (49):   
 
 (48) a. * The table has a book on the TV. 
  b. * The tablei has a pencil on a book on iti. (Belvin and den Dikken (1997: 168)) 
 (49) a. * [EXP (TABLE), [BE (BOOK), [AT (TV)]]] 
  b. * [EXP (TABLEα), [BE (PENCIL), [AT (BOOK), [AT (α)]]]] 
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As the structure in (49a) demonstrates, the ﬁrst argument of EXP of sentence (48a) cannot 
bind the complement of AT, since the complement in question denotes a referent distinct from 
the ﬁrst argument of EXP.  Thus the ﬁrst argument of EXP cannot bear the Experiencer2 role, 
and the sentence is unacceptable.  Similarly, as the structure in (49b) shows, the ﬁrst 
argument of EXP of sentence (48b) cannot bear Experiencer2, since the complement of AT, 
which in turn is the second argument of BE, does not contain a bindee.  Thus, the sentence is 
unacceptable.  Nakau (1998) argues the unacceptability of sentence (48b), and the structure 
in (49b) reﬂects his discussion.   
     Last but not least, there are several constructions in addition to EH whose subject 
arguments take the Experiencer2 role.  As is evident in the examples in (50)-(53), the verbs 
contain and include display the same behavior as EH:   
 
 (50) a.  The tablei has a book on {iti / *themj}.  
  b.  The bottlei contains wine (in {iti / *themj}). 
  c.  This ﬁlei includes several important names in {iti / *themj}. 
 (51) a. * The tablei has a pencil on a book on iti. (= (48b)) 
  b. * The bottlei contains wine in a bottle in iti. 
  c. * This ﬁlei includes several important names in a ﬁle in iti.  
 (52)  a.  This tree has a mushroom on the trunk. 
  b.   This house contains a ﬁreplace in the kitchen. 
  c.  This ﬁle includes important names in the pockets. 
 (53)  a. * This trunk has a mushroom on the tree.   
  b.  * This kitchen contains a ﬁreplace in the house.  
  c. * These pockets include important names in the ﬁle.  
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As illustrated in (50), a pronoun within the PP must refer back to the subject; as is clear from 
(51), the ﬁrst argument of EXP must bind the complement of AT, which in turn is the second 
argument of BE; as suggested by the acceptability contrast in (52-53), the ﬁrst argument of 
EXP is semantically speciﬁed to bind the complement of AT.  These examples indicate that 
the same principle lies behind the acceptability of these constructions and EH.6 
     In sections 4.2 and 4.3, we have seen that both PH and EH exhibit not only locative 
characteristics but also their own characteristics simultaneously.  Our framework can capture 
these characteristics. 
 
4.4.  Advantages of the Present Account over Other Approaches 
     In addition to offering explanations for the many different phenomena we have 
observed, the present theory also has several advantages over alternative models.  In this 
sub-section, I examine the models proposed by Jackendoff (1983, 1987), Pinker (1989), and 
                                                   
6  PH and EH exhibit one difference.  In PH, a deﬁnite article cannot appear in the position where a bindee 
appears, as illustrated in (25) in section 3.3.1, repeated here as (i): 
 
 (i) a. * John has the car. 
  b. * John has the wife.   
 
On the other hand, in EH, it can appear in the position in question, as illustrated in (43) in section 4.3.2, repeated 
here as (ii): 
 
 (ii) a.  Bill has a hole in the heart. 
  b.  The tree has a mushroom on the trunk.  
 
This difference seems to be attributed to the difference of syntactic positions where a bindee appears; that is, the 
bindee of PH appears in (surface) object position and that of EH occurs in the complement position of the 
preposition.  This reasoning is supported by the facts observed in the sentences in (26) in section 3.3.1, repeated 
here as (iii), and in the sentences in (52).   
 
 (iii) a. * John raised the hand. 
  b. * Philip stubbed the toe. 
  c. * The poor boy lost the mind. 
 
McIntyre (2006: 195) makes a similar observation.  
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Kageyama (1996), and point out that each of them faces some phenomena that are difﬁcult to 
account for. 
     First and foremost, our approach assumes that the CSs for PH and EH have one 
function embedding under it a location-denoting structure.  By assuming this, we can provide 
an explanation for locative characteristics of PH and EH, as well as their non-locative 
characteristics.  PH and EH, we argue, comprise not only locative relations but also relations 
distinct from them, namely the binding relations denoted between the ﬁrst argument of EXP 
and an argument within its second argument.  Therefore, we argue against approaches like 
Jackendoff’s that assume that the semantic representations of the relations expressed by PH 
and EH, and locative sentences are fundamentally the same.  We also argue against 
approaches like Pinker’s that assume just one function in semantic representations of 
possessive relations expressed by the verbal have.   
     In Jackendoff’s approach, which is based on the localistic view advocated by Gruber 
(1965/1976), the possessive relation is conceptualized as the possessum existing at the 
possessor, as shown in (54): 
 
 (54)   [State BE Poss ([Thing], [Place AT Poss ([Thing])])] (Jackendoff (1983: 192)) 
 
     Jackendoff postulates that conceptual structures for locative and possessive sentences 
share the same structure and the same functions, and differ only with respect to semantic ﬁelds 
in which the functions apply.  That is, the functions in the structure of locative sentences 
apply in the semantic ﬁeld of Location; those of possessive sentences in the ﬁeld of Possession, 
which is indicated by the subscript Poss in structure (54).  Although this approach may 
capture the parallelism between locative and possessive sentences as well as the commonality 
between English and Japanese possessive sentences that we saw in sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.3, it 
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cannot explain several phenomena that our approach can provide an explanation for.  For 
example, in his theory, (54) is also the structure for the verb belong, as in The car belongs to 
Mike.  Accordingly, an argument bearing the same semantic role is to be realized in different 
syntactic positions; the possessor argument of belong is to be realized in the complement 
position of the preposition to, while that of PH is to be realized in subject position.7, 8 
     In the present framework, on the other hand, this problem does not arise, since the 
possessor of PH and that of belong bear different semantic roles.  Our theory hypothesizes 
that the verb belong has roughly the CS [Y BE [AT X]], where the complement of AT is the 
possessor realized as the complement of the preposition to; the possessor of belong bears only 
the Location role.  On the other hand, the possessor of PH bears not only Location but also 
Possessor simultaneously.  The validity of this claim can be supported by the facts given in 
(55): 
 
 (55) a. * Stalin, who died several decades ago, has a tomb. 
  b.  This tomb belongs to Stalin, who died several decades ago.  
 
The possessor of PH in sentences like (55a) must be alive; on the other hand, that of the verb 
belong in sentences like (55b) need not.  In the current theoretical framework, this contrast is 
explained in terms of a difference in the semantic role taken by the possessor argument of each 
predicate.  
     Furthermore, Jackendoff (1987) observes that the subject of EH in (56a) denotes the 
same referent as that of the complement of the preposition, which bears the semantic role 
                                                   
7  It has been claimed by several previous studies that the construction that we call here PH and the verb belong 
express the same or a very similar proposition (e.g. Jackendoff (2007: 213), Tham (2009)). 
8  Jackendoff (1990: 261) notes that “have could be a stative version of receive, its subject being a stative 
Beneﬁciary,” though he continues to state that he is not yet altogether convinced.   
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Location.   
 
 (56) a.  The boxi has books in iti. (Jackendoff (1987: 382), with modiﬁcations) 
  b.  There are books in the box. (Jackendoff (1987: 382)) 
 
From this observation, he concludes that the subject argument of EH also bears only the 
Location role.  In addition, he considers sentences like (56a) to be apparently synonymous 
with there constructions such as (56b).  An entity occurring in the subject position of EH 
appears as the complement of the preposition in the there construction, which takes the 
Location role.  This fact further supports the assumption that the subject of EH bears the 
Location role (cf. Costa (1974), Culicover (2009)).  However, this assumption is not tenable, 
since it cannot explain the difference in acceptability shown in (57):  
 
 (57) a. * The tablei has a pencil on a book on iti. (= (51a)) 
  b.  There is a pencil on a book on the table.  
 
In his framework, the table in both (57a) and (57b) will bear the same semantic role.  He 
might try to account for the fact displayed in (57) by claiming that the unacceptability of (57a) 
results from the realization of the table in subject position; in other words, he might argue that 
the subject in (57a) cannot syntactically bind an anaphor because it is too deeply embedded in 
the PP.  However, this claim is argued against by the data in (58) observed by Belvin and den 
Dikken (1997), in which the binder can syntactically bind the anaphor that is deeply 
embedded in the PP.  Consider (58):   
 
 
103  
 (58) a.  Everyonei should concentrate on the pencil on the book on hisi table. 
  b.  Everyonei hates it when there is a spider crawling around on the hat on hisi 
head. 
(Belvin and den Dikken (1997: 168)) 
 
On the other hand, the present theory predicts the facts displayed in (57).  The subject of EH 
bears the semantic role Experiencer2 and the complement of the preposition in the there 
construction does not.  As we saw in the previous section, the ﬁrst argument of EXP in EH 
must bind the complement of AT, which in turn is the second argument of BE.  The bindee 
in (57a) does not ﬁll in this particular position, resulting in the unacceptability of the sentence.9 
     Secondly, Pinker (1989) adopts a different approach, which describes the CS for the 
construction that we call here PH as having no functions corresponding to BE and AT but 
containing only one function that specializes in expressing possessive relations.  Consider 
(59): 
 
 (59)   [State HAVE ([Thing], [Thing])] (Pinker (1989: 190)) 
 
In essence, Pinker does not divert a structure aimed at representing the spatial relation of two 
entities to the representations of possessive predicates such as PH, own, and possess.  He 
assumes that possession is conceptualized in two ways: one is shown in (59) and the other in 
(54), which is the structure for the verb belong in his framework.  The logical entailment of 
these two propositions is captured by the inference rule in (60):   
 
 (60)   If X HAVE Y, then Y BE (place-function) X. (Pinker (1989: 190)) 
                                                   
9  Nakau (1991, 1998: 93-94) also argues against the discussion by Jackendoff (1987).   
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As stated at the beginning of this section, we argue that the relations expressed by PH and/or 
EH cannot be captured by assuming just one function.   
     Furthermore, Pinker’s model cannot give a uniﬁed account of possessive sentences that 
are thought of as deriving from different sources, which was discussed in section 4.2.3.  He 
will have to claim that it is just an accident.  One might be tempted to claim that the CS for 
the verb grab or hold, from which have is diachronically derived, has the function HAVE in it.  
(61a) is an example of these verbs, and (61b) is their possible CS:   
 
 (61) a.  Mary {grabbed / held} a book.  
  b.  [CAUSE ([MARY],[MARY], [HAVE ([MARY], [BOOK])])] 
 
The structure in (61b) means that an agent acts on herself, which results in the situation of her 
having a book.  One might be able to argue that the resultant state represented in (61b), in 
which the function HAVE appears, has become the CS for English have.  However, it seems 
difﬁcult to suppose that the CS for the possessive sentence in Japanese originally had the 
function HAVE in it, since, as we saw in section 4.2.3, the Japanese possessive verbs, iru and 
aru, originally denote not the act of grabbing or holding, but the existence of an entity in a 
situation.  It would not be convincing, therefore, to assume that the possessive sentences in 
English and Japanese are derived from elements that were not related to each other at all and 
happen to have come to express a similar or the identical proposition.  
     Finally, Kageyama (1996) posits a structure like (62), which closely resembles the 
structure proposed by the present theory.10   
 
                                                   
10  Kageyama (1996: 53-56) seems to regard instances of PH and those of EH as instances of one and the same 
construction.  
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 (62)   [State zi BE [Poss WITH [State y BE [Loc AT zi ]]]] (Kageyama (1996: 55)) 
 
In this model, the function BE on the left hand side of the structure and the function WITH are 
realized as the verb have.  The possessor originally occurs in the complement position of the 
function AT and becomes a possessor by being realized in subject position.  This association 
is represented by the variable z in the complement of AT and the ﬁrst argument of BE.  One 
problem with Kageyama’s model and the other models presented in this sub-section is that it 
is unclear whether or not the surface subject argument is semantically speciﬁed in such a way 
that one can predict the difference in acceptability of sentences like the following: 
 
 (63) a.  This plane has four engines. (cf. (8a)) 
  b. * This desk has a book.   (= (17a)) 
 
     In short, the previous studies examined in this sub-section all face one or more problems 
that are difﬁcult to account for.  
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Chapter 5 
Conceptual Structures for Two Uses of the Double Object Construction 
and Their Binding Relations 
 
5.1.  Introduction 
     In this chapter, I deal with two uses of the double object construction (DOC): the CS for 
one use contains as its part the CS for PH; the CS for the other contains as its part the CS for 
EH.  Their presence creates binding relations between the indirect object and another entity.  
The former use can be regarded as the DOC counterpart of PH and the latter as the DOC 
counterpart of EH.  In what follows, I call them PH-DOC and EH-DOC for convenience.   
     The deﬁnition of binding should be recalled here:  
 
 (1) binding: 
  X binds Y if and only if the reference of Y is ﬁxed in terms of the reference of X. 
 
X binds Y iff Y is referentially dependent on X.  The present thesis employs the term 
“reference” as a cover term for “reference” in its strict sense and for “identity.”  That is to say, 
Y depends on X with respect to its identiﬁcation.  
     An instance of PH-DOC is exempliﬁed in (2a): 
 
 (2) a.  Providence gave him a {house / wife}. 
 = b.  Providence gave himi a {house / wife} of hisi own. 
 
Sentence (2a) exhibits a binding relation in the sense of the present thesis between the indirect 
and direct objects.  The direct object in (2a), house or wife, depends on the indirect object 
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with respect to its identiﬁcation, which is clariﬁed by the interpretation of (2a) given in (2b).  
This relation is more clearly observed in the sentences in (3), where there are universal 
quantiﬁers in the indirect object positions:   
 
 (3) a.  Providence gave everyone a house. 
  b.  Providence gave everyone a wife.   
 
In these cases, each member of the set denoted by the quantiﬁer had or got a house or wife 
different from any other member’s in the same set; the value of the direct object covaries with 
the value of the indirect object.  This relation is roughly represented as follows: 
 
 (4) a.  x1 had/got x1’s house and x2 had/got x2’s house and … and xn had/got xn’s 
house.   
  b.  x1 had/got x1’s wife and x2 had/got x2’s wife and … and xn had/got xn’s wife. 
({x1, x2, … , xn} = a set of individuals) 
 
     Instances of EH-DOC are given in (5).  This use demonstrates a binding relation in the 
sense of the present study between the indirect object and the complement of the preposition.1 
 
 (5) a. % This gave himi several more people at {hisi / *her} disposal. 
  b. % This gave everyonei Colin Powell at hisi disposal. 
 
As is illustrated in (5a), the pronoun in the PP must refer back to the referent of the indirect 
                                                   
1  Some English native speakers ﬁnd acceptable examples of EH-DOC like those in (5), while others do not.  
The % in front of the sentences in (5) reﬂects this variability in judgements.  This marker is employed 
throughout this chapter.   
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object; in this case, the pronoun his in the PP functions as a formal bound variable.  The 
binding relation is more clearly observed in sentence (5b), where there is a universal quantiﬁer 
in the indirect object position.  In this case, each member of the set denoted by the quantiﬁer 
had or got Colin Powell at his own disposal; the value of the complement of the preposition 
covaries with the value of the indirect object.  This relation is roughly represented as follows: 
 
 (6)   x1 had or got Colin Powell at x1’s disposal and x2 had or got Colin Powell at 
x2’s disposal … and xn had or got Colin Powell at xn’s disposal.   
({x1, x2, … , xn} = a set of individuals) 
 
The pronoun his in the PP in (5b) also functions as a formal bound variable.   
     We account for, in section 5.2, many different phenomena demonstrated by the two 
uses of the DOC.  We then investigate, in section 5.3, the question of whether or not the 
DOC and the corresponding prepositional phrase construction (e.g. I gave a book to Mary) 
denote the same meaning; we argue that they differ in meaning, entailing that they have totally 
different CSs.  Before moving to these sub-sections, I ﬁrst propose, in section 5.1.1, 
conceptual structures for PH-DOC and EH-DOC, whose presence creates the binding 
relations observed above.  In section 5.1.2, we argue that the DOC is associated with the 
caused possession meaning.  By caused possession, I mean the bringing about of a relation 
between the indirect object and another entity within the same sentence by the subject referent.  
The DOC, whether it be PH-DOC or EH-DOC, does not encode transfer.   
 
5.1.1.  Conceptual Structures for PH-DOC and EH-DOC 
     The present study hypothesizes that PH-DOC has the conceptual structure represented 
in (7a), and that EH-DOC has the conceptual structure represented in (7b):   
109  
 (7) a.  [Event CAUSE ([W], [State EXP ([Xα]i, [State BE ([Y (α)], [Place AT (ei)])])])] 
  b.  [Event CAUSE ([W], [State EXP ([Xα], [State BE ([Y], [Place AT ([Z (α)])])])] 
 
These CSs have the CSs for PH and EH embedded under the function CAUSE.  The 
function EXP takes as its second argument a location-denoting structure, namely the [Y BE 
[AT X]] part.  For a better understanding, we present examples of PH-DOC and EH-DOC in 
(8a) and (9a), and their CS representations in (8b) and (9b), respectively. 
 
 (8) a.  Providence gave Mike a child. 
  b.  [CAUSE ([PROVIDENCE], [EXP ([MIKEα]i, [BE ([CHILD (α)], [AT 
(ei)])])])] 
 (9) a. % This gave Mikei several more people at hisi disposal. 
  b.   [CAUSE ([THIS], [EXP ([MIKEα], [BE ([PEOPLE], [AT ([DISPOSAL 
(α)])])])] 
 
For ease of reference, the subscripts Event, State, and Place are omitted in the (b) 
representations.  The ﬁrst argument of the function CAUSE is realized as the surface subject.  
The ﬁrst arguments of EXP and BE are realized as the surface indirect and direct objects, 
respectively; the complement of AT of the CS for EH-DOC is realized as the complement of 
the preposition.  As is the case with PH, it is speciﬁed as a constructional meaning that the 
ﬁrst argument of the function EXP in the CS for PH-DOC binds the ﬁrst argument of BE.  
As is the case with EH, the ﬁrst argument of EXP in the CS for EH-DOC is speciﬁed to bind 
the complement of AT.  These are s(emantic)-selections imposed on the ﬁrst arguments of 
EXPs in these structures.  The ﬁrst argument of EXP of PH-DOC bears the Possessor role, 
while that of EH-DOC bears the Experiencer2 role.  The ﬁrst argument of the function 
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CAUSE is speciﬁed as a Causer.  The ﬁrst argument of BE bears Theme, and the 
complement of AT bears Location.  The ﬁrst argument of the function EXP simultaneously 
takes both the Possessor/Experiencer2 and Location roles.  The complement of AT of the CS 
for PH-DOC is empty, which is indicated by e.   
     Note that in constructions like EH and EH-DOC, in which the argument bearing 
Experiencer2 and the argument bearing Location are realized as different linguistic elements, it 
is binding that guarantees the subject argument and the indirect object argument bearing both 
Experiencer2 and Location.  That is, the bindee is an element within the complement which 
takes the semantic role Location.  The bindee refers back to the binder and it ensures that the 
ﬁrst argument of EXP bears both the semantic roles. 
     The (invisible) anaphors in these two uses of the DOC are anaphoric to local 
antecedents.  Consider (10):   
 
 (10) a.  Providence gave Mike’s sister a child. 
  b. % I handed Maryi’s fatherj ﬁve dollars in {*heri / hisj} hand.   
 
Sentence (10a) describes not a situation in which Mike got a child of his own, but a situation 
where Mike’s sister got a child of her own.  A pronoun in the PP in (10b) must be anaphoric 
to the indirect object referent.  Thus, the direct object in PH-DOC and the complement of the 
preposition in EH-DOC are subject to locality conditions.  These restrictions stem from the 
semantic speciﬁcations of these constructions.   
     As the CSs for PH and EH are uniﬁed into a single entry, the CSs for the two uses of the 
DOC are uniﬁed into one entry as well, as shown in (11):  
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 (11)   [Event CAUSE ([W], [State EXP ([Xα]{ i}, [State BE ([Y ({α})], 
    [Place AT ([ {X (α)}]{i})])])])] 
 
The curly bracketed elements are mutually exclusive.  Either the ﬁrst argument of EXP binds 
the ﬁrst argument of BE, or else it binds the complement of AT.  The speaker has this one 
entry stored in his or her mind.   
     The [X EXP [Y BE [AT Z]]] part of PH-DOC refers to an atemporal relation, while that 
of EH-DOC denotes a temporal relation.  I assume that the situation denoted by the relation 
between the ﬁrst argument of EXP and its second argument is not spatio-temporally limited 
when the CS contains the [AT (e)] part, where the complement of AT is empty.  In this case, 
the relation between the ﬁrst argument of EXP and its second argument tends to refer to an 
atemporal state of affairs.  The CS for PH contains the [AT (e)] part; therefore, PH expresses 
an atemporal, abstract relation and tends to refer to a state of affairs holding over a relatively 
long period of time and hence cannot be recurrent.  The same holds true for PH-DOC.  The 
CS for PH-DOC contains the [AT (e)] part.  Thus, it is difﬁcult to express a limited (short) 
duration of the situation denoted by the [X EXP [Y BE [AT X]]] part.  Observe the 
following:   
 
 (12) a. * Providence gave them a daughter for the day. 
  b. * Mary’s long prayers gave her a child for the weekend.   
 
The relations between the indirect and direct object referents in (12) are rather atemporal; 
therefore, expressions delimiting the relations such as for the day and for the weekend cannot 
occur in the sentences in (12).   
     I also assume that the situation denoted by the relation between the ﬁrst argument of 
112  
EXP and its second argument is spatio-temporally limited when the CS contains the [AT ([Z 
(α)])] part, where the complement of AT is not empty.  In this case, the relation between the 
ﬁrst argument of EXP and its second argument tends to refer to a temporary and iterative 
situation.  The CS for EH contains the [AT ([Z (α)])] part; therefore, EH expresses a 
spatio-temporally limited situation between the ﬁrst argument of EXP and its second argument.  
The same holds true for EH-DOC.  The CS for EH-DOC contains the [AT ([Z (α)])] part; 
therefore, the second argument of the function CAUSE in EH-DOC tends to refer to a state of 
affairs holding over a relatively short period of time.  Thus, it is not difﬁcult to express a 
limited (short) duration of the situation denoted by the [X EXP [Y BE [AT X]]] part.  
Observe the following:   
 
 (13) a. % This gave Mikei several more people at hisi disposal for the weekend. (cf. (9a)) 
  b.  I gave John my bicycle for the afternoon. (Oehrle (1976: 22)) 
 
In (13a), for example, the relation between Mike and the situation of him having custody of 
several people is rather temporal; thus, the expression delimiting it, namely for the weekend, 
can occur in the sentence.  
     The [AT ([Z (α)])] part of sentence (13b) is not realized in surface structure.  As is the 
case with an EH exempliﬁed in (14a), it is often the case that the [AT ([Z (α)])] part of 
EH-DOC is not realized in surface structure.  Sentence (13b) is one example; another 
example is given in (14b): 
 
 (14) a.  Judy has the car.   
  b.  Give me the pen. 
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A possible context for sentence (14a) is one in which someone asks her husband why they 
cannot use the car, and he answers that his sister, Judy, is in a shopping mall, has the car in 
question at her disposal and is currently using it.  Sentence (14b) is an imperative and can be 
uttered in a situation where the speaker wants the hearer to hand him a pen that is situated near 
the hearer.  Since it is contextually evident, it is not necessary in these cases for the [AT ([Z 
(α)])] parts to be explicitly uttered.2 
 
5.1.2.  DOC Not Encoding Transfer   
     Before we proceed to the next section, a brief comment on a constructional meaning of 
the DOC is in order.  Several previous studies argue that the DOC encodes transfer of entities 
from the subject referent to the indirect object referent; Goldberg (1992, 1995), for example, 
claims that the central sense of the construction in question involves transfer between a 
volitional agent and a willing recipient.  I argue, partially in line with Rappaport Hovav and 
Levin (2008) (RH & L (2008)),3 that the meaning of transfer is not encoded in the DOC, and 
that some instances of the DOC only appear to be associated with the meaning in question.   
     Some instances of the DOC appear to encode transfer, but this stems from the 
composition of (i) constructional meaning of the DOC, (ii) lexical meanings of the verb 
                                                   
2  Sentences like (13b) prompted Ross (1976: 267) to assume a have-like element in the (syntactic) 
representation of the DOC.  His example is given in (i):   
 
 (i)   I {gave / loaned / sent / mailed} Ted my keys until tomorrow. (Ross (1976: 267)) 
 
Until tomorrow in (i) modiﬁes the result having state.  In our framework, the DOC in (i) is an instance of 
EH-DOC with the [AT ([Z (α)])] part not appearing in surface structure.   
3  As argued by RH & L (2008: 139), sentence (i) does not express any transfer:   
 
 (i)   The court gave a parent visiting rights. (RH & L (2008: 139)) 
 
RH & L (2008) argue that it is not the case that the court had the rights in question and relinquished them to the 
parent; rather, the court brought about a possessive relation between the parent and the rights.  Because of the 
presence of the court, the rights were created, and the parent got them. 
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appearing in it, and/or (iii) values of the arguments.  For example, sentence (15) can describe 
a situation where the direct object referent was transferred from the subject referent to the 
indirect object referent. 
 
 (15)   Brett gave Leslie an apple. (RH & L (2008: 140)) 
 
As RH & L (2008: 140) note, one may conclude from this kind of example that the DOC is 
always associated with transfer of possession.  However, the interpretation in question of 
sentence (15) is a result of the composition of constructional meaning of the DOC and values 
of the arguments.  The DOC speciﬁes that the subject referent causes the creation of a 
relation between the object referents.  Both the subject and the indirect object in sentence 
(15) denote human beings, and the direct object refers to an entity that can be transferred from 
one place to another.  Our world knowledge easily makes us interpret sentence (15) as 
expressing the movement of an apple from the subject referent to the indirect object referent. 
     Another example is in (16): 
 
 (16)  % John handed Maryi ﬁve dollars in heri hand.   
 
Sentence (16) denotes a physical transfer of several dollars from the subject referent to the 
indirect object referent.  In this case, what contributes to the interpretation of transfer of 
possession is the constructional meaning of the DOC, the lexical meaning of the verb hand, 
and the values of arguments.  The DOC speciﬁes that the subject referent causes a situation 
denoted by the elements following the verb hand.  It is speciﬁed in the lexical meaning of the 
verb hand that the action of handing is effected by hand, namely the hand(s) of the subject 
referent (RH & L (2008: 136, fn. 8)).  Both the subject and indirect object in (16) refer to 
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human beings; the direct object denotes a physical object; and the complement of the 
preposition refers to a spatial goal to which the direct object referent moved.  In sum, the 
acquisition by Mary of ﬁve dollars in her hand was brought about by the subject referent using 
his hand(s); ﬁve dollars was given to the indirect object referent by the subject referent 
employing his hand(s).  Thus, the sentence compositionally creates the interpretation in 
which the subject referent physically transferred an entity to the indirect object referent.  The 
subject referents in the sentences in (15) and (16) pragmatically function as agents (cf. Nakau 
(1994)). 
     As just seen, it is possible that a causer contextually becomes an agent, especially when 
it denotes a human being, but this does not necessarily indicate that a human being in the 
subject position of the DOC always functions as an agent.  Consider the sentence in (17): 
 
 (17)   I gave John a cold. (Williams (1994: 250)) 
 
Williams (1994: 250) observes that sentence (17) does not denote a transfer of a cold from the 
subject referent to the indirect object referent.  In this case, the subject referent merely 
brought about a situation where the indirect object referent got a cold; the subject, although it 
refers to a human being, functions just as a cause.  A possible context for (17) is a situation 
where the speaker kept John waiting outside a house or building for certain hours, and John 
got a cold because of it.   
     Inanimate entities can occur in the subject positions of the DOC; inanimate entities 
cannot themselves transfer entities from one place to another, but they can cause the creation 
of relations between other entities.  Observe the sentences in (18):   
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 (18) a.  Mary’s long prayers gave her a child.  
  b. % Hisi strategy and logistics gave himi everything hei needed to win at hisi 
disposal. (cf. The Little Black Schoolbook) 
 
Sentence (18a) refers to a situation where the indirect object referent got a child of her own by 
praying for a long time.  This sentence does not express any transfer; the child in question did 
not physically move from one place to the indirect object referent.  The subject referent in 
(18a) functions as a cause creating the relation between the indirect and direct objects.  
Similarly, sentence (18b) expresses a situation where the subject referent brought about the 
indirect object referent getting the custody of his necessities; the indirect object referent came 
to be able to employ things that he needed because of the subject referent.  Sentences like 
those in (17) and (18) indicate that neither the DOC nor the verb give encodes a transfer of 
possession.   
     It should be noted here that the DOC does not encode the speciﬁc nature of the cause 
expressed by the subject referent, the ﬁrst argument of CAUSE.  It is unspeciﬁed as a 
constructional meaning that what behavior of the subject referent, if any, causes the situation 
denoted by the elements following the verb.  It can only be understood contextually (cf. 
Pinker (1989: 212)).4 
                                                   
4  Our framework explains observations made by Oehrle (1976).  Oehrle (1976: 19) observes that an instance 
of the DOC in (i) has three interpretations given in (ii).   
 
 (i)   Nixon gave Mailer a book. (Oehrle (1976: 19)) 
 (ii)   On reading (a), [i] asserts that the ownership of the book passed from Nixon to Mailer; on 
reading (b), [i] is compatible with a situation in which Mailer wrote a book which he 
wouldn’t have been able to write if it hadn’t been for Nixon; on reading (c), [i] is compatible 
with a situation in which Nixon merely handed the book to Mailer, and questions of 
ownership are simply irrelevant. (Oehrle (1976: 19), with modiﬁcations, bold mine) 
 
In our framework, readings (a) and (b) of sentence (i) are instances of PH-DOC, and reading (c) is an example of 
EH-DOC.  Readings (a) and (c) involve transfer, but this is a compositional result of values of the arguments. 
117  
     The organization of this chapter is as follows: we account for, in section 5.2, many 
different phenomena demonstrated by the two uses of the DOC.  We then investigate, in 
section 5.3, the question of whether or not the DOC and the corresponding prepositional 
phrase construction (e.g. I gave a book to Mary) denote the same meaning; we argue that they 
differ in meaning.  That is to say, they have totally different CSs.   
 
5.2.  Double Object Construction  
     The present study hypothesizes that PH-DOC has the CS represented in (7a), repeated 
here as (19a), and that the EH-DOC has the CS represented in (7b), repeated here as (19b): 
 
 (19) a.  [Event CAUSE ([W], [State EXP ([Xα]i, [State BE ([Y (α)], [Place AT (ei)])])])] 
  b.  [Event CAUSE ([W], [State EXP ([Xα], [State BE ([Y], [Place AT ([Z (α)])])])] 
 
     For a better understanding, we present examples of PH-DOC and EH-DOC in (20a) 
and (21a), and their CS representations in (20b) and (21b), respectively. 
 
 (20) a.  Providence gave Mike a child. (= (8a)) 
  b.  [CAUSE ([PROVIDENCE]), [EXP ([MIKEα]i, [BE ([CHILD (α)], [AT 
(ei)])])]] (= (8b)) 
 (21) a. % This gave Mikei several more people at hisi disposal. (= (9a)) 
  b.  [([THIS]) CAUSE, [EXP ([MIKEα], [BE ([PEOPLE], [AT ([DISPOSAL 
(α)])])])]] (= (9b)) 
 
For ease of reference, the subscripts Event, State, and Place are omitted in the (b) 
representations.  It is speciﬁed as a constructional meaning that the ﬁrst argument of EXP 
118  
binds the ﬁrst argument of BE in PH-DOC, and that the same argument binds the complement 
of AT in EH-DOC.  These are s(emantic)-selections of the ﬁrst arguments of EXP.   
     We examine, in section 5.2.1, PH-DOC and, in section 5.2.2, EH-DOC.   
 
5.2.1.  PH-DOC 
     This sub-section focuses on PH-DOC.  In the present framework, PH-DOC has the CS 
represented in (19a), repeated here as (22):   
 
 (22)   [Event CAUSE ([W], [State EXP ([Xα]i, [State BE ([Y (α)], [Place AT (ei)])])])]  
 
The ﬁrst argument of CAUSE takes the Causer role; the ﬁrst argument of EXP(ERIENCE) 
takes both the Possessor and Location roles; the ﬁrst argument of BE bears Theme.  For a 
better understanding, we present an example of PH-DOC in (23a) and its CS representation in 
(23b). 
 
 (23) a.  Providence gave Mike a child. (= (20a)) 
  b.  [CAUSE ([PROVIDENCE], [EXP ([MIKEα]i, [BE ([CHILD (α)], [AT 
(ei)])])])] (= (20b)) 
 
The CS for PH-DOC has the structure [Y BE [AT X]] embedded under the function EXP, 
entailing that this use has locative characteristics, as well as characteristics of its own.  The 
complement of function AT serves as a reference object relative to which the ﬁrst argument of 
BE is located.  The ﬁrst argument of the function EXP of the CS for PH-DOC 
simultaneously takes both the Possessor and Location roles; an argument is both the ﬁrst 
argument of EXP and the complement of the location-denoting function at the same time, 
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which is indicated by the same subscript i.  The complement of AT is empty, which is 
indicated by e. 
 
5.2.1.1.  Locative Characteristics 
     Let us ﬁrst examine locative characteristics of PH-DOC.  The Location argument 
functions as a reference object relative to which the ﬁrst argument of BE is construed.  
Consider the contrast in (24):   
 
 (24) a.  I gave Mike a book.   
  b. * I gave a book Mike. 
 
The second argument of function EXP of the CSs of the sentences in (24) is given in (25); the 
second argument of function CAUSE is given in (26); the whole CS representations are given 
in (27).   
 
 (25) a.  [BE (BOOK) [AT (MIKE)]] 
  b. # [BE (MIKE) [AT (BOOK)]] 
 (26) a.  [EXP (MIKEα)i, [BE (BOOK(α)) [AT (ei)]]] 
  b. * [EXP (BOOKα)i, [BE (MIKE(α)) [AT (ei)]]] 
 (27) a.  [(I) CAUSE, [EXP (MIKEα)i, [BE (BOOK (α)), [AT (ei)]]]] 
  b. * [(I) CAUSE, [EXP (BOOKα)i, [BE (MIKE (α)), [AT (ei)]]]] 
 
As illustrated in (25), it is more natural for a book to be understood or construed relative to a 
human being than vice versa, since a book is smaller than a human being.  This construal is 
directly reﬂected in the [Y BE [AT X]] part.  In the [Y BE [AT X]] part of the CS of (24a) 
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that is given in (25a), Mike is an argument of the function AT and book is the ﬁrst argument of 
the function BE, ensuring that book is understood relative to Mike.  On the other hand, in the 
same part of the CS of (24b) that is given in (25b), book is an argument of the 
location-denoting function and Mike is the ﬁrst argument of BE.  In this case, the book 
functions as a reference object relative to which a human being is construed.  This 
conceptualization is difﬁcult to make, so the sentence in (24b) is unacceptable.  The [Y BE 
[AT X]] part of sentence (24a) denotes an acceptable situation, rendering the sentence 
acceptable; on the other hand, the same part of (24b) refers to an unacceptable situation, 
resulting in the unacceptability of the sentence.   
     The acceptability of the [Y BE [AT X]] part is inherited to the acceptability of the 
relation between the ﬁrst arguments of EXP and BE.  The second argument of CAUSE of 
sentence (24a) is given in (26a), where the ﬁrst arguments of EXP and BE are Mike and a 
book, respectively.  In this case, the reference of the ﬁrst argument of BE can be ﬁxed in 
relation to the reference of the ﬁrst argument of EXP.  Thus, the ﬁrst argument of EXP can 
bind the ﬁrst argument of BE and bear the Possessor role, and the sentence is acceptable.  
The acceptability of structure (26a) originates from the acceptability of structure (25a).  On 
the other hand, it is difﬁcult for sentence (24b) to exhibit a binding relation between the 
indirect and direct objects, that is, between the ﬁrst arguments of EXP and BE.  The 
reference of Mike does not depend on any other element within the same sentence with 
respect to its identiﬁcation; it need not be determined in relation to a book.  Thus the ﬁrst 
argument of EXP of sentence (24b) cannot bear the Possessor role, and the sentence is 
unacceptable.  The unacceptability of structure (26b) originates from the unacceptability of 
structure (25b). 
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5.2.1.2.  Non-locative Characteristics 
     We now move on to examine cases whose acceptability is determined by the relation 
expressed between the ﬁrst arguments of EXP and BE.  When the ﬁrst argument of EXP can 
bind the ﬁrst argument of BE and can bear the Possessor role, the sentence is acceptable; when 
it cannot bind the argument and cannot bear the role in question, the sentence is unacceptable.  
For example, a part of a whole can be bound by the whole; by deﬁnition, being a part of a 
whole necessitates the dependence of the part on the whole with respect to its identiﬁcation.  
When the ﬁrst arguments of EXP and BE refer to a whole and its part, respectively, the 
sentence can successfully instantiate PH-DOC.  This theoretical assumption accounts for the 
acceptability of examples given in this sub-section. 
     Observe as an example the sentences in (28):   
 
 (28) a.  She gave the room thick and dark curtains.   
  b. * She gave the room a book. 
 
The second argument of function EXP of the CSs of the sentences in (28) is given in (29); the 
second argument of function CAUSE is given in (30); the whole CS representations are given 
in (31).   
 
 (29) a.  [BE (CURTAINS) [AT (ROOM)]] 
  b.  [BE (BOOK) [AT (ROOM)]] 
 (30) a.  [EXP (ROOMα)i), [BE (CURTAINS(α)) [AT (ei)]]] 
  b. * [EXP (ROOMα)i], [BE (BOOK(α)) [AT (ei)]]] 
 (31) a.  [(I) CAUSE, [EXP (ROOMα)i, [BE (CURTAINS (α)), [AT (ei)]]]] 
  b. * [(I) CAUSE, [EXP (ROOMα)i, [BE (BOOK (α)), [AT (ei)]]]] 
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Like the sentences examined in the previous section, one may ﬁnd that the difference in 
acceptability between the sentences in (28) can be explained by considering their second 
argument of EXP, namely the [Y BE [AT X]] part.  However, both curtains and books can 
be spatially located relative to a room, as exempliﬁed in There are thick and dark curtains in 
the room and There is a book in the room.  Therefore, the difference found in (28) cannot be 
explained by merely considering the second argument of EXP.   
     The relation expressed between the ﬁrst arguments of EXP and BE contributes to the 
differential acceptability of the sentences in (28).  It is easier to construe curtains as a part of a 
room than books.  Only in the case in (28a) can the ﬁrst argument of BE be regarded as one 
of the parts of the ﬁrst argument of EXP; only in this case can the binding relation in the sense 
of this thesis be established between these two arguments.  Hence the ﬁrst argument of EXP 
can take the Possessor role, and the sentence is acceptable.  In the case of (28b), on the other 
hand, the value of the ﬁrst argument of BE cannot be easily construed as constituting a part of 
the value of the ﬁrst argument of EXP, in which case the reference of the ﬁrst argument of BE 
cannot as easily be determined in relation to the reference of the ﬁrst argument of EXP.  Thus, 
the ﬁrst argument of EXP cannot bind the ﬁrst argument of BE and cannot bear the Possessor 
role, and the sentence is unacceptable.  
     The discussion thus far has clariﬁed that locative situations can be easier to express than 
possessive situations (cf. Harley (2003: 37)); in other words, situations expressible by the [Y 
BE [AT X]] part are less restricted than those by the relation between the ﬁrst argument of 
EXP and its second argument.  For example, the unacceptability of sentence (32) originates 
from the unacceptable relation denoted between the ﬁrst arguments of EXP and BE.  
 
 (32)  * She gave the room a book. (= (28b)) 
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The [Y BE [AT X]] part, on the other hand, denotes an acceptable situation, as exempliﬁed in 
There is a book in the room.  When the relation expressible by the [Y BE [AT X]] part is 
acceptable, it does not necessarily entail that the relation between the ﬁrst arguments of EXP 
and BE also refers to an acceptable situation.  The acceptability of the former relation does 
not entail the acceptability of the latter relation.  
     On the other hand, when the relation expressed between the ﬁrst arguments of EXP and 
BE is acceptable, the [Y BE [AT X]] part also refers to an acceptable situation.  Consider the 
data in (33):   
 
 (33)   She gave the room thick and dark curtains. (= (28a)) 
 
The reference of curtains in (33) depends on the indirect object referent with respect to its 
identiﬁcation; in this case, the [Y BE [AT X]] part also refers to an acceptable situation, as 
exempliﬁed in There are thick and dark curtains in the room.  The relation between the ﬁrst 
arguments of EXP and BE refers to an acceptable situation, entailing that the [Y BE [AT X]] 
part also denotes an acceptable situation.  
     Furthermore, when the [Y BE [AT X]] part denotes an unacceptable situation, the 
relation between the ﬁrst arguments of EXP and BE also refers to an unacceptable situation.  
Consider (34): 
 
 (34) a. * I gave a book Mike. (= (24b)) 
  b. # [BE (MIKE) [AT (BOOK)]] (= (25b)) 
  c. * [EXP (BOOKα)i [BE (MIKE(α)) [AT (ei)]]] (= (26b)) 
 
The [Y BE [AT X]] part of sentence (34a) is given in (34b), in which a book functions as a 
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reference point relative to which Mike is located.  This construal is difﬁcult to make, leading 
to the unacceptability of the sentence.  In this case, the relation between the ﬁrst arguments of 
EXP and BE is not acceptable, either.  Books cannot be easily construed as a whole of which 
a human being is a part; the reference of the ﬁrst argument of BE cannot be determined in 
relation to the reference of the ﬁrst argument of EXP.  The reference of Mike does not 
depend on any other element within the same sentence with respect to its identiﬁcation; it need 
not be determined in relation to a book.  The unacceptability of the relation expressible by the 
[Y BE [AT X]] part entails the unacceptability of the relation expressible between the ﬁrst 
arguments of EXP and BE.  Thus, locative relations are expressible more easily than 
possessive relations.  
 
5.2.1.3.  Other Examples 
     This sub-section presents other examples that can be explained by our framework.  For 
example, the present study can predict the observation by Harley (2003).  She observes that 
the DOC in (35) can express the idea that John impregnated Mary; that is, Mary got her own 
child.   
 
 (35)   John gave Mary a child. (Harley (2003: 42)) 
 
In our framework, sentence (35) instantiates PH-DOC.  The indirect object of PH-DOC 
binds the direct object, creating the interpretation observed by Harley.  In this case, the direct 
object referent depends upon the indirect object referent with respect to its identiﬁcation. 
     Our framework can account for the difference in acceptability of the sentences in (36) 
and (37):  
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 (36) a.  Nixon gave Mailer a book. 
  b. * Nixon gave Mailer someone else’s book. 
 (37) a.  Theiri marriage brought themi a child.  
  b. ?? Their marriage brought them someone else’s child. 
 
(36a) denotes a situation where the ownership of the book was transferred from Nixon to 
Mailer; (37a) expresses a situation where the referents of the indirect object got married and 
got a child of their own.  In these cases, the references of the direct objects are determined in 
relation to the references of the indirect objects.  That is to say, after the giving or bringing 
event, the book became Mary’s, and the child became theirs.  On the other hand, the (b) 
sentences in (36) and (37) do not display binding relations between the indirect and direct 
objects, since the direct object NPs contain an element that hinders their references from being 
determined in relation to the indirect objects, namely someone else.  Therefore, the indirect 
object arguments cannot bind the direct object arguments and cannot bear the Possessor role, 
and the sentences do not successfully instantiate PH-DOC.   
     The (a) sentences in (38-41) instantiate PH-DOC.  The direct object referents depend 
on the indirect object referents with respect to their identiﬁcation.  The (b) sentences are 
possible paraphrases for the corresponding sentences.5 
 
 (38) a.  Interviewing Richard Nixon gave Norman Mailer a book. (Oehrle (1976: 44)) 
  b.  Norman Mailer wrote a book by interviewing Richard Nixon. 
 (39) a.  Having a smart older sister gave John an inferiority complex. 
(Green (1974: 129)) 
  b.  John got an inferiority complex by having a smart older sister. 
                                                   
5  These paraphrases are based on observations by Oehrle (1976).   
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 (40) a.  Working hard for 20 years gave Mike a house. 
  b.  Mike built/got a house by working hard for 20 years. 
 (41) a.  Working hard for 20 years gave Mike a fortune. 
  b.  Mike made a fortune by working hard for 20 years.   
 
As a possible paraphrase in (38b) indicates, sentence (38a) denotes a situation where the 
referent of the indirect object himself wrote a book by having done some interview with 
Richard Nixon.  In this case, a book was created whose reference is determined in relation to 
the reference of the indirect object.  Similarly, sentence (39a) denotes a situation where John 
got a certain complex of his own because of the presence of his older sister; in this case, the 
reference of the complex in question is determined in relation to the reference of the indirect 
object.  Sentence (40a) refers to a situation where the indirect object referent built or got a 
house of his own by working hard for certain years; the reference of the house in question is 
determined by the reference of the indirect object.  Sentence (41a) also denotes a similar 
situation.  The indirect object referent got a fortune of his own by working hard for a long 
time; the reference of the fortune in question is determined by the indirect object referent.   
     It is expected in our framework that sentences like the (a) sentences in (38-41) are not 
acceptable when the direct object NPs contain someone else.  This expectation is borne out 
by the data in (42):   
 
 (42) a. * Interviewing Nixon gave Mailer someone else’s book. 
  b. * Having a smart older sister gave John someone else’s inferiority complex.  
  c. ?? Working hard for 20 years gave Mike someone else’s house. 
  d. ?? Working hard for 20 years gave Mike someone else’s fortune. 
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Since the direct object NPs contain someone else, their references cannot be determined in 
relation to the references of the indirect objects.  The ﬁrst arguments of EXP cannot bind the 
ﬁrst arguments of BE, and cannot take the Possessor role, and the sentences are unacceptable.  
Similar examples appear in (43) and (44): 
 
 (43) a.  Working in France gave Mike a wife. 
  b. * Working in France gave Mike someone else’s wife.   
 (44) a.  The war years gave Mailer a book. (Harley (2003: 41)) 
  b. * The war years gave Mailer someone else’s book. 
 
     The discussion so far seems to have clariﬁed that sentences like Interviewing Nixon 
gave Mailer a book are one of the prototypical examples of PH-DOC (cf. Goldberg (1992: 
61)).  The DOC or PH-DOC encodes the caused possession: the bringing about by the 
subject of a relation between the indirect and direct objects; in addition, PH-DOC encodes as a 
constructional meaning a binding relation between the indirect and direct objects.  Sentences 
like Interviewing Nixon gave Mailer a book merely reﬂect these constructional encodings of 
PH-DOC; they are neither exceptional nor idiosyncratic at all.6 
     The claim that PH-DOC encodes a binding relation between the indirect and direct 
objects can also elucidate why certain verbs should occur in the DOC when their appearance 
in it is allegedly exceptional and/or idiosyncratic.  For no reason, several previous studies 
argue, do the verbs envy and forgive occur in the DOC.  This thesis, on the other hand, claims 
that their occurrence in it is neither exceptional nor idiosyncratic.  There are motivations for 
                                                   
6  Goldberg (1992: 61) reports the existence of the claim that sentences like those in (i) are exceptional and/or 
idiosyncratic instances of the DOC. 
 
 (i) a.  Sally gave Bill a headache. 
  b.  Mary’s behavior gave John an idea.   
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these verbs to occur in the DOC; the lexical meanings of these verbs accord well with a 
constructional meaning of PH-DOC.   
     Some studies have claimed that the occurrence of envy and forgive in the DOC is 
unmotivated (Green (1974: 101), Goldberg (1992: 67; 1995: 131-132), Croft (2003)), since (i) 
their subjects do not seem to refer to a causer, and (ii) they do not seem to lexicalize the 
meaning of transfer.  Concerning claim (ii), we have already argued that the DOC does not 
encode transfer; thus, it does not pose any problem to our claim.  We will turn to claim (i) 
later in this section.   
     What we are primarily concerned with here is lexical meanings of these verbs that are 
consonant with the binding relation associated with PH-DOC.  The verbs envy and forgive 
lexicalize binding relations between entities.  Observe (45):   
 
 (45) a.  Carolyn envied heri heri good looks. (Pinker (1989: 66)) 
  b.  No one can forgive you your comment.  
(Rappaport Hovav and Levin (2007: 15), with modiﬁcations) 
 
The indirect object must bind the direct object, as illustrated below: 
 
 (46) a.  Carolyn envied heri {heri / *his / *their} good looks. 
  b.  No one can forgive you {your / *his / *her} comment. 
 
It is generally the case that one envies someone for his or her possession or behavior; it is 
unlikely to envy someone for someone else’s possession or behavior.  Similarly, it is 
generally the case that one forgives someone for his or her acts; it is unlikely that one forgives 
someone for what someone else has done.  These particular meanings of these predicates are 
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consonant with the constructional meaning of PH-DOC and thus motivate their appearance in 
it.   
     The binding relation in the sense of the present thesis can also be observed even when 
the direct object is indeﬁnite.  Consider the following:  
 
 (47) a.  People envied you a brilliant marriage. (Lippincott’s Monthly Magazine) 
  b.  Perhaps Word would forgive him a moment’s idleness.   
(Creative Spirit: A Supernatural Thriller: A Haunted House Ghost Story) 
 
A brilliant marriage in (47a) denotes a marriage that the indirect object referent had with 
someone not made explicit in the sentence; a moment’s idleness in (47b) refers to a situation 
that the indirect object referent has experienced.  In both these cases, the direct object 
referents depend on the indirect object referents with respect to their identiﬁcation; the indirect 
object referents bind the direct object referents.  Here is another example where there is no 
formal relation between the indirect and direct objects.   
 
 (48)   I envy old Podgy Hicks that boat. (Colleman and De Clerck (2008: 205)) 
 
Sentence (48) is licensed as an instance of PH-DOC as long as the direct object referent is 
understood as belonging to the indirect object referent. 
     It is expected in our framework that the sentences in (49) are unacceptable.   
 
 (49) a. * People envied you someone else’s brilliant marriage.   
  b. * God can forgive you his misinterpretation on the problem.   
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Since there are elements in the direct objects that refer to someone other than the indirect 
object referents, the indirect object referents in (49) cannot bind the direct object referents, and 
the sentences are unacceptable.   
     Let us move on to the discussion on the subject arguments of forgive and envy.  One of 
the reasons for arguing that the occurrence of forgive and envy in the DOC is exceptional 
and/or idiosyncratic is that their subjects do not seem to denote causers.  Colleman and De 
Clerck (2008) argue against this claim and argue that the subjects of forgive and envy have 
causal characteristics.  Colleman and De Clerck (2008: 205-206) claim that the subject 
referent of the verb forgive functions as a causer, in that it does the act of granting forgiveness 
to the indirect object referent.  Because of the act performed by the subject referent, the 
indirect object referent can relinquish whatever burden it has.  In this respect as well, the 
occurrence of this verb in the DOC cannot be seen as an exception.  As for the verb envy, 
Colleman and De Clerck (2008: 206) note that Colleman (2006) claims that the subject of 
envy “has a particular feeling or attitude towards” a relation between the indirect and direct 
objects, which he claims is an extension from the causality initiated by the subject toward the 
objects.  This “attitudinal” extension motivates the verb to appear in the DOC.  Thus, the 
lexical meanings of the verbs that are consonant with the binding relation of PH-DOC, as well 
as the “causal” or “attitudinal” nature on the part of the subjects accords well with 
constructional meanings of PH-DOC.  They do not at all constitute either exceptional or 
idiosyncratic cases of PH-DOC.   
     Pinker (1989: 111) categorizes the verbs envy and forgive into the “verbs of future not 
having” group.  Another verb belonging to this category is cost.7  It is generally the case that 
something costs someone things that he or she possesses, or things that matter to him or her.  
                                                   
7  Other verbs included in this group are spare, begrudge, bet, refuse, charge, ﬁne, deny, ask as in She asked him 
the time, and save as in That saved me the trouble of making a separate trip.   
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It is rather difﬁcult to imagine a context where something costs someone things that do not 
belong to him or her, or things that do not matter to him or her at all.  This particular meaning 
of the verb cost also accords well with the constructional meaning of PH-DOC and thus 
motivates its occurrence in it.  Observe (50):   
 
 (50)   That remark might cost you {your / *his / *her} job. 
 
A pronoun in the direct object NP, when it appears, must be anaphoric to the indirect object 
referent; otherwise, the indirect object referent cannot bind the direct object referent, and the 
sentence is unacceptable.   
     The binding relation in the sense of the present thesis can be observed even when the 
direct object is indeﬁnite.  Consider the following:  
 
 (51)   It cost him a lot of money. 
 
A lot of money in (51) refers to the money belonging to the indirect object referent; in this case, 
the direct object depends on the indirect object with respect to its identiﬁcation.  Thus, the 
indirect object referent bears the Possessor role, and the sentence is acceptable.   
     Instances of the DOC with the verb win also demonstrate the binding relation between 
the indirect and direct objects.  Consider (52):   
 
 (52) a.  John’s essay won him a 1969 Fiat.   
  b.  Advertising practices have won Coca-Cola an international reputation. 
  c.  The book won him a good reputation. 
((a, b), Green (1974: 99, 104)) 
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The indirect object referents in (52) bind the direct object referents; the direct object referents 
depend on the indirect object referents with respect to their identiﬁcation.  For example, the 
indirect object referent in (52a) got a Fiat of his own because of his essay.  The (b) and (c) 
sentences in (52) exhibit the same kind of relations.   
 
5.2.1.4.  Interim Summary 
     This sub-section has examined one use of the DOC, PH-DOC.  The CS for PH-DOC 
contains as its part the CS for PH, where the function EXP takes as its second argument a 
location-denoting structure, namely [Y BE [AT X]].  The ﬁrst argument of EXP binds the 
ﬁrst argument of BE.  Some phenomena can be captured by assuming the [Y BE [AT X]] 
part, and the other phenomena can be explained by assuming the binding relation between the 
ﬁrst arguments of EXP and BE.  When the ﬁrst argument of EXP binds the ﬁrst argument of 
BE and bears the Possessor role, the sentence successfully instantiates PH-DOC.  We have 
also demonstrated that sentences like Interviewing Nixon gave Mailer a book are nothing but 
prototypical examples of PH-DOC.  We have also demonstrated that the verbs envy and 
forgive have motivations in their lexical meanings to occur in PH-DOC; their lexical meanings 
accord well with constructional meanings of PH-DOC.   
 
5.2.2.  EH-DOC 
     This sub-section focuses on EH-DOC.  In the present framework, EH-DOC has the 
CS represented in (19b), repeated here as (53):  
 
 (53)   [Event CAUSE ([W], [State EXP ([Xα], [State BE ([Y], [Place AT ([Z (α)])])])])] 
 
The ﬁrst argument of CAUSE takes the Causer role; the ﬁrst argument of EXP(ERIENCE) 
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takes the Experiencer2 role; the ﬁrst argument of BE bears Theme; the complement of AT 
takes Location.  The complement of function AT serves as a reference object relative to 
which the ﬁrst argument of BE is located.  The ﬁrst argument of the function EXP in (53) 
simultaneously takes both Experiencer2 and Location.  Note that in constructions like 
EH-DOC, in which the argument bearing Experiencer2 and the argument bearing Location are 
realized as different linguistic elements, it is binding that guarantees the ﬁrst argument of EXP 
bearing both Experiencer2 and Location.  That is, the bindee is an element within the 
complement which takes the semantic role Location.  The bindee refers back to the binder 
and it ensures that the ﬁrst argument of EXP bears both the semantic roles.  The ﬁrst 
argument of BE bears Theme.   
     For a better understanding, we present an example of EH-DOC in (54a) and its CS 
representation in (54b), respectively. 
 
 (54) a. %This gave Mikei several more people at hisi disposal. (= (21a)) 
  b.  [CAUSE ([THIS], [EXP ([MIKEα], [BE ([PEOPLE], [AT ([DISPOSAL 
(α)])])])] (= (21b)) 
 
For ease of reference, the subscripts Event, State, and Place are omitted in the (b) 
representation.  The CS for EH-DOC has the structure [Y BE [AT X]] embedded under the 
function EXP, entailing that this use has locative characteristics, as well as characteristics of its 
own. 
 
5.2.2.1.  Locative Characteristics 
     Let us ﬁrst examine locative characteristics of EH-DOC.  The Location argument 
functions as a reference object relative to which the ﬁrst argument of BE is construed.  
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Consider the sentences in (55):   
 
 (55) a. % I gave himi ﬁve dollars in hisi pocket. 
  b. % They gave himi a few dollars in hisi hand. 
 
The [Y BE [AT X]] part of sentence (55a) denotes a situation where there are several dollars 
in a pocket; the same part of sentence (55b) denotes a situation where there are several dollars 
in a hand.  Certain amount of money can easily be located relative to pockets and hands, and 
not vice versa.  For example, *I gave himi hisi pocket in ﬁve dollars and *They gave himi hisi 
hand in a few dollars are totally nonsensical.   
 
5.2.2.2.  Non-locative Characteristics 
     The relation expressed between the ﬁrst argument of EXP and the complement of AT 
can determine the acceptability of instances of EH-DOC.  When the ﬁrst argument of EXP 
can bind the complement of AT and can bear the Experiencer2 role, the sentence is acceptable; 
when it cannot bind the argument and cannot bear the role in question, the sentence is 
unacceptable.  For example, a part of a whole can be bound by the whole; by deﬁnition, 
being a part of a whole necessitates the dependence of the part on the whole with respect to its 
identiﬁcation.  This theoretical assumption accounts for the acceptability of examples given 
in this sub-section. 
     Observe the sentences in (56):   
 
 (56) a. % I handed Maryi ﬁve dollars in heri hand. 
  b. * I handed Maryi’s hand ﬁve dollars to heri.   
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 (57) a.  [EXP (MARYα) [BE (DOLLARS) [AT (HAND(α))]]] 
  b. * [EXP (HANDα) [BE (DOLLARS) [AT (MARY(α))]]] 
 
The structures in (57) represent the second argument of the function CAUSE of the CSs of the 
sentences in (56).  Like the sentences examined in the previous section, one may ﬁnd that the 
difference in acceptability between the sentences in (56) can be explained by considering the 
second argument of EXP of the sentences, namely the [Y BE [AT X]] part.  However, a 
certain amount of money can be located relative both to a human being’s hand and to a human 
being, as exempliﬁed in (58):   
 
 (58) a.  There is ﬁve dollars in Mary’s hand.   
  b.  There is ﬁve dollars on Mary. 
 
Therefore, the difference found in (56) cannot be explained by merely considering the second 
argument of EXP.  
     The relation expressed between the ﬁrst argument of EXP and the complement of AT 
contributes to the differential acceptability of the sentences in (56).  A human being can 
function as a whole of which a hand is a part; the reference of a hand depends on the reference 
of a human being with respect to its identiﬁcation .  Only in the (a) sentence in (56) can the 
complement of AT be bound by the ﬁrst argument of EXP.  The ﬁrst argument of EXP can 
bear the Experiencer2 role and the sentence is acceptable.  On the other hand, it is difﬁcult to 
construe a hand as a whole of which a human being is a part.  In this case, the ﬁrst argument 
of EXP cannot bind the complement of AT; it cannot take the Experiencer2 role; and the 
sentence is unacceptable.   
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5.2.2.3.  Other Examples 
     This sub-section presents other examples that can be explained by our framework.  
Consider ﬁrst instances of EH-DOC like the following:   
 
 (59) a. % This gave Mikei several more people at hisi disposal. (= (54a)) 
  b. % Hisi strategy and logistics gave himi everything hei needed to win at hisi 
disposal. (= (18b)) 
 
It is expected that there cannot appear in the PPs pronouns that do not refer back to the indirect 
objects.  This expectation is borne out by the data in (60):  
 
 (60) a. * This gave Mike several more people at her disposal. 
  b. * Hisi strategy and logistics gave himi everything hei needed to win at her 
disposal.   
 
Other examples are observed in (61) and (62):   
 
 (61) a. % I gave himi ﬁve dollars in hisi pocket. 
  b. % They gave himi a few dollars in hisi hand. 
 (62) a. % They handed heri the paper in heri hand.  She was so amazed.  
(Short Stories For the Young and Old At Heart) 
  b. % Julia turned to Gracei and handed heri the small package in heri hand.  
(The Courtship of the Vicar’s Daughter) 
 
The facts given in (63) and (64) parallel those given in (60). 
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 (63) a. * I gave him ﬁve dollars in her pocket.  
  b. * They gave him a few dollars in her hand.   
 (64) a. * They handed her the paper in his hand. 
  b. * Julia turned to Gracei and handed heri the small package in his hand. 
 
5.2.2.4.  Interim Summary 
     We have examined in this sub-section one use of the DOC, EH-DOC.  The CS for 
EH-DOC contains as its part the CS for EH, where the function EXP takes as its second 
argument a location-denoting structure, namely [Y BE [AT X]].  The ﬁrst argument of EXP 
binds the complement of AT.  Some phenomena can be captured by assuming the [Y BE 
[AT X]] part, and the other phenomena can be explained by assuming the binding relation 
between the ﬁrst argument of EXP and the complement of AT.  When the ﬁrst argument of 
EXP binds the complement of AT and bears the Experiencer2 role, the sentence successfully 
instantiates EH-DOC. 
 
5.3.  The Double Object Construction and the Prepositional Phrase Construction 
     Now that we have demonstrated how our framework explains many different 
phenomena pertaining to the two uses of the DOC, we move on to focus on the question of 
whether the DOC, as exempliﬁed in (65a), and the corresponding prepositional phrase 
construction (PPC), as exempliﬁed in (65b), denote the same or distinct meanings.   
 
 (65) a.  Mike gave Mary a book. 
  b.  Mike gave a book to Mary. 
 
This phenomenon is called dative alternation and this question has long been debated in the 
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literature.  In this sub-section, the distinction between PH-DOC and EH-DOC is irrelevant.  
So I just employ the term the DOC.8 
     The DOC and the PPC encode different meanings.  The DOC is associated with the 
caused possession meaning, and that the PPC is associated with the caused motion meaning.  
By caused possession, I mean the bringing about of a relation between the subject and the 
elements following the verb.  Caused motion entails that an agent transfers a theme along a 
path to a goal (Goldberg (1995)).  If the DOC and the PPC were associated with one and the 
same meaning, the DOC and the PPC would share one of the CSs proposed in the previous 
section, the CS for PH-DOC or the CS for EH-DOC.  This thesis argues that they do not 
share a CS; they have distinct CSs.  Following Pinker (1989) and Goldberg (1995), I 
hypothesize roughly the CS for the PPC as shown in (66).  (67a) is an instance of this 
construction, and (67b) is its rough representation.   
 
 (66)   [Event CAUSE ([X], [Event GO ([Y], [Path TO ([Z])])])] 
 (67) a.  Mike gave a book to Mary. 
  b.  [CAUSE ([MIKE], [GO ([BOOK], [TO ([MARY])])])] 
 
For ease of reference, the subscripts Event and Path are omitted in the (b) representation.  
The CS for the PPC in (66) has the motion-denoting structure [Y GO [TO Z]] embedded 
under the function CAUSE and means that X transfers Y to Z.  This CS does not have a 
function corresponding to the function EXP(ERIENCE) embedding a location-denoting 
structure under it.  In addition, the PPC does not encode binding relations between one 
element and another, either.  It is speciﬁed in the CS for the PPC that the ﬁrst argument of 
CAUSE is an agent.  It follows from this assumption that entities that cannot be an agent 
                                                   
8  The discussion in this sub-section is based on Takeuchi (to appear).   
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cannot occur as the subject of this construction.   
     The PPC is treated analogously with so-called “caused motion constructions” (Goldberg 
(1995: 90)), constructions that are thought of as including a path.  Their examples are in the 
following:  
 
 (68) a.  Joe kicked the bottle into the yard. (Goldberg (1995: 90)) 
  b.  They sprayed the paint onto the wall. (Goldberg (1995: 152)) 
  c.  Frank sneezed the tissue off the table. (Goldberg (1995: 152)) 
 
     Nevertheless, the DOC and the PPC can denote one and the same situation as a result of 
the composition of values of the arguments, but this does not entail that the two constructions 
encode one and the same meaning.  Consider (69): 
 
 (69) a.  John gave the bell boy a large tip. 
  b.  John gave a large tip to the bell boy.   
(cf. Van Bell and Van Langendonck (1996: 238)) 
 
As argued by Van Bell and Van Langedonck (1996), the difference between sentences like 
those in (69) can be neutralized by our world knowledge.  It is understood that giving 
someone a tip involves a transfer of a tip from the giver to the givee.  In this case, the 
interaction of values of the arguments results in denoting one and the same situation, no matter 
which construction may be employed.  The DOC and the PPC in (69) happen to denote one 
and the same situation.  
     Section 5.3.1 surveys previous studies on the question of the dative alternation; section 
5.3.2 argues for the claim that the DOC and the PPC encode different meanings.  Section 
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5.3.3 gives a summary.   
 
5.3.1.  Previous Studies 
     There are roughly three classes of analyses.  One assumes that both constructions 
encode one and the same meaning.  Using the term by Rappaport Hovav and Levin (2008) 
(RH & L (2008)), we call this approach “the single meaning approach” (Baker (1988), Larson 
(1988, 1990), Aoun and Li (1989), Butt et al. (1997), etc.).  A second approach assumes that 
the constructions encode related, yet distinct meanings.  Using the term by RH & L again, 
we call this approach “the multiple meaning approach” (Pinker (1989), Goldberg (1992, 1995), 
Krifka (1999, 2004), Harley (2003), Beck and Johnson (2004), to name a few).  A third 
approach can be called the verb-sensitive approach (Jackendoff (1990), Rappaport Hovav and 
Levin (2008)).  This approach focuses on lexical meanings of dative verbs, rather than 
constructional meanings.  We call those verbs dative verbs that appear in either the DOC or 
the PPC, or both.  The third approach argues that one type of dative verbs only denotes 
caused possession in either construction, and that another type of dative verbs denotes both 
caused possession and caused motion in the DOC, and caused motion in the PPC.  We will 
overview these approaches one by one.   
 
5.3.1.1.  Single Meaning Approach 
     A generative syntactic analysis for the single meaning approach will hypothesize a 
derivation which relates one construction to the other, in line with the Uniformity of Theta 
Assignment Hypothesis by Baker (1988).  UTAH assumes that “identical thematic relations 
are mapped onto identical syntactic positions across structures.”  In this approach, the two 
constructions are “thematic paraphrases” and have one and the same underlying syntactic 
structure, giving rise to two different surface realizations of arguments.  The particle to is 
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either inserted or deleted, depending on the choice of underlying structure.  Aoun and Li 
(1989), for example, assume that the DOC is basic and the PPC is derived, with the particle to 
inserted in the course of derivation; Larson (1988), on the other hand, assumes that the PPC is 
basic and the DOC is derived, with the particle deleted in the course of derivation.9, 10 
 
5.3.1.2.  Multiple Meaning Approach 
     The multiple meaning approach does not assume a derivational relation between the 
two constructions: each construction encodes meanings of its own and gives rise to its own 
surface realization of arguments.  This approach generally entails that the double object 
construction denotes caused possession, and that the PPC denotes caused motion.  The PPC 
in this approach contains in its representation, semantic or syntactic, a path along which a 
theme moves to a goal.   
     From here to the end of this sub-section, I present many different examples that the 
multiple meaning approach claims to serve as evidence that the two constructions differ in 
their meaning.  The single meaning approach, on the other hand, must provide an 
explanation for the different acceptabilities of these data.   
     Let us ﬁrst present so-called idiomatic examples (e.g. Green (1974), Oehrle (1976), 
Gropen et al. (1989)): 
 
 (70) a.  The noise gave Terry a headache. 
  b. * The noise gave a headache to Terry.  
                                                   
9  Larson (1990: 601) proposes his own version of UTAH.  See (i):   
 
 (i) Relativized UTAH 
Identical thematic relationships are represented by identical relative hierarchical relations between 
items at D-Structure. 
 
10  There are also non-derivational single meaning approaches (e.g. Butt et al. (1997)).   
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 (71) a.  The count gives me the creeps.  
  b. * The count gives the creeps to me.  
 
It is argued that the subject referents in the (a) sentences in (70) and (71) brought about a 
possessive relation between the indirect and direct object referents; in other words, because of 
the subject referents, the indirect object referents came to have the direct object referents.  In 
these cases, the direct object referents were created, not transferred.  Hence caused 
possession.  On the other hand, the subject referents in the (b) sentences, as they are 
inanimate entities, cannot themselves have a headache or the creeps and cannot transfer them 
to another entity.  In these cases, the constructional meaning of the PPC is not compatible 
with the propositions that are intended to convey.   
     The differential acceptability of sentences like those in (72) has also been considered to 
support the multiple meaning approach (e.g. Harley (2003), Krifka (2004)).11 
 
 (72) a.  Interviewing Richard Nixon gave Norman Mailer a book. (Oehrle (1976: 44)) 
  b. * Interviewing Richard Nixon gave a book to Norman Mailer.   
(RH & L (2008: 151)) 
 
Sentence (72a) does not express the proposition that a book was physically transferred from 
somewhere to Norman Mailer.  It conveys that Mailer wrote and/or published a book by 
doing some interview with Nixon; in this case, a book was created.  The constructional 
meaning of the PPC is not compatible with the proposition that can be conveyed by the 
corresponding DOC, since interviewing someone cannot physically move objects from one 
place to another.    
                                                   
11  We examined example (72a) in section 5.2.1.3 as example (38a).   
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     The pairs of sentences in (73-75) also display different acceptability:12 
 
 (73) a.  The war years gave Mailer a book. (Harley (2003: 41)) 
  b. * The war years gave a book to Mailer. (Harley (2003: 41)) 
 (74) a.  The absence of competition guaranteed Scorsese the prize money.  
  b. * The absence of competition guaranteed the prize money to Scorsese. 
(Pesetsky (1995: 194)) 
 (75) a.  Lipson’s textbook taught me Russian. (Oehrle (1976: 75)) 
  b. * Lipson’s textbook taught Russian to me. (Oehrle (1976: 75)) 
 
The sentences in (73-75) express the bringing about of a relation between the indirect and 
direct objects, not the transfer of an entity from one place to another.  Thus, only the DOC is 
compatible with the meanings intended to convey. 
     In addition, there are several non-alternating verbs.  It is known that verbs of “future 
not having,” verbs like cost, envy, spare, and forgive can only occur in the DOC (Pinker 
(1989: 111), cf. Green (1974: 101), Oehrle (1976: 142)).  Observe the following:   
 
 (76) a.  That remark might cost you your job. (Pinker (1989: 65)) 
  b. * That remark might cost your job to you. (Pinker (1989: 65)) 
 (77) a.  Carolyn envied heri heri good looks. (Pinker (1989: 66)) 
  b. * Carolyn envied heri good looks {to / from / of} heri. (Pinker (1989: 66)) 
 (78) a.  Please spare me your sarcasm. (Pinker (1989: 65)) 
  b. * Please spare your sarcasm {to/ from / of} me.  (Pinker (1989: 65)) 
 
                                                   
12  We examined example (73a) in section 5.2.1.3 as example (44a).   
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 (79) a.  No one can forgive you that comment. (RH & L (2008: 144)) 
  b. * No one can forgive that comment to you. (RH & L (2008: 144)) 
 
It is claimed that these verbs do not encode caused motion; thus, the lexical meanings of these 
predicates are not compatible with the constructional meaning of the PPC.   
     On the other hand, verbs expressing a continuous imparting of force or control (Pinker 
(1989)) appear only in the PPC.  Consider the following data:   
 
 (80) a. * Ann pulled Beth the box. 
  b.  Ann pulled the box to Beth. 
 (81) a. * Ann rode Beth the horse. 
  b.  Ann rode the horse to Beth. 
 (82) a. * Ann walked Beth the dog. 
  b.  Ann walked the dog to Beth.  
(Krifka (2001: 2)) 
 
The causing events denoted by these verbs coincide with the moving events of themes (Pinker 
(1989), Krifka (2001)); for example, to pull something, to ride something, or to walk 
something entails the movement of things pulled, ridden, or walked.  Thus, these verbs 
lexicalize a movement event.  However, there is no movement associated with the DOC, so 
the verbs and the construction are not compatible with each other.13 
     Verbs of manner of speaking do not occur in the DOC, either.  
 
 
                                                   
13  Other verbs belonging to this category are push, lower, and haul.   
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 (83) a. * Ann yelled Beth the news. (Krifka (1999: 10)) 
  b.  Ann yelled the news to Beth. (Krifka (1999: 10)) 
 (84) a. * Ann shouted Beth the news. (Krifka (1999: 3)) 
  b.  Ann shouted the news to Beth. (Krifka (1999: 3)) 
 
These types of verbs, in their transitive use, share one characteristic with verbs of continuing 
imparting force or control: the causing event named by the verb coincides with the transfer of 
information, that is, the transfer of a theme.  For example, to yell something or to shout 
something entails the movement of something yelled or shouted.  These verbs, too, lexicalize 
a movement; therefore, they are compatible only with the PPC.   
 
5.3.1.3.  Verb-Sensitive Approach 
     A third approach can be called “the verb-sensitive approach.”  This approach treats 
verbs like give or sell differently from those like throw or send.  Jackendoff (1990) claims 
that verbs in the former class inherently mean change of possession, and that those in the latter 
class mean “instantaneous imparting of force in some manner causing ballistic motion” 
(Pinker (1989: 110)).  Partially in line with Jackendoff (1990), Rappaport Hovav and Levin 
(2008) (RH & L (2008)) classify dative verbs into two types:   
 
 (85) Dative verbs having only a caused possession meaning: 
  a. Verbs that inherently signify acts of giving: give, hand, lend, loan, pass, rent,   
sell, … 
  b. Verbs of future having: allocate, allow, bequeath, grant, offer, owe, promise, … 
  c. Verbs of communication: tell, show, ask, teach, read, write, quote, cite, … 
 
146  
 (86) Dative verbs having both caused motion and possession meanings: 
  a. Verbs of sending: forward, mail, send, ship, … 
 b. Verbs of instantaneous causation of ballistic motion: ﬂing, ﬂip, kick, lob, slap, 
shoot, throw, toss, … 
  c. Verbs of causation of accompanied motion in a deictically speciﬁed direction: 
bring, take 
  d. Verbs of instrument of communication: e-mail, fax, radio, wire, telegraph, 
telephone, … 
(RH & L (2008: 134)) 
 
In their framework, verbs in (85) (give-type verbs) denote only the caused possession meaning 
in either construction.  Verbs in (86) (throw-type verbs) denote either the caused possession 
or caused motion meaning in the DOC, and the caused motion meaning in the PPC.  Here is 
a summary of their verb-sensitive approach and the multiple meaning approach:  
 
 A summary of the verb-sensitive approach 
 DOC PPC 
 give-type verbs  caused possession  caused possession 
 throw-type verbs 
 
 caused motion or 
 caused possession 
 caused motion 
 
 A summary of the multiple meaning approach 
 DOC PPC 
 all dative verbs  caused possession  caused motion 
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RH & L (2008) argue that the different acceptabilities of sentences observed in the previous 
section can be accounted for by considering the heaviness of the NPs and/or information 
structure.  We will overview their contention as a representative study of the verb-sensitive 
approach. 
     One of the important premises of their claim is that instances of the PPC with a 
give-type verb do not encode an event schema that includes a path and therefore does not 
involve transfer.  In support of this claim, they present as an example the following data: 
 
 (87)   Cultural commissioner Megan Whilden said that the ﬁve ‘Artscape’ pieces 
would ‘give a festive air to Park Square, they’re fun and interesting.’  
(RH & L (2008: 139)) 
 
They argue that sentence (87) does not involve transfer, since the theme NP a festive air does 
not exist prior to the event named by the verb give.  They conclude from this kind of example 
that if there is no transfer, there is no path.   
     RH & L (2008) argue that heaviness and/or information structure play a crucial role in 
the choice between the two constructions.  They roughly deﬁne heaviness and information 
structure in the following way:   
 
 (88) a.   Heaviness: Heavy material comes last. 
  b.   Information structure: Given material comes before new material.   
(RH & L (2008: 156)) 
 
We ﬁrst overview their claim on heaviness and then move on to their claim on information 
structure.   
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     In their framework, idiomatic uses such as give X a headache can occur in the PPC 
when the goal NP is heavy.  Consider the data in (89): 
 
 (89) a.   … it is unreadable, guaranteed to give a headache to anyone who looks hard 
  at the small print. (RH & L (2008: 158), bold mine) 
  b.  ‘Doing my taxes’ gives a headache to 22 percent of Americans surveyed 
for Bristol-Myers Squibb, which makes Excedrin pain-relief medicine. 
(RH & L (2008: 158), bold mine) 
 
The goal NPs in (89) are relatively heavier than the theme NPs, and it licenses the PPCs.   
     The sentences in (90) are also presented as evidence that heaviness plays a key role in 
determining the choice between the PPC and the DOC: 
 
 (90) a. # Nixon’s behavior gave an idea for a book to Mailer.   
  b.  Nixon’s behavior gave an idea for a book to every journalist living in New 
York City in the 1970s. 
(after Snyder (2003: 35), bold mine) 
 
Although sentence (90a) is claimed to be unacceptable out of context, it certainly is acceptable 
when the goal NP is long and heavy, as illustrated in (90b).   
     Let us move on to their discussion on information-structural considerations.  RH & L 
claim that information-structural considerations can account for the different acceptability of 
sentences like those in (91):   
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 (91) a.  Interviewing Richard Nixon gave Norman Mailer a book. (= (72a)) 
  b. * Interviewing Richard Nixon gave a book to Norman Mailer. (= (72b)) 
 
The PPC is acceptable when the theme NP is given, as illustrated in (92):  
 
 (92) A:  It is very difﬁcult to get an idea for a book simply from an interview. 
  B:  Well, interviewing Nixon gave an idea for a book to Mailer.  
(RH & L (2008: 157), bold mine) 
 
The theme NP an idea for a book is introduced in the sentence uttered by Speaker A and thus 
given in the sentence uttered by Speaker B.  This data is presented as evidence that there is 
no semantic difference encoded between the two constructions.  
     The information-structural account can also explain idiomatic uses such as give X a 
headache and give X the creeps.  Consider (93) and (94):   
 
 (93) a.  The noise gave Terry a headache. (= (70a)) 
  b. * The noise gave a headache to Terry. (= (70b)) 
 (94) a.  The count gives me the creeps. (= (71a)) 
  b. * The count gives the creeps to me. (= (71b)) 
 
It is generally the case that a recipient is human, and a theme is non-human.  Human beings, 
rather than inanimate entities, are likely to be familiar in a given discourse and hence to be a 
topic in the discourse; on the other hand, an illness, as it is inanimate, is usually new 
information.  Thus, it is information-structurally appropriate for a recipient to precede a 
theme, which makes suitable the employment of the default word order of the DOC.  When 
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the idiomatic uses occur in the PPC, as in the (b) sentences of (93) and (94), the theme is 
regarded as old information and the recipient is considered to be new information.  This 
interpretation is unlikely, and thus the sentences are judged unacceptable without context.   
     It is expected in their framework that an illness, when it is old information, can precede 
a recipient.  This expectation is, they argue, borne out by the data in (95):  
 
 (95)   I think it’s time you give your lovely illness to someone else!!! 
(RH & L (2008: 159), sic) 
 
It is concluded from this kind of data that one and the same meaning is associated with both 
constructions.   
 
5.3.2.  Arguing for the Multiple Meaning Approach 
     This sub-section argues that the DOC and the PPC denote different meanings: the DOC 
denotes caused possession and the PPC caused motion.  By caused possession, I mean the 
bringing about by the subject argument of a relation between the indirect and direct objects.  
The DOC does not encode a transfer of entities from the subject referent to the indirect object 
referent.  The classiﬁcation of dative verbs by RH & L (2008) is irrelevant here.  I ﬁrst 
investigate the heaviness account overviewed above and argue against it.  I then move on to 
demonstrate that the PPC, regardless of the type of verb appearing in it, does have an event 
schema that includes a path.  I then move on to investigate the information-structure account 
overviewed above and argue against it.  This sub-section also claims that some instances of 
the PPC can be licensed by the Conduit Metaphor, and that this metaphor can only license the 
PPC, not the DOC.  At the end of this sub-section, I present other examples whose 
acceptability is predicted in our framework.   
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5.3.2.1.  Against the Heaviness Account   
     Let us ﬁrst examine the issue of heaviness.  Heavy material comes last in order to 
observe the principle of end weight (e.g. Wasow (2002)).  Acceptability for various types of 
constructions can certainly be overridden by this factor, but this does not indicate at all that the 
DOC and the PPC have one and the same meaning associated with them.  When the goal NP 
is heavy, to employ the default word order of the PPC is sometimes the only option available; 
we have sometimes no choice but to employ the PPC in order to observe the principle of end 
weight.   
     For example, the heaviness of an NP determines the naturalness of the sentences in (96) 
and (97):   
 
 (96) a.  Robin talked with Dana about the cockroach that ate Cincinnati. 
  b. ? Robin talked about the cockroach that ate Cincinnati with Dana. 
 (97) a. ? Robin talked with the former vice-chairman of the sociopathy department 
about Leslie.   
  b.  Robin talked about Leslie with the former vice-chairman of the sociopathy 
department.   
(Culicover and Jackendoff (2005: 146-147), with modiﬁcations) 
 
These data indicate that a sentence sounds more natural when a heavier material comes last.  
In (96), the information talked about is heavier than the person talked with; thus, the (a) 
sentence sounds more natural than the (b) sentence.  In (97), on the other hand, the person 
talked with is heavier; thus, the (b) sentence sounds more natural.   
     Hawkins (1994) observes that sentence (98a) is the most acceptable of the three, and 
that sentence (98c) is the least acceptable.   
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 (98) a.  Joe looked the number up. 
  b.  Joe looked the number of the ticket up. 
  c.  Joe looked the number that Mary had forgotten up. 
(Hawkins (1994: 65)) 
 
In terms of heaviness, the heavier the linguistic element denoting the material looked up, the 
less acceptable the sentence becomes.  This is precisely because the element in question is 
situated not at the end of the sentence, although it becomes heavier and heavier than the 
particle up.   
     When it comes to the DOC and the PPC, to employ the default word order of the PPC is 
sometimes the only option available when the goal NP is heavy.  Bresnan et al. (2007) 
observe the contrasts in (99) and (100):   
 
 (99) a.  That movie gave me the creeps.   
  b. * That movie gave the creeps to me.   
 (100) a. ?? Stories like these must give people whose idea of heaven is a world without 
religion the creeps… 
  b.  Stories like these must give the creeps to people whose idea of heaven is a 
world without religion…  
(Bresnan et al. (2007: 73-74), bold mine) 
 
As illustrated in (99), when the goal NP is not heavy, only the DOC is acceptable; as 
illustrated in (100), when the goal NP is heavy, the PPC is much preferable to the DOC.  
These data indicate that we have no choice but to employ the PPC when the goal NP is long 
and heavy; the default word order of the PPC is appropriate in order not to violate the principle 
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of end weight.  
     If there is no difference in meaning between the PPC and the DOC, the PPC in (99b) 
should be just as acceptable as the DOC in (99a).  Since sentences like (99b) cannot be 
acceptable without factors such as heaviness, as illustrated in (100b), it seems reasonable to 
suppose that the DOC and the PPC encode distinct meanings.  It is not that the DOC in (99a) 
is preferable to the PPC in (99b); in this case, the DOC is perhaps the only option available.   
     The same principle lies behind the contrasts observed in the following sentences:   
 
 (101) a.  Working hard for 20 years gave Mike a house. 
  b. * Working hard for 20 years gave a house to Mike.   
 (102) a. ?? Working hard for 20 years gave every journalist living in New York City in 
the 20th century a house. 
  b.  Working hard for 20 years gave a house to every journalist living in New 
York City in the 20th century. 
 
Sentence (101a) is acceptable, and sentence (101b) is not.  However, when the goal NP is 
heavy, the PPC is much preferable to the DOC, as illustrated in (102).  In this case, the 
heaviness of the goal NP licenses the employment of the word order of the PPC in order for 
the sentence to be understandable. 
 
5.3.2.2.  PPC Having a Path 
     In this sub-section, I present several pieces of evidence indicating that the PPC, 
regardless of the type of verb occurring in it, has an event schema that includes a path.  A 
path in the PPC stems from the spatial semantic meaning of the particle to (e.g. Langacker 
(1991), Colleman and De Clerck (2009)).  The DOC, on the other hand, lacks this particle 
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and thus lacks an event schema including a path.   
     As noted by Colleman and De Clerck (2009: 37, fn. 14), English to has not 
grammaticalized into a dative marker as its French counterpart has.  English to can mark a 
goal toward which a theme moves but cannot mark a source from which a theme moves 
away; on the other hand, its French counterpart à marks not only a goal but also a source.  
Observe the sentences in (103) and (104):   
 
 (103) a.  Ils  ont  donné  un livre à  Paul. 
    They have given  a  book to  Paul 
    ‘They gave a book to Paul.’ 
  b.  They gave a book to Paul.   
 (104) a.  Ils  ont  volé  un livre à  Paul. 
    They have stolen  a  book to  Paul 
    ‘They stole a book from Paul.’ 
  b. * They stole a book to Paul.   
(cf. Colleman and De Clerck (2009: 37, fn. 14)) 
 
French à is not but English to is subject to this direction constraint.  These facts indicate that 
French à has grammaticalized (from an allative marker) into a dative marker, while English to 
has not undergone the same stage of grammaticalization.  English to is a preposition.   
     The basic meaning of English to is to mark a goal at the end of spatio-temporal path.  
This particle brings in the path semantics to the PPC.  Langacker (1991: 13-14), for example, 
describes the meaning difference in the sentences in (105) in the way given in (106): 
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 (105) a.  Bill sent a walrus to Joyce. 
  b.  Bill sent Joyce a walrus.   
 (106)   In [105a] the morpheme to speciﬁcally designates the path followed by the 
walrus, thereby rendering this aspect of the conceptualization more prominent 
than it would otherwise be … In [105b] on the other hand, to is absent, but the 
juxtaposition of two unmarked nominals (Joyce and a walrus) after the verb 
symbolizes a possessive relationship between the ﬁrst nominal and the second.  
Consequently [105b] lends added prominence to the conﬁgurartion that 
results when the walrus completes its trajectory, namely that which ﬁnds it in 
Joyce’s possession …   
(Langacker (1991: 13-14), after Colleman and De Clerck (2009: 10)) 
 
The verb in the example of the PPC in (105a) is send, a throw-type verb; nevertheless, 
Langacker’s argument also applies to instances of the PPC with give-type verbs.   
     If we assume that the semantic representation of the PPC has a path, we can account for 
an observation made by Harley (2003).  Harley (2003: 42) observes that the DOC in (107a) 
can express the idea that John impregnated Mary, while the PPC in (107b) seems to entail that 
an already existing child was physically transferred.14 
 
 (107) a.  John gave Mary a child. (Harley (2003: 42)) 
  b.  John gave a child to Mary. (Harley (2003: 42)) 
 
Not only sentence (107a) but also sentence (107b) contains the verb give.  Harley’s 
observation pertaining to (107b) follows from the combination of the following: (i) the particle 
                                                   
14  We examined sentence (107a) in section 5.2.1.3 as example (35).   
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to contributes a path semantics to the PPC; (ii) the PPC encodes caused motion; (iii) a child 
was transferred along a path to a goal; and (iv) the child must exist prior to the giving event in 
order to move along a path to a goal.   
     Similar examples are given in (108) and (109):   
 
 (108) a.  God sent Mary a daughter. 
  b.  God sent a daughter to Mary. 
 (109) a.  Mary’s long prayers brought her a son. 
  b.  Mary’s long prayers brought a son to her. 
 
The (a) sentences in (108) and (109) describe events where the subject referents caused the 
bringing about of relations between the indirect object and direct object referents.  In these 
cases, the direct object referents were not transferred but created.  On the other hand, the (b) 
sentences describe events where the subject referents caused already existing children to go to 
the goal NPs physically.   
     The validity of these observations is supported by the data in (110-111), where # 
indicates that the sentences are less preferable than the counterparts.   
 
 (110) a.  Mary wanted a child so much, but she didn’t get pregnant.  She prayed and 
prayed, and ﬁnally God sent her a son. 
  b. # Mary wanted a child so much, but she didn’t get pregnant.  She prayed and 
prayed, and ﬁnally God sent a son to her.   
 (111) a.  Mary wanted a child so much, but she didn’t get pregnant.  She prayed and 
prayed, and ﬁnally her long prayers gave her a son. 
  b. # Mary wanted a child so much, but she didn’t get pregnant.  She prayed and 
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prayed, and ﬁnally her long prayers gave a son to her. 
 
The context makes it clear that the woman in question wanted a child of her own.  What is at 
issue here is the creation of children, not the transfer of already existing children.  Thus, as 
illustrated in (110) and (111), the DOCs are preferred.  The fact that the PPCs are not 
preferred in this particular context follows from our assumption that the PPC encodes an event 
schema including a path.  The PPCs in the (b) sentences describe situations where an already 
existing child was transferred from one place along a certain path to another; the son in the (b) 
sentences could thus be anyone’s son, which does not accord well with the context.  
     Note in passing that the path in the PPC with a give-type verb lacks any internal 
structure.  As observed by several previous studies (e.g. Jackendoff (1983: 192), Krifka 
(2004)), the path in the PPC whose verb is a give-type one has no internal structure.  
Consider (112): 
 
 (112) a. * Susan gave the ball {all the way / halfway} to Bill. 
  b.  Jake threw the ball {all the way / halfway} to Bill. 
  c.  I sent the package {all the way / halfway} around the world to the Antarctic. 
(RH & L (2008: 138)) 
 
Expressions like all the way and halfway denote internal structures of paths.  Since they 
cannot appear in the PPC with a give-type verb as in (112a), unlike the PPCs with throw-type 
verbs as in (112b) and (112c), the path of this type of PPC is not internally complex.  
Nevertheless, these data merely indicate that the path in the PPC whose verb is a give-type one 
lacks any internal structure; they do not indicate at all that this type of the PPC lacks a path 
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altogether.15   
 
5.3.2.3.  Against the Information-Structure Account 
     Let us move on to investigate the validity of the information-structural account that we 
saw in section 5.3.1.3.  To conclude, information-structural considerations cannot validate 
the claim that the DOC and the PPC encode one and the same meaning.   
     If we assume that the DOC denotes caused possession and the PPC denotes caused 
motion, we can straightforwardly account for the fact that sentences like (113) exhibit different 
acceptabilities: 
 
 (113) a.  Interviewing Richard Nixon gave Norman Mailer a book. (= (91a)) 
  b. * Interviewing Richard Nixon gave a book to Norman Mailer. (= (91b)) 
 
It is argued in RH & L (2008) that sentences like (113b) are acceptable when the theme NP is 
given information, and the data in (114) is presented:  
 
 (114) A:  It is very difﬁcult to get an idea for a book simply from an interview. 
  B:  Well, interviewing Nixon gave an idea for a book to Mailer. (= (92)) 
 
                                                   
15  The give-type verbs in the PPC can take only the possessional goal, as illustrated in (i) and (ii):   
 
 (i) a. * Where did you give the ball? 
  b.  Where did you throw the ball?  To third base. 
  c.  Where did you send the bicycle?  To Rome.   
(RH & L (2008: 137), cf. Levinson (2005)) 
 (ii) a.  I gave the package to {Maria / *London}. 
  b.  I sent the package to {Maria / London}. 
  c.  I threw the ball to {Maria / the other side of the ﬁeld}.   
(RH & L (2008: 138), cf. Green (1974: 103), Goldsmith (1980: 430)) 
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On the basis of these kinds of examples, it is concluded that there is no semantic difference 
between the DOC and the PPC.  However, the explanation of the sentence in (114) uttered 
by Speaker B cannot straightforwardly apply to the sentences in (113), since the value of the 
theme NPs differs.  In (113), it is a book; in (114), it is an idea for a book.  Note that 
sentence (113b) is distinctly odd even when the theme NP is given.  Observe (115):   
 
 (115) A:  It is very difﬁcult to write a book simply from an interview. 
  Bi: * Well, interviewing Richard Nixon gave a book to Norman Mailer. 
  Bii:  Well, interviewing Richard Nixon gave Norman Mailer a book.   
 
Thus, one must provide an explanation for the differential acceptability of sentences like those 
in (113).  
     We hypothesize that the subject argument of the DOC and that of the PPC are speciﬁed 
as a causer and as an agent, respectively.  The gerund phrase in the subject position of the 
DOC in (113a) can cause the creation of a relation between the indirect and direct objects; in 
other words, the indirect object referent wrote a book by interviewing someone.  Thus, 
sentence (113a) is acceptable.  On the other hand, the same gerund phrase, as it is not 
animate, cannot be an agent and thus cannot physically transfer entities from one place to 
another.  In other words, doing the act of interviewing cannot physically move entities like 
books from one place to another.  Therefore, sentence (113b) is unacceptable.   
     The same reasoning applies to examples similar to (113).  Observe the sentences in 
(116-119):16 
                                                   
16  Oehrle (1976: 27-28) gives similar examples as well:   
 
 (i) a.  The American program to land a man on the moon gave Mailer a book. 
  b. * The American program to land a man on the moon gave a book to Mailer.   
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 (116) a.  Working hard for 20 years gave Mike a house. (= (40a)) 
  b. * Working hard for 20 years gave a house to Mike. 
 (117) a.  Working hard for 20 years gave Mike a fortune. (= (41a)) 
  b. * Working hard for 20 years gave a fortune to Mike. 
 (118) a.  Trying to see around the couple in front of us gave me a pain in the neck. 
  b. * Trying to see around the couple in front of us gave a pain in the neck to me. 
 (119) a.  Having a smart older sister gave John an inferiority complex.  
  b. * Having a smart older sister gave an inferiority complex to John. 
(Green (1974: 103, 129), bold mine) 
 
The gerund phrases in the subject positions of the DOCs can cause the indirect object referent 
to have things like houses, fortunes, pains, and complexes; in other words, the indirect object 
referents built a house, made a fortune, had a pain in the neck, or had a certain complex by 
working hard for certain years, trying to see around the couple in front of them, or having a 
smart sibling.  Thus, the (a) sentences in (116-119) successfully instantiate the DOC.  On 
the other hand, the same gerund phrases, as they are not animates, cannot be agents and thus 
cannot physically transfer entities from one place to another.  In other words, the events 
denoted by the gerund phrases themselves cannot physically move houses, fortunes, pains, 
and complexes.  Therefore, the (b) sentences cannot instantiate the PPC.   
     The facts observed in (120-123) parallel that in (115). 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
 (ii) a.  A series of accidental circumstances gave Knopf & Co. The Magic Mountain. 
  b. * A series of accidental circumstances gave The Magic Mountain to Knopf & Co.  
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 (120) A:  It is very difﬁcult to build a house simply by working hard. 
  Bi: * Well, working hard for 20 years gave a house to Mike. 
  Bii:  Well, working hard for 20 years gave Mike a house. 
 (121) A:  It is very difﬁcult to make a fortune simply by working hard. 
  Bi: * Well, working hard for 20 years gave a fortune to Mike.  
  Bii:  Well, working hard for 20 years gave Mike a fortune.  
 (122) A:  It is very difﬁcult to get a pain in the neck simply by trying to see around 
people in front of you.   
  Bi: * Well, trying to see around the couple in front of us gave a pain in the neck to 
me. 
  Bii:  Well, trying to see around the couple in front of us gave me a pain in the 
neck. 
 (123) A:  It is very diﬁcult to get a complex simply by having brothers or sisters.   
  Bi: * Well, having a smart older sister gave an inferiority complex to John.   
  Bii:  Well, having a smart older sister gave John an inferiority complex.  
 
The data in (120-123) indicate that one cannot conclude by simply resorting to 
information-structural considerations that there is no semantic difference between the two 
constructions.   
     I present other data indicating the existence of semantic difference between the two 
constructions.  If there is no semantic difference encoded between the two constructions, and 
different acceptabilities can be accounted for by information-structure considerations, it will 
be expected that the DOC and the inverted PPC can appear in the same environment.   
Information-structurally, they have the same status, with a goal preceding a theme.  However, 
this expectation is not borne out.  Consider (124-126):   
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 (124) A:  Norman Maileri did not work at all last year.   
  Bi: * Well, interviewing Richard Nixon gave to himi a book. 
  Bii:  Well, interviewing Richard Nixon gave himi a book.   
 (125) A:  It is very difﬁcult to build a house simply by working hard. 
  Bi: * Well, working hard for 20 years gave to Mike a house. 
  Bii:  Well, working hard for 20 years gave Mike a house. 
 (126) A:  It is very difﬁcult to make a fortune simply by working hard. 
  Bi: * Well, working hard for 20 years gave to Mike a fortune.    
  Bii:  Well, working hard for 20 years gave Mike a fortune.  
 
If we assume that the DOC and the PPC differ in meaning, these data can easily be explained.   
     Recall the sentence in (95), repeated here as (127).  It is presented as evidence that 
idiomatic examples such as X gives Y a headache/the creeps can also occur in the PPC when 
information-structural conditions are satisﬁed. 
 
 (127)   I think it’s time you give your lovely illness to someone else!!!  
 
Sentence (127) merely describes a situation where the subject of the PPC is required to 
transfer his/her own illness to someone else.  To conclude, it is irrelevant in this particular 
case to discuss information-structural considerations. 
     We should recall the discussion that we saw in section 5.3.1.3.  Consider the idiomatic 
examples in (128):   
 
 (128) a.  The noise gave Terry a headache. (= (93a)) 
  b. * The noise gave a headache to Terry. (= (93b)) 
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RH & L (2008) argue that it is generally the case that a recipient is human, and a theme is 
non-human.  Human beings, rather than inanimate entities, are likely to be familiar in a given 
discourse and hence to be a topic in the discourse; on the other hand, an illness, as it is 
inanimate, is usually new information.  Thus, it is information-structurally appropriate for a 
recipient to precede a theme, which makes suitable the use of the default word order of the 
DOC.  When the idiomatic uses occur in the PPC, as in the (b) sentence of (128), the theme 
is regarded as old information and the recipient is considered to be new information.  This 
interpretation is unlikely, and thus the sentence is judged unacceptable without context.  It is 
expected in their framework that an illness, when it is old information, can precede a recipient.  
They present the data in (127), claiming that their expectation is borne out by it.  However, 
the PPC in (127) denotes a transfer of a theme.  It is precisely for this reason that the PPC, 
not the DOC, is employed.  Information-structural considerations are simply irrelevant here.   
     There still remains a question of why the sentence in (114) uttered by Speaker B, 
repeated here as (129), should be acceptable, to which we now turn in the next section.   
 
 (129) A:  It is very difﬁcult to get an idea for a book simply from an interview. 
  B:  Well, interviewing Nixon gave an idea for a book to Mailer.  
 
5.3.2.4.  Conduit Metaphor 
     The Conduit Metaphor (e.g. Reddy (1979), Lakoff and Johnson (1980)) can apply to the 
PPC and can license some of its instances.  For example, the sentence in (129) uttered by 
Speaker B, repeated here as (130), is licensed by this metaphor.17 
 
 
                                                   
17  This idea itself is given to me by Yukio Hirose (p.c.).   
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 (130) A:  It is very difﬁcult to get an idea for a book simply from an interview. 
  B:  Well, interviewing Nixon gave an idea for a book to Mailer.  
 
The PPC encodes caused motion.  Caused motion and the conduit metaphor are compatible 
with each other, since caused motion entails sending entities from one place to another, which 
is what the conduit metaphor is all about.  Therefore, the conduit metaphor can apply to the 
PPC.  This hypothesis can also invalidate some examples presented by RH & L (2008).   
     The conduit metaphor consists of the following three components:  
 
 (131)   Conduit Metaphor (Reddy (1979), Lakoff and Johnson (1980)): 
  i.  Ideas are objects. 
  ii.  Words are containers. 
  iii.  Communication is sending. 
 
In this metaphor, communication involves ideas contained in words traveling across from the 
speaker to the hearer.   
     As shown in (131), what is made to travel by the conduit metaphor is ideas or things of 
similar sort.  They denote internal conceptual or emotional material and called by Reddy 
(1979) repertoire member of individuals.  See (132):   
 
 (132)   Repertoire Member (RM) (Reddy (1979)) 
    e.g. ideas, thoughts, meanings, or feeling 
 
     We employ the verb convey as a diagnostic for RM, as exempliﬁed in (133):   
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 (133) a.  to convey a(n) {idea / thought / meaning / feeling}   
  b. * to convey a {TV / car / desk / chair} 
 
The verb convey in this diagnostic is intended to mean to make ideas, feelings, etc. known to 
somebody, not to take, carry or transport somebody/something from one place to another, as 
in A carriage was waiting to convey her home.  If a noun can appear as the direct object of 
the verb convey, it denotes an RM.   
     Let us look at the subject of conveying repertoire members.  Many different entities, 
including events, can convey RMs, supporting the claim that sentence (130B) is licensed by 
the metaphor in question.  Consider (134):   
 
 (134) a.  The passage conveys a feeling of excitement.  
  b.  Your writing must transfer these ideas to those who need them.  
  c.  His letter brought the idea to the French pilots.  
(Reddy (1979: 313)) 
 
Each sentence in (134) contains an RM: a feeling of excitement in (134a), these ideas in 
(134b), and the idea in (134c).  As exempliﬁed in the passage in (134a), your writing in 
(134b), and his letter in (134c), the subject of the act of sending RMs can be inanimate.  
Furthermore, not only inanimate entities but also events or state of affairs can do the act of 
sending RMs.  Consider (135):  
 
 (135) a.  This understanding gave meaning to her suffering. (The Attack of the Blob) 
  b.  Caring conveys a feeling of compassion and empathy. (The Abc’s of Values) 
  c.  Thinking of Erica brought an idea to me. (My Father’s Letters) 
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RMs can also be conveyed by understanding, caring, and thinking.  Thus, it seems 
reasonable to assume that interviewing someone, the event denoted in the subject position of 
the PPC in (130B), can also convey RMs.  This thesis argues that sentence (130B) is licensed 
by the conduit metaphor.   
     The (b) sentences in (113) and (116-119), repeated here as (136), are not licensed by 
this metaphor, since nouns like books, houses, fortunes, pains, and complexes do not refer to 
RMs.   
 
 (136) a. * Interviewing Nixon gave a book to Norman Mailer. 
  b. * Working hard for 20 years gave a house to Mike. 
  c. * Working hard for 20 years gave a fortune to Mike. 
  d. * Trying to see around the couple in front of us gave a pain in the neck to me. 
  e. * Having a smart older sister gave an inferiority complex to John. 
 
Observe (137):  
 
 (137)  * to convey a(n) {book / house / fortune / pain / inferiority complex} 
 
Therefore, the sentences in (136) cannot be licensed by the conduit metaphor.  Note that it is 
allowed to say to convey the impression of a pain or an inferiority complex, in which case the 
thing conveyed is an impression.  The word impression denotes a RM, as is clear from the 
following deﬁnition of it: an idea, a feeling or an opinion that you get about 
somebody/something, or that somebody/something gives you (Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries, 
bold mine). 
     The claim that the conduit metaphor can apply to the PPC can invalidate another type of 
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data given by RH & L (2008).  As we saw in section 5.3.1.3, sentences like (87), repeated 
here as (138), are presented as evidence that a PPC with a give-type verb does not involve an 
event schema that includes a path.   
 
 (138)   Cultural commissioner Megan Whilden said that the ﬁve ‘Artscape’ pieces 
would ‘give a festive air to Park Square, they’re fun and interesting.’  
 
It is claimed that sentence (138) does not involve transfer, since the theme NP a festive air 
does not exist prior to the event named by the verb give.  If there is no transfer, there is no 
path.18 
     One possible problem with their claim will be that it is uncertain whether or not the 
theme NP exists before the giving event.  There is no evidence presented supporting its 
non-existence; thus, one cannot easily conclude that sentence (138) does not express transfer, 
and that it does not contain a path.   
     Sentence (138) is an instance of the PPC to which the conduit metaphor applies; the 
direct object a festive air denotes an RM, as illustrated in (139):   
 
 (139)   to convey a festive air 
 
Sentence (138) thus does not serve as evidence that the PPC with a give-type verb does not 
involve transfer and does not contain a semantic representation including a path.   
     Let us look at the subject of conveying a certain air.  Inanimate entities like ‘Artscape’ 
pieces can convey a certain air, supporting the claim that sentence (138) is licensed by the 
conduit metaphor.  Observe the sentences in (140):   
                                                   
18  Artscape is an annual art festival held in America.   
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 (140) a.  He managed to convey a mild, almost scholarly air. (Heaven’s Net is Wide) 
  b.  The lack of ‘historical’ events can therefore convey a spurious air of 
immobility. (The Cambridge Ancient History) 
  c.  The six published versions of this myth do not differ greatly.  Reo Fortune’s 
version from Tewara is the most detailed and discursive, and because it 
follows the rhythms of the vernacular it conveys a canonical air.   
(The Kula: New Perspectives on Massim Exchange) 
 
The subjects of conveying a certain air in these sentences refer to a human being ((a)), a lack 
of something ((b)), and a myth ((c)).  These data make it clear that not only can human 
beings convey a certain air, but also non-human entities can do so.  Thus, sentence (138) 
accords well with our analysis.   
     Furthermore, the present study argues against the claim by some previous studies that 
some examples of the DOC are licensed by the conduit metaphor.  I argue that they are 
actually not licensed by it.  For example, Goldberg (1992) argues that sentence (141) is 
licensed by the conduit metaphor.   
 
 (141)   Maryi gave Joe heri thoughts on the subject. 
(Goldberg (1992: 63), with modiﬁcations)  
 
Our account is as follows: the presence of her in the direct object NP in (141) makes the idea 
Mary’s idea, not Joe’s.  It is difﬁcult to suppose that Joe created in himself someone else’s 
idea.  In this case, we have no choice but to think that Mary transferred her own idea to Joe.  
As a result, it appears that the conduit metaphor applies to the DOC, but it is illusory.  Only 
the PPC, not the DOC, can be licensed by the metaphor in question. 
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     In fact, as we saw at the beginning of section 5.3, the DOC and the PPC can denote one 
and the same state of affairs, as a result of the composition of values of the arguments.  
Nevertheless, this does not indicate that the DOC and the PPC can be licensed by the same 
metaphor.  Consider (142): 
 
 (142) a.  John gave the bell boy a large tip. (= (69a)) 
  b.  John gave a large tip to the bell boy. (= (69b)) 
 
As argued by Van Bell and Van Langedonck (1996), the difference between sentences like 
those in (142) can be neutralized by our world knowledge.  It is understood that giving 
someone a tip involves a transfer of a tip from the giver to the givee.  In this case, the 
interaction of values of the arguments results in denoting one and the same situation, no matter 
which construction may be employed.   
 
5.3.2.5.  Predictable Examples 
     This sub-section presents examples predicted to be explained by our assumptions.  For 
example, given that the DOC denotes caused possession and the PPC denotes caused motion, 
it is expected to ﬁnd the meaning contrasts observed by Williams (1994).  Consider (143) 
and (144) (Williams (1994: 250)):19 
 
 (143) a.  I gave John a cold. [not my cold] 
  b.  I gave a cold to John. [my cold] 
 (144) a.  I gave John an idea. [not my idea] 
  b.  I gave an idea to John. [my idea] 
                                                   
19  Sentence (143a) appears as sentence (17) in section 5.1.2.   
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The DOC expresses the bringing about by the subject referent of a relation between the 
indirect and direct objects; on the other hand, the PPC denotes a transfer of the direct object 
referent from the subject referent to the complement of the preposition.  Therefore, the direct 
object referents in the (a) sentences in (143) and (144) are considered to be created within the 
indirect object referents.  A possible context for (143a) is a situation where the speaker kept 
John waiting outside a house or building for certain hours, and John got a cold because of it; a 
possible situation denoted by (144a) is that the presence of the subject referent or its certain 
behavior created an idea within the indirect object referent.20  On the other hand, the direct 
object referents in the (b) sentences are transferred from the subject referents to the 
complements of the preposition; the subject referents in the (b) sentences in (143) and (144) 
transferred their own cold or idea to someone else.  For example, Akashi (2005) observes 
that a cold in sentences like (143b) denotes a virus.  A cold virus can be transferred from one 
place to another, and the sentence successfully instantiates the PPC.  This interpretation of 
the word cold also appears in the PPCs given in (145): 
 
 (145) a.  Don’t give your cold to others!  Cover your nose and mouth with a tissue 
when you cough or sneeze, then throw the tissue away and wash your hands.   
(Akashi (2005: 73)) 
  b.  If you give your cold to Mom and she gives it to Dad and each of them gives 
it to two other people …  (A Kid’s Ofﬁcial Guide to Germs) 
  c.  The Contac commercial on television used to say: “Give your hand to a friend 
and give your heart to your love, but give your cold to Contac.” 
(Best Funeral Meditations) 
 
                                                   
20  Krifka (1999: 4) makes a similar observation. 
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     The reasoning applied to the (b) sentences in (143) and (144) can also apply to instances 
of the PPC with the word a headache.21  As we saw before, PPCs like the following are 
unacceptable.   
 
 (146)  * The lightning gave a headache to me.   
 
     As Akashi (2005) observes, headache not only means (i) “a continuous pain in the 
head,” but also (ii) “a person or thing that causes worry or trouble” (Oxford Learner’s 
Dictionaries).  Here are some examples of the word headache denoting meaning (ii): 
 
 (147) a.  He was a headache to her.   
  b.  It is a headache to all relativists, whether they admit it or not.   
 
Headache of meaning (ii) refers to an entity that can be transferred (Akashi (2005: 73)), since 
it denotes a person or thing.  It is thus expected that it can appear in the PPC, and this 
expectation is borne out by the following data: 
 
 (148) a.  Sending a copy to every elector is a nice gesture, but futile, because it is 
unreadable, guaranteed to give a headache to anyone who looks hard at the 
small print. (cf. (89a)) 
  b.  TAX TIME is a big headache for Americans, according to The Excedrin 
Headache Report.  “Doing my taxes” gives a headache to 22 percent of 
                                                   
21  The reasoning applied to the (b) sentences in (143) and (144) applies to the following sentence discussed in 
section 5.3.2.3 as well.   
 
 (i)   I think it’s time you give your lovely illness to someone else!!! (= (127)) 
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Americans surveyed for Bristol-Myers Squibb, which makes Excedrin 
pain-relief medicine. (cf. (89b)) 
 
The contexts in (148) make it clear that a headache appearing in them does not refer to a 
continuous pain in someone’s head; the sentence TAX TIME is a big headache for Americans 
in (148b), for example, particularly makes it clear that a headache in this context denotes 
meaning (ii).  It is described in (148a) that sending an unreadable copy to every elector is 
equal to giving to them things causing worry or trouble.  The PPC in (148b) describes a 
situation where making a tax payment is equal to giving to those who do it things causing 
worry or trouble.  The word headache can occur as a theme of the PPC, as long as it denotes 
an entity that can be transferred. 
     We have observed the sentences in (148) in section 5.3.1.3.  They are presented by RH 
& L (2008) as examples demonstrating that heaviness plays a role in determining the choice 
between the DOC and the PPC.  The sentences in question instantiate the PPC precisely 
because they denote transfers of themes.  Heaviness considerations are irrelevant in these 
cases, since the word headache denoting meaning (ii) can appear even when a goal NP is not 
heavy.  Observe (149): 
 
 (149) a.  Sending a copy to every elector is a nice gesture, but futile, because it is 
unreadable, guaranteed to give a headache to everyone. 
  b.  TAX TIME is a big headache for Americans, according to The Excedrin 
Headache Report.  “Doing my taxes” gives a headache to all Americans.  
 
The data in (149) validate our claim.   
     It is also expected that the sentences in (150-152) differ in their acceptability.  
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 (150) a.  Providence gave them a daughter.  
  b. * Providence gave a daughter to them. 
 (151) a.  Providence sent them a daughter. 
  b. * Providence sent a daughter to them. 
 (152) a.  Their marriage brought them a child.  
  b. * Their marriage brought a child to them. 
 
The subjects of the sentences above are not human beings.  Therefore, while they can cause 
the creation of relations between the indirect and direct objects, they cannot be agents and 
cannot physically move children along a certain path to a goal.  We can account for the 
different acceptability of the sentences in (153) and (154) in the same way.   
 
 (153) a.  Working in France gave Mike a wife. 
  b. * Working in France gave a wife to Mike. 
 (154) a.  Living in France gave them a child. 
  b. * Living in France gave a child to them.   
 
The (b) sentences in (150-154) cannot be licensed by the conduit metaphor, since nouns like 
daughter and child do not denote repertoire members.  Observe (155): 
 
 (155)  * to convey a { daughter / child / wife / husband } 
 
    Our framework also predicts the contrasts found in (156) and (157), where # indicates the 
sentence is less preferable than the counterpart.   
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 (156) a.  Looking at it gave her pleasure.  That is, the emotion surged up within her. 
  b. # Looking at it gave pleasure to her.  That is, the emotion surged up within 
her. 
 (157) a.  Interviewing Nixon gave Mailer an idea for a book.  The idea surged up 
within him. 
  b. # Interviewing Nixon gave an idea for a book to Mailer.  The idea surged up 
within him. 
 
The second sentences denote situations where things like emotions and ideas are created 
within a person.  The DOC speciﬁes that the referent of the direct object is created within the 
referent of the indirect object, not transferred from one place to another.  Therefore, the 
DOCs in (156) and (157) are easier than the PPCs for the second sentences to follow.   
 
5.3.3.  Summary 
     Section 5.3 has argued that the DOC and the PPC differ in their meaning; they encode 
different meanings.  The DOC encodes caused possession, and the PPC caused motion.  By 
caused possession, I mean the bringing about of a relation between the indirect object referent 
and another entity.  The DOC does not encode the meaning of transfer.  By caused motion, 
I mean that an agent causes a theme to move along a path to a goal; the PPC is associated with 
the meaning of transfer.  In terms of conceptual structure, the DOC and the PPC have 
different conceptual structures.   
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Chapter 6 
Concluding Remarks 
 
6.1.  Summary 
     This thesis has been concerned with explicating the nature of possessive have (PH), 
existential have (EH), PH-DOC, and EH-DOC in English from the perspective of a simpliﬁed 
version of Conceptual Semantics (Jackendoff (1983, 1990, 2002, 2007), Culicover and 
Jackendoff (2005), Culicover (2009)).  PH-DOC and EH-DOC are the DOC counterparts of 
PH and EH.   
     I have proposed the following conceptual structures:   
 
 (1) a.  [EXP ([Xα]i, [BE ([Y (α)], [AT (ei)])])] 
  b.  [EXP ([Xα], [BE ([Y], [AT ([Z (α)])])])] 
 
PH has structure (1a), and PH-DOC has it embedded under another function; whereas EH has 
structure (1b), and EH-DOC has it embedded under another function.  The function EXP of 
each of the structures in (1) takes as its second argument the location-denoting structure [Y BE 
[AT X]], entailing that constructions having either of these conceptual structures have not only 
locative characteristics but also characteristics denoted by the relation between the ﬁrst 
argument of EXP and its second argument.  These conceptual structures encode referential 
dependency of one element on another.  The ﬁrst argument of EXP of structure (1a) binds 
the ﬁrst argument of BE, and that of structure (1b) binds the complement of AT.  PH, EH, 
PH-DOC, and EH-DOC demonstrate many different phenomena that can be accounted for by 
assuming these semantic representations.  They all encode binding relations between one 
argument and another, and these constructions cannot be fully understood unless one assumes 
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these relations, and these relations are best represented over conceptual structure.   
     Let us brieﬂy retrace our steps so far.  Chapter 2 has outlined our theoretical 
framework, on which the present argument is based.  It has outlined basic tenets of 
Conceptual Semantics and introduced theoretical apparatus.  Two basic tenets of Conceptual 
Semantics are (i) that it is a mentalistic theory, and (ii) that it assumes that meaning is 
decompositional; the semantic representation of a given sentence consists of functions and 
arguments that they take.  Arguments bear semantic roles.  This chapter has deﬁned binding 
in conceptual semantics terms and proposed conceptual structures shared by PH and PH-DOC 
on the one hand, and EH and EH-DOC on the other.  The proposed conceptual structures 
have the function EXP(ERIENCE) embedding under it a location-denoting structure, namely 
[Y BE [AT X]].  In the framework of Conceptual Semantics, binding relations are 
represented over conceptual structure.  This chapter has also deﬁned the Possessor and 
Experiencer2 roles.  Possessor is taken by the ﬁrst argument of the function EXP of the 
conceptual structures for PH and PH-DOC; the Possessor argument binds the ﬁrst argument of 
BE.  Experiencer2, on the other hand, is taken by the ﬁrst argument of EXP of the conceptual 
structures for EH and EH-DOC; the Experiencer2 argument binds the complement of AT.  
These speciﬁcations are s(emantic)-selections of the ﬁrst arguments of EXP and are 
represented at the level of conceptual structure.   
     Chapter 3 has been concerned with previous claims/studies pertaining to have.  It has 
ﬁrst overviewed two often-made claims concerning have constructions: (i) one is that the 
subject arguments of PH and EH are (human) locations; in terms of semantic roles, they bear 
only the Location role and do not take any other semantic role, and (ii) the other is that English 
have has no semantics at all, and the interpretation of a given have sentence is completely 
determined by the values of its arguments.  At the end of this chapter, we overviewed 
another often-made claim that the construction that we call here PH can be divided into two 
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subclasses, regarding the so-called relationality of a noun in object position.  The PH taking a 
so-called non-relational noun as the surface object is said to denote alienable possession, while 
the PH taking a so-called relational noun as the surface object is said to denote inalienable 
possession.  This claim entails that the two PHs differ in the volitionality of the subject 
arguments: the subject of the PH denoting alienable possession refers to a volitional entity, 
whereas that of the PH denoting inalienable possession refers to a non-volitional entity.  This 
claim also seems to entail that the subject arguments of the two PHs bear two different 
semantic roles.  Contrary to this claim, which is argued for by several previous studies (e.g. 
Belvin (1993), Harley (1998)), I have demonstrated that there is only one PH, and that the 
subject argument of PH does not exhibit any volition.  In terms of semantic roles, the subject 
argument of PH bears one and the same semantic role regardless of the relationality of a noun 
in the object NP.   
     Based on the discussions in chapters 2 and 3, chapter 4 has accounted for many 
different phenomena exhibited by PH and EH.  This chapter has answered the questions 
raised in the previous chapter: (i) the question of whether or not the subject arguments of PH 
and EH bear only the Location role, and (ii) the question of whether or not have has any 
meaning at all. 
     The subject arguments of both PH and EH bear not only the Location role but also the 
Experiencer role.  Some phenomena exhibited by PH and EH can be accounted for by 
assuming that the subject arguments are locations.  In other words, some phenomena can be 
explained by assuming the [Y BE [AT X]] parts in the conceptual structures for PH and EH.   
     The other phenomena can be accounted for by assuming that the subject arguments bear 
the Experiencer role.  In other words, the other phenomena can be explained by considering 
the binding relations between the ﬁrst argument of EXP and the ﬁrst argument of BE or the 
complement of AT.  The binding relations are constructional meanings of PH and EH.  
178  
Brugman (1988: 51) notes that “having either a general or an abstract meaning is not the same 
as having no meaning,” and we have followed her in this respect.  Nakau (1998) argues that 
EH is an Experiencer construction.  This thesis argues that not only EH but also PH is an 
Experiencer construction.   
     Chapter 5 has explained many different phenomena demonstrated by PH-DOC and 
EH-DOC.  The conceptual structures for both PH-DOC and EH-DOC have the 
location-denoting structure [Y BE [AT X]] embedded under the function EXP, entailing that 
they have locative characteristics, as well as characteristics expressed by the binding relation 
between the ﬁrst argument of EXP and its second argument.  Some phenomena exhibited by 
PH-DOC and EH-DOC can be explained by considering the [Y BE [AT X]] parts of their 
conceptual structures; the other phenomena can be accounted for by considering the binding 
relations between the ﬁrst argument of EXP and the ﬁrst argument of BE or the complement 
of AT.   
     This chapter has also argued for the claim that the DOC and the corresponding 
prepositional phrase construction (PPC) encode distinct meanings.  In terms of conceptual 
structure, they have different conceptual structures.  The DOC is associated with the caused 
possession meaning.  By caused possession, I mean the bringing about of a relation between 
the subject and the elements following the verb; the DOC is not associated with the meaning 
of transfer.  On the other hand, the PPC is associated with the caused motion meaning.  
Caused motion entails that an agent transfers a theme along a path to a goal (Goldberg 
(1995)).   
 
6.2.  Future Research 
     Let me conclude this thesis by pointing out issues for future research.  There seem to 
be many other predicates encoding referential dependency.  It seems that predicates like the 
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following encode binding relations in the sense of this thesis: need, want, require, would like, 
hope for, and feel a need for.  Taking need and want for examples, it has been pointed out by 
several previous studies that need NP and want NP denote propositions whose interpretation is 
obtained by assuming the presence of a have-like predicate (McCawley (1974), Ross (1976), 
Larson et al. (1997), Harley (2004), Marušič and Žaucer (2006), Schwarz (2006), Beavers et 
al. (2008), Harves (2008), Harves and Kayne (2012), etc.).  For example, the sentences in 
(2a) and (3a) are understood as meaning (2b) and (3b), respectively: 
 
 (2) a.  Harry needs a new car. 
  b.  Harry needs to have a new car.  
 (3) a.  Harry wants a new car. 
  b.  Harry wants to have a new car. 
 
     In our framework, the use of need and want exempliﬁed in (2a) and (3a) may be 
analyzed as having conceptual structures similar to that of PH.  For example, sentence (4a) is 
interpreted as denoting situations described by sentence (4b):   
 
 (4) a.  He {needs / wants} a {house / wife}. 
  b.  Hei {needs / wants} a {house / wife} of hisi own.  
 
The surface object in (4a) is referentially dependent on the subject referent.  This relation is 
more clearly observed in the sentence in (5), where there is a universal quantiﬁer in the subject 
position:   
 
 (5)   Everyone {needs / wants} a {house / wife}.   
180  
Each member of the set denoted by the quantiﬁer in the sentence in (5) needs or wants a house 
or wife different from any other member’s in the same set.  The value of the direct object in 
(5) covaries with the value of the subject.   
     Furthermore, these predicates exhibit a similar behavior to that of EH.  Consider (6):   
 
 (6) a.  Hei {needs / wants} a desk in hisi room.  
  b.  Everyonei {needs / wants} a copy of the paper on hisi desk.   
 
Sentence (6a) parallels instances of EH such as Hei has a hole in hisi shoe, in that the PP 
contains a pronoun that refers back to the subject.  The identity of the room in (6a) is 
determined by the identity of the subject referent.  This relation is more clearly observed in 
the sentence in (6b), where there is a universal quantiﬁer in the subject position.  In this case, 
the value of the complement of the preposition covaries with the value of the subject.   
     Sentence (7a) can also be analyzed as analogous to EH: 
 
 (7) a.  I {need / want} a desk in Mary’s room. 
  b. * I don’t know Maryi at all.  I don’t bear any relation whatsoever to heri.  
That is, I am not a father, boyfriend, friend, teacher, or boss to heri.  (Now) I 
{need / want} a desk in heri room.   
 
Sentence (7a) can only be uttered in a situation in which Mary’s identity is determined by the 
identity of the subject, for example, in a situation in which Mary is a daughter of the subject 
referent’s.  When there is no such connection between the subject referent and Mary, 
sentence (7a) is not acceptable.  This is illustrated in the data in (7b).  
     Sentences such as (7a) contrast with sentences such as (8), whose PPs do not include an 
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element depending on the subject with respect to its identiﬁcation.  Observe (8) and (9):  
 
 (8) a.  I put a book on Mary’s desk. 
  b.  I hid a book behind Mary’s desk.  
 (9)   I didn’t know Maryi at all.  I didn’t bear any relation whatsoever to heri.  
That is, I was not a father, boyfriend, friend, teacher, or boss to heri.  
Yesterday, I {put / hid} a book {on / behind} heri desk.  
 
One can put or hide something behind anyone’s desk.  Thus, verbs like put and hide are not 
constrained in the same way as verbs like need and want are.   
     Predicates like get, ﬁnd, seek, choose, select, pick, pick out, and hire are also known as 
demonstrating a have-like behavior (Burton (1995), Kobukata (2004), Marušič and Žaucer 
(2006)).  For example, the sentences in (10), with the verb hire, behave like PH:   
 
 (10) a.  Mike hired a secretary.   
  b.  Everyone hired a secretary.   
 
Sentence (10a) describes a situation where Mike hired a secretary of his own.  This relation is 
more clearly observed in sentence (10b), where there is a universal quantiﬁer in the subject 
position.  Each member of the set denoted by the quantiﬁer in sentence (10b) hired a 
secretary of his or her own.  Thus, the conceptual structure for predicates like hire may 
perhaps have characteristics analogous to that for PH.   
     Predicates such as need, want, and hire seem to encode referential dependency of one 
element upon another; these predicates may also constitute a category whose members 
lexicalize referential dependency.  In line with the have constructions and the two uses of the 
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DOC, it may be reasonable to assume that there is an anaphor in the semantic representations 
of these predicates; the semantic representations for predicates like these may be associated 
with referential dependency.   
     We have examined PH, EH, PH-DOC, and EH-DOC, all of which encode referential 
dependency of one element upon another.  We have argued that these constructions cannot 
be fully understood unless one examines their semantic speciﬁcations; they all encode 
referential dependency of one element upon another, and it is best represented at the level of 
conceptual structure.  My immediate hope is that the conceptual semantics approach adopted 
here will act as a stimulus for more research for clarifying the nature of referentially dependent 
expressions and constructions containing those expressions.  
 
 
183  
References 
 
Akashi, Hiromitsu (2005) Give-bun no Kotai Kanosei ni Tsuite (On the Interchangebility of 
Sentences with the Verb Give), Eigo Goho Bunpo Kenkyu 12, 63-79. 
Anderson, John M. (1971) The Grammar of Case: Towards a Localistic Theory, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge.   
Aoun, Joseph and Yen-hui Audrey Li (1989) “Scope and Constituency,” Linguistic Inquiry 20, 
141-172.   
Arad, Maya (1998) VP-Structure and the Syntax-Lexicon Interface, MIT Working Papers in 
Linguistics.   
Authier, Marc and Lisa Reed (1991) “Ergative Predicates and Dative Cliticization in French 
Causatives,” Linguistic Inquiry 22, 197-205. 
Bach, Emmon (1967) “Have and Be in English Syntax,” Language 43, 462-485.   
Baker, Carl L. (1995) “Contrast, Discourse Prominence, and Intensiﬁcation, with Special 
Reference to Locally Free Reﬂexives in British English,” Language 71, 63-101. 
Baker, Mark C. (1988) Incorporation, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.  
Baker, Mark C. (1996) “On the Structural Positions of Themes and Goals,” Phrase Structure 
and the Lexicon, ed. by Johan Rooryck and Laurie Zauring, 7-34, Kluwer, Dordrecht.   
Baker, Mark C. (1997) “Thematic Roles and Syntactic Structure,” Elements of Grammar, ed. 
by Liliane Haegeman, 73-137, Kluwer, Dordrecht.  
Barker, Chris (1995) Possessive Descriptions, CSLI Publications, Stanford, CA. 
Beavers, John, Elias Ponvert, and Stephen Wechsler (2008) “Possession of a Controlled 
Substantive: Light Have and Verbs of Possession,” SALT XVIII, 108-125.    
Beck, Sigrid and Kyle Johnson (2004) “Double Objects Again,” Linguistic Inquiry 35, 
97-123. 
184  
Belvin, Robert (1993) “The Two Causative Haves Are the Two Possessive Haves,” CLS 29, 
61-75. 
Belvin, Robert and Marcel den Dikken (1997) “There, Happens, To, Be, Have,” Lingua 101, 
151-183.  
Benveniste, Emile (1966) Problémes de Linguistique Genérale (Problems in General 
Linguistics), Gallimard, Paris. [Translated into English by Mary Elizabeth Meek and 
Published as Problems in General Linguistics, University of Miami Press, Coral Gables, 
Florida, 1971.] 
Bresnan, Joan and Jonni M. Kanerva (1992) “The Thematic Hierarchy and Locative Inversion 
in UG: A Reply to Paul Schachter’s Comments,” Syntax and Semantics 26: Syntax and 
the Lexicon, ed. by Tim Stowell and Eric Wehrli, 111-125, Academic Press, New York.  
Bresnan, Joan, Anna Cueni, Tatiana Nikitina, and R. Harald Baayen (2007) “Predicting the 
Dative Alternation,” Cognitive Foundations of Interpretation, 69-94, Royal Netherlands 
Academy of Arts and Sciences. 
Bresnan, Joan and Tatiana Nikitina (2010) “The Gradience of the Dative Alternation,” Reality 
Exploration and Discovery: Pattern Interaction in Language and Life, ed. by Lian Hee 
Wee and Linda Uyechi, 161-184, CSLI Publications, Stanford, CA.   
Bruening, Benjamin (2010a) “Double Object Constructions Disguised as Prepositional 
Datives,” Linguistic Inquiry 41, 287-305.   
Bruening, Benjamin (2010b) “Ditransitive Asymmetries and a Theory of Idiom Formation,” 
Linguistic Inquiry 41, 519-562.   
Brugman, Claudia M. (1988) The Syntax and Semantics of HAVE and Its Complements, 
Doctoral dissertation, University of California, Berkeley. 
Brunson, Barbara and Elizabeth Cowper (1992) “On the Topic of Have,” Proceedings of CLA 
Annual Conference, Toronto Working Papers in Linguistics, Universitiy of Toronto, 
185  
43-52.  
Burton, Strang C. (1995) Six Issues to Consider in Choosing a Husband: Possessive Relations 
in the Lexical Semantic Structures of Verbs, Doctoral dissertation, The State University 
of New Jersey.   
Butt, Miriam, Mary Dalrymple, and Anette Frank (1997) “An Architecture for Linking 
Theory in LFG,” The LFG 97 Conference.  
Cantrall, Williams R. (1974) Viewpoint, Reﬂexives, and the Nature of Noun Phrases, Mouton, 
The Hague. 
Carlson, Greg N. (1987) “Same and Different: Some Consequences for Syntax and 
Semantics,” Linguistic and Philosophy 10, 531-565. 
Clark, Eve V. (1978) “Locationals: Existential, Locative and Possessive Constructions,” 
Universal of Human Language Volume 4: Syntax, ed. by Joseph H. Greenberg, Charles 
A. Ferguson, and Edith A. Moravcsik, 85-126, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA. 
Colleman, Timothy (2006) De Nederlandse Datiefalternantie: Een Constructioneel en 
Corpusgebaseerd Onderzoek [The Dative Alternation in Dutch: A Constructional and 
Corpus-based Study], Doctoral dissertation, Ghent University.  
Colleman, Timothy and Bernard De Clerck (2008) “Accounting for Ditransitive Constructions 
with Envy and Forgive,” Functions of Language 15, 187-215.   
Colleman, Timothy and Bernard De Clerck (2009) “Caused Motion? The Semantics of the 
English To-Dative and the Dutch Aan-Dative” Cognitive Linguistics 20, 5-42.   
Costa, Rachel M. B. (1974) A Generative Semantic Study of the Verb Have, Doctoral 
dissertation, University of Michigan. 
Cowper, Elizabeth (1989) “Thematic Underspeciﬁcation: The Case of Have,” Toronto 
Working Papers in Linguistics 10, 85-93.   
Croft, William A. (2003) “Lexical Rules vs. Constructions: A False Dichotomy,” Motivation 
186  
in Language: Studies in Honor of Günter Radden, ed. by Hubert Cuyckens, Thomas 
Berg, René Dirven and Klaus-Uwe Panther, 49-68, John Benjamins, 
Amsterdam/Philadelphia.   
Culicover, Peter and Ray Jackendoff (1995) “Something Else for the Binding Theory,” 
Linguistic Inquiry 26, 249-275.   
Culicover, Peter and Ray Jackendoff (2005) Simpler Syntax, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Culicover, Peter (2009) Natural Language Syntax, Oxford University Press, Oxford.  
Déchaine, Rose-Marie, Teun Hoekstra, and Johan Rooryck (1995) “Augmented and 
Non-augmented HAVE,” Proceedings of Langue et Grammaire 1, 85-101. 
de Jong, Franciska (1987) “The Compositional Nature of (In)deﬁniteness,” The 
Representation of (In)deﬁniteness, ed. by Eric J. Reuland and Alice G. B. ter Meulen, 
270-285, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
Freeze, Ray (1992) “Existentials and Other Locatives,” Language 68, 553-595. 
Givón, Talmy (1975) “Cause and Control: On the Semantics of Interpersonal Manipulation,” 
Syntax and Semantics 4, ed. by John P. Kimball, 59-89, Academic Press, New York.   
Goldberg, Adele E. (1992) “The Inherent Semantics of Argument Structure: The Case of the 
English Ditransitive Construction,” Cognitive Linguistics 3, 37-74. 
Goldberg, Adele E. (1995) Constructions, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
Goldsmith, John (1980) “Meaning and Mechanism in Grammar,” Harvard Studies in Syntax 
and Semantics, ed. by Susumu Kuno, 423-449, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.   
Green, Georgia M. (1974) Semantics and Syntactic Regularity, Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington. 
Grimshaw, Jane (1990) Argument Structure, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.   
Gropen, Jess, Steven Pinker, Michelle Hollander, Richard Goldberg, and Ronald Wilson 
(1989) “The Learnability and Acquisition of the Dative Alternation in English,” 
187  
Language 65, 203-257. 
Gruber, Jeffrey (1965) Studies in Lexical Relations, Doctoral dissertation, MIT. [Published as 
part of Lexical Structures in Syntax and Semantics by North-Holland, Amsterdam, 
1976.] 
Guéron, Jacqueline (1995) “On HAVE and BE,” NELS 25, 191-206.   
Guéron, Jacqueline (2003) “Inalienable Possession and the Interpretation of Determiners,” 
From NP to DP Volume 2: The Expression of Possession in Noun Phrases, ed. by 
Martine Coene and Yves D’hulst, 189-220, John Benjamins, Amsterdam/Philadelphia.  
Hale, Kenneth and Samuel Jay Keyser (1993) “On Argument Structure and the Lexical 
Expression of Syntactic Relations,” The View from Building 20, ed. by Kenneth Hale 
and Samuel Jay Keyser, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.  
Harley, Heidi (1995) Subjects, Events and Licensing, Doctoral dissertation, MIT.  
Harley, Heidi (1997) “Logophors, Variable Binding and the Interpretation of Have,” Lingua 
103, 75-84.  
Harley, Heidi (1998) “You’re Having Me on! Aspects of Have,” La Grammaire de la 
Possession (The Grammar of Possession), ed. by Jacqueline Guéron and Anne 
Zribi-Hertz, 195-226, Université Paris X, Nanterre. 
Harley, Heidi (2003) “Possession and the Double Object Construction,” Linguistic Variation 
Yearbook 2, ed. by Pierre Pica and Johan Rooryck, 31-70, John Benjamins, 
Amsterdam/Philadelphia.   
Harley, Heidi (2004) “Wanting, Having, and Getting: A Note on Fodor and Lepore 1998,” 
Linguistic Inquiry 35, 255-267. 
Harves, Stephanie (2008) “Intensional Transitives and Silent HAVE: Distinguishing between 
Want and Need,” Proceedings of the 27th West Coast Conference on Formal Linguistics, 
211-219. 
188  
Harves, Stephanie and Richard Kayne (2012) “Having Need and Needing Have,” Linguistic 
Inquiry 43, 120-132. 
Hawkins, John A. (1994) A Performance Theory of Word Order and Constituency, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.   
Heine, Bernd (1997) Possession: Cognitive Sources, Forces, and Grammaticalization, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Helke, Michael (1973) “On Reﬂexives in English.” Linguistics 106, 5-23.  
Hirose, Yukio (2009) “Washashijisei to Shiten to Taihi - Nichieigo Saikidaimeishi no 
Imikakucho no Shikumi - (Logophoricity, Point of View, and Contrast - The System 
of Semantic Extension of Reﬂexive Pronouns in Japanese and English),” ‘Uchi’ to 
‘Soto’ no Gengogaku (Linguistics on ‘Inside’ and ‘Outside’), ed. by Atsuro 
Tsubomoto, Naoko Hayase, and Naoaki Wada, 147-173, Kaitakusha, Tokyo. 
Ichijo, Yuya (2011) “Jisho Meidai・Hijisho Meidaino Have Shoyubun (The Possessive Have 
Constructions Expressing Eventive Proposition and Non-eventive Proposition),” Eigo 
Goho Bunpo Kenkyu 18, 79-93. 
Iwata, Seizi (2014) “He Laughed His Head Off - Goi·Kobunteki Apurochi (He Laughed His 
Head Off - A Lexical, Constructional Approach),” Paper presented at the 35th Annual 
Meeting of Tsukuba English Linguistics Society.   
Jackendoff, Ray (1983) Semantics and Cognition, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
Jackendoff, Ray (1987) “The Status of Thematic Relations in Linguistic Theory,” Linguistic 
Inquiry 18, 369-411. 
Jackendoff, Ray (1990) Semantic Structures, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
Jackendoff, Ray (2002) Foundations of Language, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Jackendoff, Ray (2007) Language, Consciousness, Culture, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
Jackendoff, Ray (2009) “The Parallel Architecture and Its Place in Cognitive Science,” 
189  
Oxford Handbook of Linguistic Analysis, ed. by Berrnd Heine and Heiko Narrog, 
583-605, Oxford University Press, Oxford.   
Jackendoff, Ray, J. Maling, and A. Zaenen (1993) “Home Is Subject to Principle A,” 
Linguistic Inquiry 24, 173-177. 
Jelinek, Eloise and Maryann Willie (1996) “Psych verbs in Navajo,” Athabaskan Language 
Studies: Essays in Honor of Robert W. Young, ed. by Eloise Jelinek, Sally Midgette, 
Keren Rice, and Leslie Saxon, 15-34, University of New Mexico Press, Albuquerque.   
Kaga, Nobuhiro (2007) Thematic Structure: A Theory of Argument Linking and Comparative 
Syntax, Kaitakusha, Tokyo.   
Kageyama, Taro (1996) Doshi Imiron: Gengo to Ninchi no Setten (Verb Semantics: The 
Language-Cognition Interface), Kurosio, Tokyo. 
Kayne, Richard (1993) “Toward a Modular Theory of Auxiliary Selection,” Studia 
Linguistica 47, 3-31.   
Kishimoto, Hideki (2000) “Locational Verbs, Agreement, and Object Shift in Japanese,” The 
Linguistic Review 17, 53-109. 
Kobukata, Yuko (2004) “The Deﬁniteness Effect of Have and Other Possessive Verbs,” 
Tsukuba English Studies 23, 27-42.   
Koizumi, Masatoshi (1995) Phrase Structure in Minimalist Syntax, Doctoral dissertation, 
MIT.  
Krifka, Manfred (1999) “Manner in Dative Alternation,” WCCFL 18, 260-271, Cascadilla 
Press, Somerville, MA.  
Krifka, Manfred (2001) “Lexical Representations and the Nature of the Dative Alternation,” 
Paper presented at DIP Colloquium, University of Amsterdam.   
Krifka, Manfred (2004) “Semantic and Pragmatic Conditions for the Dative Alternation,” 
Korean Journal of English Language and Linguistics 4, 1-32. 
190  
Kuno, Susumu (1987) Functional Syntax: Anaphora, Discourse and Empathy, University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago. 
Lakoff, George and Marc Johnson (1980) Metaphors We Live By, University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago.   
Landau, Idan (2010) The Locative Syntax of Experiencers, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.   
Langacker, Ronald W. (1991) Concept, Image, and Symbol: The Cognitive Basis of Grammar. 
Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin/New York.   
Langacker, Ronald W. (1993) “Reference-Point Constructions,” Cognitive Linguistics 4, 1-38. 
Langacker, Ronald W. (1995) “Possession and Possessive Constructions,” Language and the 
Cognitive Construal of the World, ed. by John R. Taylor and Robert E. MacLaury, 
51-79, Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin/New York.   
Langacker, Ronald W. (2003) “Strategies of Clausal Possession,” International Journal of 
English Studies 3, 1-24.   
Larson, Richard (1988) “On the Double Object Construction,” Linguistic Inquiry 19, 335-391. 
Larson, Richard (1990) “Double Objects Revisited: Reply to Jackendoff,” Linguistic Inquiry 
21, 589-632.   
Larson, Richard, Marcel den Dikken, and Peter Ludlow (1997) “Intensional Transitive Verbs 
and Abstract Clausal Complementation,” Ms., Stony Brook University and CUNY. 
Leech, Geoffrey N. (1980) Explorations in Semantics and Pragmatics, John Benjamins, 
Amsterdam/Philadelphia. 
Levinson, Lisa (2005) “To in Two Places in the Dative Alternation,” The 28th Annual Penn 
Linguistics Colloquium (Penn Working Papers in Linguistics 11) ed. by Sudha 
Arunachalam, Tatjana Schefﬂer, Sandhya Sundaresan and Joshua Tauberer, 155–168, 
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA.   
191  
Levinson, Steven C. (2000) Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of Generalized 
Conversational Implicature, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.   
Löbner, Sebastian (1985) “Deﬁnites,” Journal of Semantics 4, 279-326. 
Lyons, John (1967) “A Note on Possessive, Existential and Locative Sentences,” Foundations 
of Language 3, 390-396.   
Lyons, John (1977) Semantics (volume 2), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.   
Marušič, Frank and Rok Žaucer (2006) “On the Complement of the Intensional Transitive 
Want,” Stony Brook Occasional Papers in Linguistics, Volume 1: Intensionality and 
Sentential Complementation, 128-151.   
McCawley, James D. (1974) “On Identifying the Remains of Deceased Clauses,” Language 
Research 9, 73-85. 
McCloskey, James and Peter Sells (1988) “Control and A-chains in Modern Irish,” Natural 
Language and Linguistic Theory 6, 143-189.   
McIntyre, Andrew (2006) “The Interpretation of German Datives and English Have,” Datives 
and Other Cases, ed. by Daniel Hole, André Meinunger, and Werner Abraham, 
185-212, John Benjamins, Amsterdam/Philadelphia.  
Mitchell, Jonathan Edward (1986) The Formal Semantics of Point of View, Doctoral 
dissertation, University of Massachusetts.  
Mohanan, Tara Warrier (1994) Argument Structure in Hindi, CSLI Publications, Stanford, 
CA. 
Morita, Joe (2003) “On the Structure and (Un)passivizability of Contain,” English Linguistics 
20, 169-196. 
Nakau, Minoru (1991) “Keiken no HAVE (Experiencer Have),” Gendai Eigogaku no Ayumi 
(Footsteps of Modern Linguistics: Festschrift for Prof. Yasui Minoru on His Seventieth 
Birthday), 333-342, Kaitakusya, Tokyo.  
192  
Nakau, Minoru (1994) Ninchi Imiron no Genri (Principles of Cognitive Semantics), 
Taishukan, Tokyo.  
Nakau, Minoru (1998) “Kukan to Sonzai no Kozu (Schema of Space and Existence),” Kobun 
to Zishokozo (Constructions and Event Structure), by Minoru Nakau and Yoshiki 
Nishimura, 1-106, Kenkyusha, Tokyo. 
Oehrle, Richard (1976) The Grammatical Status of the English Dative Alternation, Doctoral 
dissertation, MIT.  
Ormazabal, Javier and Juan Romero (2010) “The Derivation of Dative Alternations,” 
Argument Structure and Syntactic Relations: A Cross-Linguistic Perspective, ed by 
Maia Duguine, Susana Huidobro, and Nerea Madariaga, 203-232, John Benjamins, 
Amsterdam/Philadelphia. 
Ormazabal, Javier and Juan Romero (2012) “PPs without Disguises: Reply to Bruening,” 
Linguistic Inquiry 43, 455-474.   
Ostler, Nicholas (1979) Case-linking: A Theory of Case and Verb Diathesis Applied to 
Classical Sanskrit, Doctoral dissertation, MIT.   
Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries: http://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com   
Partee, Barbara H. (1989) “Binding Implicit Variables in Quantiﬁed Contexts,” CLS 25, 
342-365.   
Partee, Barbara H. (1997) “Appendix B. Genitives - A Case Study (by B. Partee),” Handbook 
of Logic and Language, ed. by Johan van Benthem and Alice ter Meulen, 464-470, 
Elsevier and MIT Press, Amsterdam and Cambridge, Mass.    
Partee, Barbara H. (1999) “Weak NP’s in HAVE Sentences,” JFAK, CD-Rom, ed. by J. 
Gerbrandy, M. Marx, M. de Rijke, and Y. Venema, University of Amsterdam, 
Amsterdam.  
Partee, Barbara H. and Vladimir Borschev (1998) “Integrating Lexical and Formal Semantics: 
193  
Genitives, Relational Nouns, and Type-Shifting,” Proceedings of the 2nd Tbilisi 
Symposium on Language, Logic, and Computation, 229-241.    
Payne, Doris L. (2009) “Is Possession Mere Location? Contrary Evidence from Maa,” The 
Expression of Possession, ed. by William B. McGregor, 107-142, Mouton De Gruyter, 
Berlin/New York.   
Pesetsky, David (1995) Zero Syntax, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.   
Pinker, Steven (1989) Learnability and Cognition: The Acquisition of Argument Structure, 
MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
Pylkkänen, Liina (2008) Introducing Arguments, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.   
Rappaport Hovav, Malka and Beth Levin (2007) “The English Dative Alternation: The Case 
for Verb Sensitivity,” ms., Stanford University, <http://web.stanford.edu/~bclevin 
 /dat07> 
Rappaport Hovav, Malka and Beth Levin (2008) “The English Dative Alternation: The Case 
for Verb Sensitivity,” Journal of Linguistics 44, 129-167. 
Reddy, Michael (1979) “The Conduit Metaphor - A Case of Frame Conﬂict in Our Language 
about Language,” Metaphor and Thought, ed. by Andrew Ortony, 284-324, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge.   
Reinhart, Tanya and Eric Reuland (1993) “Reﬂexivity,” Linguistic Inquiry 24, 657-720. 
Ritter, Elizabeth and Sara T. Rosen (1997) “The Function of Have,” Lingua 101, 295-321.  
Ross, John R. (1970) “On Declarative Sentences,” Readings in English Transformational 
Grammar, ed. by Roderick A. Jacobs and Peter S. Rosenbaum, 222-272, Ginn and 
Company, Waltham, MA. 
Ross, John R. (1976) “To Have Have and to Not Have Have,” Linguistic and Literary Studies 
in Honor of Archibald A. Hill 1, ed. by  Mohammad Ali Jazayery, Edgar C. Polomé, and 
Werner Winter , 263-270, Mouton, The Hague. 
194  
Schwarz, Florian (2006) On Needing Propositions and Looking for Properties,” SALT XVI 
Conference Proceedings, ed. by M. Gibson and J. Howell, 259-276, Cornell University, 
Ithaca, NY. 
Shibatani, Masayoshi (1978) Nihongo no Bunseki (Analyses of Japanese), Taishukan, Tokyo. 
Snyder, Kieran M. (2003) The Relationship between Form and Function in Ditransitive 
Constructions, Doctoral dissertation, University of Pennsylvania. 
Speas, Margaret (1990) “Comments on Papers by James Gair, Yamura Kachru, and K. P. and 
Tara Mohanan,” Experiencer Subjects in South Asian Languages, ed. by Manindra K. 
Verma and K. P. Mohanan, 77-83, CSLI Publications, Stanford, CA. 
Talmy, Leonard (1983) “How Language Structures Space,” Spatial Orientation: Theory, 
Research, and Application, ed. by Herbert L. Pick and Linda P. Acredolo, 225-282, 
Plenum Press, New York.   
Talmy, Leonard (2000) Toward a Cognitive Semantics, Volume 1: Typology and Process in 
Concept Structuring, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
Takeuchi, Shiro (2011) Possessive Have and Existential Have, unpublished MA thesis, 
Reitaku University.   
Takeuchi, Shiro (2013a) “Nichieigo niokeru Goi·Kobun·Danwa no Kankeisei (The 
Relationship between Words, Constructions, and Discourses in Japanese and English),” 
Report of a Linguistics Project at Linguistic Research Center at Reitaku University, 
59-70, Reitaku University.   
Takeuchi, Shiro (2013b) “The (Un)passivizability of Have, Own, and Possess,” JELS 30, 
341-347. 
Takeuchi, Shiro (2013c) “The Licensing Condition for Experiencer Have,” JELS 30, 208-214. 
Takeuchi, Shiro (2014) “A Note on the Possessive Use of Have: Is the Possessor Volitional or 
Not?,” Tsukuba English Studies 33, 1-13.   
195  
Takeuchi, Shiro (to appear) “On the English Dative Alternation: Arguing for the Multiple 
Meaning Approach,” JELS 33.   
Takezawa, Koichi (2003) “Aru to Have/Be no Togoron (The Syntax of Aru and Have/Be),” 
Gengo 32, 61-68. 
Tham, Shiao Wei (2005) Representing Possessive Predication: Semantic Dimensions and 
Pragmatic Bases, Doctoral dissertation, Stanford University. 
Tham, Shiao Wei (2006) “The Deﬁniteness Effect in English Have Sentences,” Proceedings 
of the 2004 Texas Linguistics Society Conference, 137-149.  
Tham, Shiao Wei (2009) “A Conceptual (Re)Interpretation of the Possessor-as-Location 
Hypothesis,” ms., Wellesley College, <http://www.wellesley.edu/sites/default/ﬁles 
 /assets/departments/eall/ﬁles/stham-possloc.pdf> 
Van Belle, W. and W. Van Langendonck (1996) “The Indirect Object in Dutch,” The Dative 
Volume 1: Descriptive Studies, ed. by W. Van Belle and W. Van Langendonck, 
217-250, John Benjamins, Amsterdam/Philadelphia.    
Van Valin, Robert, Jr. and Randy Lapolla (1997) Syntax: Structure, Meaning and Function, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Verma, Manindra K. and K. P. Mohanan eds. (1990) Experiencer Subjects in South Asian 
Languages, CSLI Publications, Stanford, CA.   
Vikner, Carl and Per Anker Jensen (2002) “A Semantic Analysis of the English Genitive. 
Interaction of Lexical and Formal Semantics,” Studia Linguistica 56, 191-226.  
Washio, Ryuichi (1997) “Tadosei to Voisu no Taikei (Transitivity and the System of Voice),” 
Voisu to Asupekuto (Voice and Aspect) by Ryuichi Washio and Ken-ichi Mihara, 
1-106, Kenkyusya, Tokyo.  
Wasow, Thomas (2002) Postverbal Behavior, CSLI Publications, Stanford, CA. 
Williams, Edwin (1994) Thematic Structure in Syntax, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.  
196  
Zribi-Hertz, Anne (1989) “Anaphor Binding and Narrative Point of View: English Reﬂexive 
Pronouns in Sentence and Discourse,” Language 65, 695-727.   
Zribi-Hertz, Anne (1995) “Emphatic or Reﬂexive? On the Endophoric Character of French 
Lui-meme and Similar Complex Pronouns,” Journal of Linguistics 31, 333-374. 
